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INTRODUCTION
The United States government pursues its current "war on terror" and other
national security objectives abroad through an extraordinary range of extraterri-
torial military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic activity. According
to the Pentagon, the U.S. military currently operates in "[miore than 146
countries."' The FBI has forty-five foreign offices; the DEA has seventy-nine in
fifty-four countries. The exact extent of the overseas presence of the U.S.
intelligence community is not publicly disclosed, but is no doubt extensive.
Many aspects of the United States' extraterritorial security operations could
violate the Constitution if the affected noncitizens outside the United States had
individual constitutional rights. A large number of prominent legal academics-
whom I call globalists--contend that aliens outside the United States should
have such rights, at least in some circumstances, and that U.S. courts should
enforce constitutional limits on extraterritorial action by the U.S. government
against noncitizens. Given the number and eminence of the globalists, the vigor
of their arguments, and the frequency of their publications in the country's
leading law journals, it might be said that globalism is the emerging conven-
tional wisdom in the legal academy. In 2004, in Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme
Court hinted that it may agree with the globalists.3
This Article offers textual and historical arguments against a globalist reading
of the Constitution. I make the textual argument that globalist approaches to the
constitutional text err in two important ways: employing an unacknowledged
clear statement rule when reading the Bill of Rights, with a default presumption
that rights exist for aliens abroad unless expressly restricted; and reading the
Constitution clause-by-clause in isolation, rather than looking at the document
as a whole. I make the historical argument that globalist claims about the
1. See U.S. Dep't of Def., DoD 101: An Introductory Overview of the Department of Defense,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dodlO1/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
2. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Facts and Figures 2003, http://www.fbi.gov/priorities
priorities.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006); U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., DEA Domestic Office
Locations, http://www.usdoj.gov/dealagency/domesic.htm#foreign (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
3. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004). For a discussion of Rasul, see infra notes
73-76 and accompanying text.
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original intent of the Founders have not been supported with even minimally
sufficient evidence, and that the relevant evidence, once gathered, is inconsis-
tent with globalism. Although this Article rejects globalism on textual and
historical grounds, at the same time it adduces textual and historical evidence
that noncitizens were among the intended beneficiaries of important provisions
and structures in the Constitution and that aliens within the United States are to
be protected by the Constitution and Bill of Rights. But in contrast to global-
ism's desire to deploy a judicially enforced Constitution abroad, I argue that
noncitizens outside the United States are to be protected only by diplomacy,
treaties, the law of nations (today's customary international law), and nonconsti-
tutional policy choices of the political branches.
Part I, a background section, discusses the historical context out of which
globalism emerged, the modem variants of globalism, and the leading Supreme
Court cases. This Part highlights the stakes in the debate by showing that
globalism is inconsistent with entrenched legal positions taken by the political
branches of the U.S. government. It also introduces the important question of
constitutional method, asking what are more- versus less-legitimate ways to
interpret the Constitution. Part II categorizes globalist scholarship by its ap-
proach to constitutional history and text. One group of globalists makes an
original intent claim that the Bill of Rights was written in general language
because its protections were intended to be universal, unrestricted by territorial
location, in the United States or abroad, or personal status, be it citizen or alien.
The second, larger group of globalists who do not make an original intent claim
instead asserts or assumes that the text of the Bill of Rights is silent as to its
geographic and personal scope and so supports, or at least does not stand in the
way of, application of normative constitutional theories that would find rights
for aliens abroad.
Parts III through V are my positive reading of the Constitution, addressing
both text and pre- and post-ratification history. I should note at the outset that
the historical evidence I present from 1787 to 1789 is not direct, but circumstan-
tial. The historical sources with the most salience for orthodox practitioners of
original intent interpretation, such as the records of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, the ratification debates in the press and the state conventions in 1787-
1788, and the congressional and public discussion of the proposed Bill of
Rights, do not appear directly to discuss extraterritorial application of constitu-
tional rights for either citizens or aliens. Globalist scholars have not presented
any direct evidence from these sources, and my own research has not uncovered
any. While it is difficult to prove a negative, it appears that the issue was not
discussed at that time. I do not claim, therefore, to have located and crystallized
an original intent or original understanding of the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights at the moments of their adoption. (Globalists, too, should eschew any
such suggestion.) My more modest historical goal is to describe both the
20071
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"ambient law of the era" 4-the background assumptions and conceptions of the
Founding era regarding issues related to globalism-and the practice and
debates under the new Constitution in the 1790s and early decades of the
nineteenth century. Indeed, it is only in the nineteenth century and thereafter
that I have found direct evidence rejecting globalism.
To attempt to recover the intellectual context at and around the time of the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, Part III consults a
number of sources. English constitutional history, which was familiar to many
of the American public figures most involved in the framing and ratification
debates,5 provides context for some issues. Colonial charters of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and post-independence American state constitutions
are important sources for understanding the U.S. Constitution,6 as is the most
important precedent for the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation. Helpful
to understanding the political, legal, and constitutional context of the U.S.
Constitution are the writings of English Judges Coke and Blackstone and of
influential social contract, natural law, and law of nations theorists such as
Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Vattel, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Grotius, and Ruther-
forth.7 Finally, I look at evidence of constitutional meaning found in the
post-ratification history and traditions of the U.S. government from 1789 through
the first decades of the nineteenth century.
Part III addresses the contemporary context of thought and debate in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries regarding issues that bear on global-
ism, such as the rights of aliens, the territorial basis of law and sovereignty, and
distinctions between the sources and purposes of international law and domestic
law (known at the time as the law of nations and municipal law, respectively).
Part IV addresses the constitutional text by reading certain parts of the original
Constitution of 1787 and the subsequent Bill of Rights of 1789. I attempt to
show that globalism errs by reading the provisions of the Bill of Rights in
isolation from many other parts of the Constitution that inform its meaning,
such as the Preamble and the governmental structures for managing internal and
external affairs created by Articles I, II, and III. This Part shows that external
4. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
5. See FORREST McDoNALD, Novus ORo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECrUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
5-6 (1985) (noting that "most of the Framers" were familiar with the history of England "at least since
Elizabethan times" and that English constitutional history was an important guide to the shaping of the
new American Constitution). The American Founders would have learned English constitutional history
by reading Blackstone and Hume, see id. at 37 n.35, among other sources.
6. See, e.g., BERNARD SciwARTz, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF
RIGHTS 26-91 (Madison House 1992) (1977); Donald S. Lutz, Introductory Essay to COLONIAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN CONSITrUrTION, at xx-xxv (Donald S. Lutz ed., 1998).
7. Regarding the significant influence of these writers on the Founding generation, see BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOOICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-32 (1967); DONALD S. LUTZ, A
PREFACE TO AMERICAN POLmcAL THEORY 113-40 (1992); McDONALD, supra note 5, at 7, 60, 80; GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATON OF THE AMEauCAN REPUBLIC 259-305 (2d ed. 1998); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of
the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv.
843, 859-65 (1978).
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relations were to be managed by the political branches in a flexible manner,
consistent with national defense exigencies, treaties, and the law of nations.
This is inconsistent with globalism's call for a judicially enforceable Bill of
Rights to govern external relations with noncitizens. Part IV also shows that
globalists have not confronted the implications of the Constitution's domestic
limitation on the habeas suspension power (the constitutional text allows suspen-
sion only "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion,",8 which are domestic events). I
argue that the writ cannot exist in any situations where the political branches-
which are given the leading constitutional task of preserving and protecting the
Constitution, government, and people of the United States--cannot temporarily
suspend it if "the public Safety may require it."9 Because they cannot suspend
based on purely external threats, the writ should not be constitutionally pro-
tected on behalf of aliens abroad.
In Part V, I review evidence of constitutional meaning derived from early
practice of the U.S. government under the new Constitution. The evidence
supports the view that treaties, the law of nations, and U.S. statutes, not the Bill
of Rights, provided the law applicable to the United States' relations with
noncitizens outside the country.
I. BACKGROUND
Americans have long debated where, and for whose benefit, the Constitution
applies. Examples include the debates about the constitutional status of slaves
and ex-slaves, Indians, immigrants or would-be immigrants, residents of U.S.
territories destined for statehood, and residents of island possessions acquired
by the United States as a result of conquest (e.g., the Spanish-American War)
and not destined for U.S. statehood. 0
This Article is focused on the most recent instantiation of this larger debate
about the personal and territorial scope of U.S. constitutionalism, namely,
whether the Bill of Rights constrains U.S. military, law enforcement, intelli-
gence, or diplomatic operations against aliens abroad.' Simple fairness and
fidelity to the country's most enduring values might seem to dictate that any
person, anywhere, who is subject to coercive force by the United States should
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter NEUMAN,
STRANGERS]; Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1, 17 (2002).
11. By using terms like "abroad" and "extraterritorial," I am not referring to territories under the
pervasive and potentially indefinite governmental authority of the United States such as Puerto Rico
when, early in the last century, the United States colonized the island but had not yet granted U.S.
citizenship to its residents. Those situations are different from the type of episodic military, intelligence,
or law enforcement conduct addressed in this Article. Except for a brief mention in the Conclusion, I do
not discuss the so-called Insular Cases involving colonial administrations in Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), or the cases involving governments in U.S.
territories before they became states of the Union, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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be entitled to assert basic constitutional protections against government overreach-
ing. The United States was founded, after all, in protest against a distant English
king and Parliament that denied the colonists their rights as Englishmen and, in
the words of the Declaration of Independence, "transport[ed] us beyond Seas to
be tried for pretended offences" and "abdicat[ed] Government here, by declar-
ing us out of his Protection and waging War against us.' 12 In the face of this,
Americans rebelled, justifying their rebellion by declaring that "all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.,
13
From the beginning, Americans welcomed foreigners to emigrate here to enjoy
the opportunity and liberty they were creating. 14 America's first literary best
seller, Thomas Paine's enormously influential Common Sense, declared in 1776
that the new country should become "an asylum for mankind" where freedom
would flourish.' 5 And James Madison, 'hen advocating the adoption of the Bill
of Rights in Congress in 1789, stated that his proposals "expressly declare the
great rights of mankind."' 16 With these values and these beginnings as a nation,
one might argue that Americans would never have tolerated that the constitutive
document establishing their government deem a person entirely defenseless
against government power simply because of one's territorial location, in the
United States or abroad, or personal status, be it citizen or alien.
For globalists, this elementary idea of justice draws strength from the fact
that, today, U.S. citizens enjoy the full panoply of individual constitutional
rights when abroad and that aliens within the United States enjoy many constitu-
tional rights, including important due process rights against arbitrary detention
12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 21, 25 (U.S. 1776).
13. Id. para. 2.
14. The Declaration of Independence complained that George III "has endeavoured to prevent the
population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners;
refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither." Id. para. 9. Many Founders believed that
immigration would be a boon to the new nation. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Thomas
Jefferson (Jan. 1, 1788), in 8 THE DOCUtENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 282
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. At the Philadelphia Conven-
tion in 1787, James Madison advocated that Americans "invite foreigners of merit & republican
principles among us." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENnON OF 1787, at 268 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS]. Gouverneur Morris approvingly told the Convention that "the
privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us ... exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in
any part of the world." Id. at 238.
But not all Americans were so welcoming, even to white European immigrants. See JOHN C. MILLER,
CRISIS IN FREEDOM 43-44 (1951). Not surprisingly, immigration of criminals was discouraged. See, e.g.,
34 JouRNALs OF THE COrrNENrAL CONGRESS 528 (1788) (recommending that states legislate against
admission of "convicted malefactors"). And African "immigrants" were, of course, transported here in
slave galleys and viciously subjugated and abused for hundreds of years.
15. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 42 (Willey Book Co. 1942) (1776). Paine was not writing in favor
of immigration as such, but of America becoming a refuge for "freedom," which had been "hunted
round the globe" by tyrannous governments and expelled from Europe, Africa, and Asia. Id.
16. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 449 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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or punishment.17 Is it not, then, unfair and anomalous to leave only aliens who
happen to be abroad outside the protection of our fundamental law? One
globalist, Professor Kal Raustiala, argues that the notion that "constitutional
protections are completely inapplicable to non-citizens abroad... is clearly at
odds with the best spirit of our constitutional tradition."'18 In a similar vein, the
globalist Professor Louis Henkin asks, "[i]f constitutional limitations apply
wherever the United States exercises authority, why not when governmental
actions abroad affect aliens there? If constitutional provisions apply to both
aliens and citizens at home, why not to both aliens and citizens abroad?"' 9
Almost all of the modern scholarship is globalist, including important works
by influential academics such as Henkin, 20 Gerald Neuman, 21 David Cole,
George Fletcher, Jules Lobel, Jordan Paust, Kal Raustiala, and Stephen
Saltzburg.22 Former professor, now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, has also
expressed globalist views.23 Although globalists disagree among themselves
about the scope of extraterritorial constitutional protections for aliens, this
Article uses the single term "globalist" to contrast their position to the view that
the Constitution does not protect the individual rights of noncitizens abroad
17. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ThE U.S. CONSTITUTION 305-07 (2d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS].
18. Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag?: Iraq, the War on Terror, and the Reach
of the Law, FINDLAw'S WRIT (Apr. 9, 2003), http:llwrit.findlaw.comlcommentaryl20030409_raustiala.
html.
19. Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at
our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 23-24 (1985) [hereinafter Henkin, Compact].
20. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990) [hereinaf-
ter HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM]; HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 17; Henkin, Compact, supra note
19; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 721, 722 cmt. m (1987). Professor
Henkin was the chief reporter for the American Law Institute on the Restatement.
21. See, e.g., NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10; Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo
Loophole, 50 Lov. L. REv. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Neuman, Guantanamo]; Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterri-
torial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2073 (2005)
[hereinafter Neuman, Extraterritorial]; Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign
Relations, 2004 SuP. CT. REv. 111, 151 (2004) [hereinafter Neuman, Abiding]; Gerald L. Neuman,
Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) [hereinafter Neuman, Whose Constitution?].
22. See, e.g., David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 367, 370-73 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, Foreign Nationals]; David
Cole, Who They Are: The Double Standard that Underlies Our Torture Policies, SLATE, Nov. 11, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2130028 [hereinafter Cole, Double Standard]; Jules Lobel, The Constitution
Abroad, 83 Am. J. INr'L L. 871, 875-76 (1989); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions:
Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2001) [hereinafter Paust, Antiterrorism]; Jordan J. Paust,
Post-9/JJ Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons,
Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1335, 1350 (2004) [hereinafter Paust, Post-9/1l]; Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73
FoRDHAm L. REv. 2501, 2521-23 (2005); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond
the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 752-53 (1980). Professor Paul Stephan's
work is an anti-globalist exception. See Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on International
Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777 (1980); Paul B. Stephan Ili, Constitutional
Limits on the Struggle Against International Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19
CONN. L. REv. 831 (1987).
23. See infra note 99.
20071
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
whatsoever. For purposes of this Article, then, a globalist is one who advocates
that, in some or all circumstances, aliens abroad enjoy the same or similar
individual constitutional protections as American citizens would. This definition
necessarily, though regrettably, elides some distinctions among globalists.
For methodological purposes, I group globalists into two categories accord-
ing to their views of the constitutional history and text. One camp--exemplified
by Professor Henkin-claims that the original intent animating the Bill of
Rights, or at least many of its key provisions, was globalist and that this was
expressed in the general language of the Bill, unrestricted as it is by person or
place.24 According to Henkin, the Framers intended the Bill of Rights to
embody a "universal human rights ideology.,2 5 The other, larger camp of
globalists asserts or assumes that the constitutional text is silent or underspeci-
fled regarding whether it applies to aliens abroad, and that the Bill of Rights'
general, unrestricted language therefore does not stand in the way of normative
constitutional theories that produce globalist results.
There are many strains of non-originalist globalism; the breadth of the debate
can best be understood by looking to the work of Professor Neuman, the most
prolific non-originalist globalist scholar. Neuman describes three approaches
used to argue that the Constitution should reach aliens abroad: "universalism,"
"global due process," and "mutuality of obligation. 2 6 Universalism "require[s]
that constitutional provisions that create rights with no express limitations as to
the persons or places covered should be interpreted as applicable to every
person and at every place."27 As Neuman notes, universalism is often justified
by the historically important idea that all mankind has inalienable natural rights
against the government.28 When justified by reference to the Founders' alleged
belief in natural rights of all mankind, as it is by Professors Henkin and Lobel
and Justice Ginsburg, globalist universalism is originalism. Global due process
is a balancing approach, reducing the availability of constitutional protections
for aliens abroad in situations where the U.S. "government[ has a] reduced right
to obedience and reduced means of enforcement., 29 This approach has been
used by Justice Kennedy and the second Justice Harlan. 30 Neuman prefers the
third approach, "mutuality of obligation," a presumption that constitutional
rights are available to aliens abroad "in contexts where the United States seeks
24. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ...."); id. amend. IV ("The right
of the people .. "); id. amend. V ("No person shall be held .... ); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions ...."); see also infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
25. HENKiN, CONSTrrtMONALISM, supra note 20, at 99-100.
26. See NEuMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 5-8. Neuman also describes a fourth "membership"
approach that has been used historically to restrict constitutional rights to members of the political
community. Id. at 6-7.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 8.
30. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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to impose and enforce its own law.",31 Globalists such as Professors Cole and
Raustiala use a mutuality approach like Neuman's.32
For Neuman, the proper approach has "interrelated normative and descriptive
aspects. 33 While Neuman professes that the constitutional text and other
descriptive inputs are important, he finds little text in the Constitution that
precludes globalism and so concludes that the question of the "scope" of a
constitutional right "must be resolved primarily by deliberative choice among
alternative approaches on the basis of their normative characteristics and their
coherence with less unsettled constitutional practices. 34 As another globalist
put it after rejecting a textual methodology, the question of constitutional rights
for "aliens abroad more generally[] comes down to a question of what our
values are."35
Non-originalist globalists use a common set of normative values to read the
Constitution's allegedly silent or underspecified text. Neuman, for example,
rejects global due process largely because its "touchstone" is "government
flexibility," not the protection of individual rights.36 Many other globalists
emphasize the need to protect individual rights against U.S. government power,
often by invoking the individual human rights protections under international
law that have increased so substantially in recent years. 37 Neuman and many
other globalists criticize any theory of extraterritorial rights that does not
confine the government's power to manipulate the physical location of persons
and its actions against persons in order to exploit rightless areas of the globe.38
Neuman and others also express normative concerns about the likelihood of
government misconduct if any persons are declared to be entirely rightless. For
example, Neuman worries that "[i]f the Due Process Clause does not apply to
detainees at Guantanamo, then the Government effectively has discretion to
starve them, to beat them, to maim them, or to kill them, with or without
hearings and with or without evidence of any wrongdoing. '39 Most importantly,
the normative preference underlying the choice of the mutuality of obligation
model of globalism is a version of the fundamental American constitutional
31. Neuman, Extraterritorial, supra note 21, at 2076, 2077.
32. See Cole, Foreign Nationals, supra note 22, at 382-83; Raustiala, supra note 22, at 2550.
33. NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 97.
34. Id. at 98.
35. Kermit Roosevelt I1, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 2017, 2069 (2005).
36. NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 103, 114.
37. See, e.g., Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 299, 300, 312, 314
(2004); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 980 (2002); Henkin, Compact, supra note 19,
at 29; Jordan J. Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CoNN. L. REv.
697,723 (1987).
38. See NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 102, 105 n.d, 115; Neuman, Abiding, supra note 21,
at 151; Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 50; see also Amann, supra note 37, at 295; Joan
Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 303,
321-22 (2002); Raustiala, supra note 22, at 2504.
39. Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 52.
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norm of consent. In Neuman's words, "rights are prerequisites for justifying
legal obligation. '40 It is simply illegitimate for the American government to
subject anyone to its laws without also granting rights; this is an exercise of
"naked force" that is alien to our constitutional tradition.4'
In contrast to universalism (constitutional rights available to everyone every-
where), and global due process (rights potentially available everywhere but
always subject to balancing against government interests), the mutuality ap-
proach to globalism used by Neuman and others professes to be categorically
limited and to eschew interference with the political branches' conduct of
military and other national defense operations abroad. As Neuman puts it, the
Constitution does not impose a requirement of "due process of war.",42 The
"American constitutional tradition," says Neuman, "has persistently left open"-
that is, unregulated-"the substance of the United States' international rela-
tions., 43 As discussed below, Neuman takes a narrow view of the category of
extraterritorial national defense actions against aliens that, is free from the Bill
of Rights. But nominally, if not always in practice, the categorical limit of his
mutuality model distinguishes it from universalism, which apparently would
regulate, with the Bill of Rights, even military operations abroad against aliens.
Professor Lobel, for example, has implied that it would have "violate[d] basic
constitutional principles" for the United States to preemptively assassinate
Hitler in 1938. 4 Globalism, therefore, is certainly not a unified school of
thought. Grouping scholars under the single "globalist" rubric is merely in-
tended to allow critical examination of the methodological claims about history
and text that many of them have in common.
This Article presents textual and historical arguments against a globalist
interpretation of the Constitution, thereby addressing globalists' textual and
originalist claims on their own methodological terms. I offer no conclusions
about the insoluble debate about the best method of interpreting the Constitu-
tion; my reliance on text and history should not be taken as a claim that those
are the only legitimate methods. I rely on them because, besides meeting
globalist arguments on their own methodological terms, textual and historical
methods have additional advantages. Most ways of reading the Constitution
begin with the text, purposes, and historical understandings, even if they then
move beyond these starting points. Accordingly, even commentators who use an
additional framework should nevertheless find it profitable to consider text and
history as a threshold matter. In addition, reliance on constitutional text, in-
40. NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 8.
41. See Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 52.
42. Neuman, Abiding, supra note 21, at 151 n.166 (citing NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at
110-11).
43. NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 110.
44. Lobel, supra note 22, at 879.
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formed by history and contextual sources,4 5 is employed by legal scholars of all
ideological stripes who write about foreign relations.46 Moreover, historical and
textual methods are often used by members of the political branches of govern-
ment4 7 and the courts, as shown by the Supreme Court's reliance on these
methodologies in decisions concerning application of constitutional rights abroad
or the reach and scope of habeas corpus review of executive detention.48
There are five primary Supreme Court cases on which globalists focus their
scholarship; none directly supports a global constitution, but several have been
read expansively by globalists as support for their views. First, the Court's 1891
decision in Ross v. McIntyre49 held that a foreign seaman who committed
murder on a U.S.-flagged vessel in Japanese waters could not invoke the Bill of
Rights to challenge his criminal conviction in a U.S. consular court in Japan.50
The Supreme Court treated the seaman as if he were a U.S. citizen for purposes
of reviewing his constitutional claim, and held that the "[C]onstitution can have
no operation in another country.",5 1 Many globalists use Ross to suggest that,
until the mid-twentieth century, a dogma of strict "territoriality"-that is, the
view that domestic law can have no force abroad-prevented American legal
thought from conceiving that either citizens or noncitizens could possibly have
extraterritorial constitutional rights.52 Once this rigid dogma of strict territorial-
45. Besides looking at the plain meaning of the language of the Constitution, I will attempt to draw
inferences from the structure created by the text, viewed contextually in light of the entire Constitution.
My reading of text and structure will also attempt to take account of the purposes animating the
constitutional provisions, see, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 5-7 (1993), pre- and
post-ratification constitutional history, and the "contemporary context of thought and debate," Jack N.
Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 Cmi.-KENr L. REv. 103, 113
(2000).
46. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 45; HEaNKN, CONSTrrUTIONALISM, supra note 20; HAROLD H. KOH, THE
NATIONAL SECURrrY CONSTITUTION (1990); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITu-
TIONAL POWER (1976); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321 (1985); Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259
(2002); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L.J. 231 (2001); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define
and Punish ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 447 (2000); William
Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 695 (1997);
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154 (1999); John C. Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv.
167 (1996).
47. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-7 at 18 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 36, 53 (discussing
the treaty power by looking to constitutional text and the intent of the Framers); Proposed Deployment
of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 327 (1995) (relying on
constitutional text, structure, and history).
48. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-74, 481-82 (2004); id. at 502--04 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301-03 (2001); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 264-68 (1990); id. at 284-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
50. See id. at 480.
51. Id. at 464.
52. See NEmAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 7 ("Under a strictly territorial model, the Constitution
constrains the United States government only when it acts within the borders of the United States. Strict
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ity was rejected for citizens, globalists argue, it made no sense to preserve it for
noncitizens.5 3
In 1950, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,54 the Supreme Court denied petitions for
writs of habeas corpus filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia on behalf of German government intelligence operatives convicted of
war crimes by a U.S. military court in China and imprisoned in U.S.-occupied
Germany.5 5 Commentators dispute the precise holding of Eisentrager-for
instance, whether the dismissal was on the merits, or based on lack of jurisdic-
tion or lack of standing.56 There is also debate as to whether the result-no Bill
of Rights review available-turned on the fact that the petitioners were admitted
agents of an enemy power during a formally declared war, that they were
confined as part of a military operation, or that they were noncitizens with no
preexisting connection to the United States who were confined abroad.
In 1957, in Reid v. Covert,5 7 the Supreme Court rejected Ross by holding
unconstitutional the practice, sanctioned by international agreements with the
host countries, of trying civilian dependents of U.S. military personnel stationed
abroad in U.S. military courts lacking Bill of Rights protections.58 A plurality of
the Court used such broad language to reach this result-stating that the U.S.
government "can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution" '59-that many globalists claim that Reid establishes, or at least
strongly suggests, that the Constitution's individual rights protections also apply
abroad to noncitizens.60 But the Court used the words "citizen" or "American"
at least thirteen times in discussing the facts and law, raising questions about
Reid's applicability to aliens. In particular, Reid's language that the U.S. govern-
ment "can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution" is both introduced and followed by explicit statements that the
Court is discussing the unique relationship between the U.S. government and its
territoriality prevailed as dogma for most of American constitutional history, until the Supreme Court
overturned it in 1957 in Reid v. Covert."); Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 45 (noting that
"[p]re-modern case law assists little in deciding how the Bill of Rights should apply to aliens abroad"
because it reflects "the rigidly territorial methodology of turn-of-the-century conflict of laws" which
assumed that "constitutional rights were unavailable-to both citizens and aliens-outside the borders
of the United States").
53. See, e.g., Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 45; John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad:
Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. &
POL. 287, 292-93 (1985); Akash R. Desai, Note, How We Should Think About the Constitutional Status
of the Suspected Terrorist Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1579, 1608-09
(2003).
54. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
55. Id. at 790-91.
56. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1400 (1953).
57. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
58. Id. at 39-41.
59. Id. at 6.
60. See, e.g., HENriN, FOREIGN AFFAms, supra note 17, at 305-06; Paust, Antiterrorism, supra note
22, at 19.
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"citizens. 61 Many globalists misread this passage both by downplaying the
importance of citizenship to the Court's holding and by engaging in question
begging. According to Professor Paust, for example, this passage in Reid
supports globalism by teaching that the question is not whether aliens abroad
have rights, but "whether our government has any power or delegated authority
to act inconsistently with the Constitution. ' '62 But assuming that globalists are
right that the Constitution is, as a general matter, always and everywhere
operative, one still must determine how it specifically limits the powers of the
government. To do this, one must read the provisions of the Constitution that
either grant rights or withhold powers. The Reid formulation, therefore, only
begs questions about the personal or territorial scope of constitutional rights.
Interpreting the personal and territorial scope of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights is inescapable. Sophisticated globalists like Professor Neuman recognize
this and avoid the circularity of the Reid argument.63
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
64
that the Fourth Amendment did not invalidate a warrantless search by U.S. and
Mexican law enforcement of the Mexican residence of a Mexican national who
had previously been kidnapped and brought to the United States, where he was
in law enforcement custody awaiting indictment on drug-related charges.6 5 A
plurality of the Court concluded that "the people" mentioned in the Constitu-
tion's Preamble, Article I, and the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments, "seems to have been a term of art" referring "to a class of persons
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that communi-
ty.'66 The Court contrasted "the relatively universal term of 'person"' in the
Fifth Amendment and the narrower term "the people., 67 Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez
was found not to be among "the people."68 Although Justice Kennedy (the fifth
vote for the majority), the dissenting Justices, and amici advocating for the
defendant dismissed this textual argument,69 the distinction between "persons"
and "people" has since been used by globalists to argue that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has a broader scope than the Fourth Amend-
ment and protects noncitizens outside the United States.7 °
61. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
62. Paust, Antiterrorism, supra note 22, at 19; see also, e.g., Henkin, Compact, supra note 19, at
23-24; Lobel, supra note 22, at 872-73.
63. Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 44-45.
64. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
65. Id. at 274-75.
66. Id. at 265.
67. Id. at 269.
68. See id. at 271.
69. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 287 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brief for Amici
Curiae ACLU et al. in Support of Respondent at 11-12 & n.4, Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
(No. 88-1353) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
70. See, e.g., Paust, Antiterrorism, supra note 22, at 19-20; Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or
Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 307, 318 (2003); see also Brief of
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A recent Supreme Court decision is similarly open to varied readings. In
2004, in Rasul v. Bush,7 1 the Court purported to decide only that statutory
jurisdiction existed for federal district courts to hear habeas petitions filed by
noncitizens detained by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.7 2 But in
dicta in a footnote, the majority hinted that it might embrace some form of
globalism. Footnote 15 states:
Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat
nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in
Executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the
long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without
access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing-
unquestionably describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States."73
By quoting the habeas statute in this fashion, the Court simply may have been
restating, albeit in a confusing way, its statutory holding. But there are at least
two other possibilities. One view, advanced by Professor Neuman, is that
footnote 15 "confirm[s] that innocent alien detainees at Guantanamo have
constitutional rights."7 4 An even broader reading sees footnote 15 as stating that
noncitizen detainees anywhere outside the United States have enforceable
constitutional rights.75 The broader reading is quite aggressive, though, because
Rasul emphasized that Guantanamo Bay is a "territory over which the United
States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, 76 something which cannot
be said about most of the rest of the world outside the United States. In sum,
Rasul is ambiguous enough to provide support for globalist claims.
In June 2006, the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 77 --the Guan-
tanamo military commission case. Like Rasul, Hamdan contains ambiguity
about extraterritorial constitutional rights for aliens that will likely be seized
upon by globalists. Although an alien confined outside the territorial United
States at Guantanamo Bay, Hamdan asserted individual constitutional rights by
arguing that reading a congressional statute to strip federal courts of habeas
Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group et al. at 8 & n.8, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v.
McNary, 969 F2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-6090) [hereinafter IHRLG Brief].
71. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
72. See id. at 484.
73. Id. at 483 n.15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000)).
74. Neuman, Abiding, supra note 21, at 147 (emphasis added).
75. See Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and "The Water's Edge": Sovereignty, "Territo-
rial Jurisdiction, " and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 165, 195-206 (2006).
76. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475. Later the Court suggests that Guantanamo is within or under the
"territorial jurisdiction" of the United States. Id. at 480; see also id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory .... ").
77. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). The decision in Hamdan was reached after the substantive work on this
Article was completed and thus the discussion of its impact is limited.
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jurisdiction over his case would render the statute invalid under the Suspension
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.78 The Court declined to reach these
issues, relying instead on "[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction. '7 9
The Court's holding on the merits also relied on congressional statutes and
international law incorporated by reference into those statutes, but not on the
Constitution. Yet ambiguity can be seen in the Supreme Court's handling of the
government's contention, with which the D.C. Circuit had suggested it agreed,
that Hamdan's lack of constitutional rights as an alien outside the United States
precluded him from raising a constitutional separation of powers argument.8 0
Although the Supreme Court did not reach this argument, in finding the military
commission illegal the Court did reference, in a general fashion, concerns that
sound in separation of powers. 8 ' Although globalists might disagree, the better
reading of Hamdan is that the majority opinion does not sub silentio hold that
Hamdan had enforceable constitutional rights. First, the Court did not in fact
hold that the military commission violated the Constitution. It was very careful
to say that it relied only on statutes and international law 2 -which, it is worth
noting, are the sources of law to which this Article contends the Supreme Court
should look for any applicable protection of aliens abroad.83 Second, the issue
raised by the circuit court and the government was whether structural separation
of powers challenges to the commission could be invoked by an alien outside
the United States, not whether individual constitutional rights were available.
Whether or not aliens abroad have enforceable individual rights, it is a different
question-and one that seems more plausible to answer in the affirmative-
78. See Petitioner's Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss at 32-39, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (No. 05-184).
79. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764. The Court did not even bother to mention Hamdan's (arguably
frivolous) equal protection argument.
80. The government argued that alien enemy combatants outside U.S. territory receive no constitu-
tional protections of any kind whatsoever. See Brief of Respondents Donald Rumsfeld et al. at 43,
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184) ("Petitioner's argument that the President lacks the authority to
convene a military commission to try and punish him for his alleged war crimes fails for the many
independent reasons discussed above. Because that argument is predicated on the proposition that the
Constitution places structural limits on the President's authority to convene military commissions,
however, it fails for an additional, even more fundamental reason. As an alien enemy combatant
detained outside the United States, petitioner does not enjoy the protections of our Constitution."); see
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006).
81. See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74, 2780.
82. See id. at 2759 ("[W]e conclude that the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacks
power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ [Uniform Code of
Military Justice] and the Geneva Conventions.").
83. The Court's most explicit reference to separation of powers concerns came in a portion of the
opinion joined by only four Justices, discussing whether conspiracy is a cognizable offense against the
laws of war. See id. at 2780. That being said, the fifth Justice for the majority, Justice Kennedy,
expressly invoked separation of powers concerns in his concurrence. See id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part). It seems from Verdugo-Urquidez that Justice Kennedy believes that, in some
circumstances at least, aliens outside the United States can invoke the protection of the Constitution.
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 276 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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whether the structural checks and balances created by the Constitution are
always and everywhere operational and may be invoked by any litigant who is
otherwise properly before the court.8 4
So, although the weight of academic commentary and Rasul suggest that
globalism may be ascendant, the Supreme Court has not yet accepted globalist
arguments. The Court's failure to date to embrace globalism cannot be ex-
plained by a lack of opportunities for the issue to be raised. Ever since declaring
independence, the United States has operated extraterritorially, using force,
conducting searches and seizures, capturing and detaining enemies and crimi-
nals, and exercising control over would-be immigrants. And in Hamdan and
many other cases against the U.S. government, alien plaintiffs and globalist
scholars-as counsel or amici-have repeatedly pressed their views. 85 Nor can
the Court's failure to accept globalism fully be explained by the fact that courts
often apply abstention doctrines, such as the political question doctrine, to
foreign affairs issues; on several occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed
the merits of constitutional claims of Americans abroad in cases raising foreign
affairs issues.
8 6
If the arguments for global constitutional rights for aliens are to gain the force
of law, it will be by judicial interpretation of the Constitution in the face of
opposition by the political branches. Globalists do not point to any treaty,
statute, executive order, or other official statement by the political branches of
84. If no structural commands in the Constitution are ever enforceable by aliens outside the United
States, then a central contention of this Article-that aliens abroad were thought by the Founders to be
protected by international law-would be undermined. For it is the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion which makes treaties the supreme law of the land. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
85. See Brief for Amici Curiae of Former U.S. Government Officials in Support of Petitioners at
17-25, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334 & 03-343) (Professor Neuman) [hereinafter
Rasul Amici Brief]; Brief for Amici Curiae International Law and National Security Law Professors
Listed Herein in Support of Petitioner-Appellee at 12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (No. 04-5393) (Professor Paust); Brief for Appellees at 37, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary,
969 F2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-6090) (Professor Lobel); IHRLG Brief, supra note 70 (Professor
Neuman); ACLU Brief, supra note 69, at 10-17 (Professor Cole).
86. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306-10 (1981) (considering a constitutional challenge to the
revocation of the passport of a U.S. citizen ex-CIA officer residing abroad who had publicized identities
of undercover intelligence operatives); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 235
(1960) (considering whether the Bill of Rights barred a trial abroad by a military court of a U.S. citizen
wife of a U.S. soldier); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), rev'g on reh'g Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S.
470 (1956) (same); Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1891) (considering whether the Bill of
Rights applied in the trial of an American sailor by a U.S. consular court in Japan); Mitchell v.
Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851) (considering a takings claim by a U.S. citizen against a U.S.
army officer for trespass in Mexico during war); cf. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901)
(considering whether, were a U.S. citizen extradited to U.S.-occupied Cuba to face criminal charges, he
would be entitled there to protections of the U.S. Constitution); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14,
18-19 (1800) (considering whether the Georgia Constitution barred the attainder for treason of a U.S.
citizen who had fled, during the Revolutionary War and before filing suit, to British-owned Jamaica). In
Afroyim v. Rusk, the plaintiff, who convinced the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment barred
his involuntary expatriation by the U.S. on account of having gone to Israel and voted in an election
there, see 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967), may have remained abroad while he pursued his lawsuit, see 250
F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the federal government that suggests a preference for deeming aliens abroad to
have judicially enforceable constitutional rights.8 7 On the contrary, executive
branch practice-across presidential administrations of widely varying political
ideologiesm-has been to argue that aliens abroad do not have enforceable
constitutional rights or a right to habeas corpus review.88 Moreover, Congress
has enacted many rules governing the current U.S. national security structure
that arguably are inconsistent with certain globalist tenets. 89
Although I conclude that the better reading of the Constitution's text and
history is that the protections of the Bill of Rights are not global, this Article
nevertheless shows that the United States has a tradition of protecting foreigners
abroad. But rather than being based on enforcing constitutional limitations, the
American global tradition protected aliens abroad through international law,
diplomacy, and the policy choices of the political branches of the U.S. govern-
ment. Unlike judicial construction of the Constitution, these forms of global
protection of aliens are, to a substantial degree, under the ultimate policy
control of the political branches of government-which is precisely the point.
Before proceeding with the remainder of this Article, it is necessary to clarify
87. But cf S. RaP. No. 56-249, at 11 (1900) (stating, in the context of discussing whether inhabitants
of colonial possessions like Puerto Rico have constitutional rights, that certain constitutional limitations
on Congress's power are always in effect, such as the prohibitions against ex post facto legislation,
establishments of religion, slavery, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the validity of contracts or
taking property without due process).
88. For examples from Democratic administrations, see Brief for the Respondent at 11-12, Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (No. 96-1060); Brief for Petitioners at 7, 65-68, Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950) (No. 49-306); Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at
29-30, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (Nos. 45-61 Misc. & 45-672). For Republican administra-
tions, see Reply Brief in Support of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 18-20,
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Brief for the Respondents at 10-13, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos.
03-334 & 03-343); Brief for the Petitioners at 16 n.10, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S.
155 (1993) (No. 92-344); Brief for the United States at 11-30, Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (No.
88-1353); Constitutionality of Closing the Palestine Information Office, an Affiliate of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, 11 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 104, 111-12 (1987); 5 Intelligence Activities: The
Nat'l Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearings on S. Res. 21 Before the S. Select
Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 66, 74
(1975) (statement of Att'y Gen. Edward Levi).
89. For instance, the foreign intelligence surveillance framework assumes that aliens abroad do not
have a Fourth Amendment interest in not being subject to intelligence collection. See 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1801 (West 2005 & Supp. 2005); cf. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 1.8, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4,
1981) (giving the CIA broad authority to collect intelligence outside the United States). The War
Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(2000)) can be read as congressional approval for the President to use military force abroad for several
months, subject only to a reporting requirement. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542-1544 (2000). It requires no
"due process" of any kind for the targets. Similarly, the statutory provisions governing executive covert
actions do not impose any process requirements that specifically protect the affected individuals outside
the United States. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A § 413, 413b (West 2005 & Supp. 2005). The Non-Detention
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000), requires congressional authorization for all detentions of U.S. citizens
but omits aliens from this protection. Many ideological restrictions in the immigration laws, see e.g., 8
U.S.C. 1424(a) (2000) (denying naturalization to any alien who, among others things, is "a member of
or affiliated with" communist or totalitarian political parties), would be unconstitutional if applied to
citizens.
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what it does not claim. Certain arguments against globalism have lately been
associated with aggressive claims by Bush Administration lawyers about presi-
dential power to disregard statutes limiting coercive interrogation techniques, 90
and about the alleged inapplicability of many international legal protections to
the "war on terror."91 Many commentators assert that these legal claims are not
only mistaken but also have allowed egregious abuses to occur at American
detention facilities around the world. This Article does not directly engage these
debates because it is devoted to analyzing whether the textual and historical
evidence supports a globalist reading of constitutional-not statutory or interna-
tional law-rights.
This Article does, however, provide support for critics of some of the more
extreme legal claims of the current administration. For instance, in the process
of showing why global constitutionalism is difficult to square with the constitu-
tional text and history, this Article suggests that many Founders believed that
aliens should find some protection from the coercive force of the U.S. govern-
ment under treaties and the law of nations, as well as congressional statutes and
the dictates of humanity, diplomacy, and policy. 92 In addition, this Article's
conclusion that global constitutionalism is difficult to defend on a textual or
historical basis suggests that proponents of better treatment for noncitizens
caught up in the U.S. war on terror should focus on securing aliens' rights
through congressional intervention-such as the recent McCain amendment
barring mistreatment of detainees 93-- or through international law, rather than
90. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERRORISM (Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter DOD REPORT], at 21. This report asserts:
In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a military
campaign, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inappli-
cable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to [the President's] Commander-in-Chief authority
[because] Congress lacks authority under Article I to set the terms and conditions under which
the President may exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to control the conduct of
operations during a war.
Id.; see also Jay S. Bybee, Memo. for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of
Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 31 (Aug. 1, 2002) ("Any effort to apply
[the U.S. statute implementing the Convention Against Torture] in a manner that interferes with the
President's direction of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy combat-
ants.., would be unconstitutional.").
91. See Jay S. Bybee, Memo. for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II, Dep't of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
9-32 (Jan. 22, 2002) (concluding that the Geneva Conventions do not protect members of al Qaeda or
the Taliban); see also DOD REPORT, supra note 90, at 67 ("Customary international law does not
provide legally-enforceable restrictions on the interrogation of unlawful combatants under DOD control
outside the United States.").
92. Resolving the difficult and much-debated questions of exactly how or even whether customary
international law binds the executive branch or Congress, and whether or when it is judicially
enforceable against executive branch action or congressional statutes, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
93. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, tit. X, § 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2739
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 200dd(a) (West 2006)) ("No individual in the custody or under
the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location,
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arguing for a strained reading of the Constitution.
II. GLOBALIST CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND
ORIGINAL INTENT
This Part describes the globalist conventional wisdom regarding the constitu-
tional text and original intent. It divides globalists into two groups. One group
makes the original intent claim that the Bill of Rights was written in general
language because its protections were intended to be universal, unrestricted by
territory or personal status. The larger group of globalists who do not make an
original intent claim assert or assume instead that the text of the Bill of Rights is
silent as to its geographic and personal scope and so supports or, at least, does
not stand in the way of, application of normative constitutional theories that
would find rights for aliens abroad. 94
A. INTENTIONAL TEXTUAL UNIVERSALITY: GLOBALIST ORIGINALISM
Some globalists assert that the Founders' decision to write the individual
rights provisions of the Bill of Rights in broad, even universal, terms evidences
the affirmative intent that these rights be unlimited by geography or personal
status, as a citizen or alien. Professor Henkin has been the most influential
exponent of this originalist argument. He finds that the Constitution is "silent
concerning its applicability beyond the borders of the United States. Little is
said in the Constitution concerning citizens, and nothing about aliens."9 5 This
was intentional, according to Henkin:
Our federal government must not invade the individual rights of any human
being. The choice in the Bill of Rights of the word "person" rather than
"citizen" was not fortuitous; nor was the absence of a geographical limitation.
shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."). Because the Military
Commision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, was enacted after this Article was completed, it cannot be
addressed here. Contrary to the claims of some Bush Administration lawyers, the plain language of the
Constitution is difficult to reconcile with the view that Congress lacks constitutional power to limit
coercive interrogation techniques used by executive branch agents. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10,
11, 14 (providing Congress with the "Power" to "define and punish... Offences against the Law of
Nations," "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," and "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"); see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper
Clause).
94. But not all globalists fit into the two methodological categories that I have described. A few
reject a textual methodology and do not use a historical method either. See Nathan J. Diament, Foreign
Relations and Our Domestic Constitution: Broadening the Discourse, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 911, 912-13,
942-44 (1998); Roosevelt, supra note 35, at 2042-43, 2048. Others closely analyze whether aliens
abroad have constitutional rights with minimal or no discussion of the constitutional text or original
understandings. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 38, at 327-34, 340; Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of
U.S. Law Enforcement: Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 Hous. L. REv. 307 (2002).
95. Henkin, Compact, supra note 19, at 12; see also id. at 14 ("The Bill of Rights, added by
amendment in 1791, also does not specify whose rights it was designed to safeguard."); id. at 18 ("The
Constitution does not state its geographic reach or, more specifically, whether it applies solely within
the United States.").
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Both reflect a commitment to respect the individual rights of all human
beings.9 6
For Henkin, the original understanding of the Founders was a "universal
human rights ideology.",97 Professor Henkin does not cite any specific state-
ments by the Founders or other conventional historical authority for these
propositions about the Founders' intent. Instead, he generally relies on (i) the
broad dicta in Reid v. Covert to the effect that the Constitution applies to
everything the federal government does, (ii) the Founding generation's belief in
the pre-existing natural rights of "all men," as the Declaration of Independence
put it, and (iii) the fact that the Bill of Rights is textually general or unrestricted
as to the persons or places protected.98 Other globalist originalists, including
Justice Ginsburg, tend to rely on Henkin's work9 9 rather than specific historical
evidence.
B. TEXTUAL SILENCE OR TEXTUAL GENERALITY
A larger number of globalists eschew reliance on original intent and state
instead that the Constitution, or particular provisions of it, is silent or underspeci-
fled regarding its territorial and personal scope. For example, Neuman writes
that "[tihe Due Process Clause is phrased in universal terms, protecting any
'person' rather than 'citizens' or members of 'the people.' Nor does its wording
specify limitations as to place."' 00 Another globalist asserts that the language of
the Bill of Rights is clear about whom it protects (e.g., "any 'person' must
[mean] literally any person"), but "says nothing about where a violation takes
place" and contains "no explicit geographical limitation to its reach."1 °1
96. Id. at 32.
97. HENKIN, CONSTurIONAUSM, supra note 20, at 99-100.
98. See id. at 100 ("Nothing in the Constitution or in the framers' conceptions suggested that they
had in mind any territorial limitations [on the Constitution's protections.]" (relying on the Declaration
of Independence, the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, and Reid v. Covert)).
99. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspec-
tive in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAio L. REv. 1, 8 (2003); Lobel, supra note 22, at 875-76;
Ragosta, supra note 53, at 300; Bryan William Horn, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth
Amendment Protection Against Coerced Self-Incrimination, 2 DuKE J. CoMp. & INT'L L. 367, 375
(1992). For judicial opinions containing discussion of globalism by Justice Ginsburg, see United States
v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 701-02 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for
Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
100. Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 49 (footnote omitted); see also IHRLG Brief, supra
note 70, at 8; Eric J. Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and
Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329, 335 (1994) ("The Constitu-
tion neither specifies the extent of its geographical reach nor identifies the 'people' or 'persons' it
protects."). Neuman notes that a few constitutional rights are personally or territorially restricted by
their text. See NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 102-03 ("The only provision of the Bill of Rights
with a geographic referent is the venue clause of the Sixth Amendment .... ").
101. Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial Power and the
United States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 147, 169, 171 (1999). For other globalist
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As suggested by these references to "people" and "persons," globalist textual
claims rely heavily on the "open-textured" language used by the Bill of Rights
to describe the rights holders. 10 2 Globalists often apply a clear statement rule,
which assumes that if constitutional rights were actually territorially or person-
ally limited, the limitation would be specifically expressed in the text.10 3 In
other words, the default presumption is that constitutional rights should poten-
tially exist for aliens abroad unless expressly restricted by the text of a particu-
lar constitutional provision. On this view, unrestricted language used to describe
the rights holders-the term "people" found in the First, Second, and Fourth
Amendments, the term "person" found in the Fifth Amendment, and the term
"the accused" found in the Sixth Amendment-suggests that rights are available
globally unless expressly restricted. Other provisions of the Bill of Rights, such
claims along these lines, see Amann, supra note 37, at 314 ("Containing no territorial limitation akin to
that in the European Convention, the text of the U.S. Constitution constrains neither the political
branches from acting abroad nor the judicial branch from reviewing their actions."); Neuman, Whose
Constitution?, supra note 21, at 980 ("[Tlhe drafting of the Bill of Rights reflected inattention to the
problematics of government activity abroad rather than a conscious effort to design entitlements solely
for application within the territory."); id. at 927 ("[T]he drafters of the federal Bill of Rights did not
take care to distinguish between the respective rights of citizens and persons."); Raustiala, supra note
22, at 2555 ("The Constitution itself contains no textually demonstrable spatial limitation."); see also,
e.g., George P. Fletcher, Citizenship and Personhood in the Jurisprudence of War, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
953, 958-59 (2004); Paust, Antiterrorism, supra note 22, at 25; Paust, Post-9/1l, supra note 22, at
1350; Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 752-53; Darin A. Bifani, Comment, Tension Between Policy
Objectives and Individual Rights: Rethinking Extradition and Extraterritorial Abduction Jurisprudence,
41 BUFF. L. REv. 627, 687 n.358 (1993); Desai, supra note 53, at 1601-02.
102. Amann, supra note 37, at 301.
103. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law-The Interna-
tional Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators From Non-
Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 868 (2003) ("One might reasonably argue that the seemingly
all-inclusive term 'person' renders the Due Process clause universally applicable to all human beings,
wherever they may be located, in their dealings with the United States government."); Margulis-
Ohnuma, supra note 101, at 197 (arguing that the Constitution protects noncitizens abroad when the
U.S. is "acting in a sovereign capacity over the alleged victim," and stating that "Inleither the text of
the Constitution nor Supreme Court precedents unequivocally states whether or not the Constitution
generally applies overseas" (emphasis added)); Horn, supra note 99, at 375 ("[The text of the Fifth
Amendment] does not restrict itself to trials involving citizens nor does it detail any geographical
limits, as it could easily have done.... Therefore, to give the text its plain meaning, we must read 'any'
as 'any' and 'no person' as 'no person."').
Within his categorical "mutuality" framework, Professor Neuman essentially applies a clear state-
ment rule as well, even though he is careful to leave room for "inputs" or "structural arguments" that
might potentially rebut the clear statement presumption. See NEuMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 98
("The rationale of the mutuality approach has been the presumption that American constitutional rights
and the obligation of obedience to American law go together; particular provisions may be more
narrowly interpreted because of textual or structural arguments, but in the absence of contrary
indications the rights and the obligations are coextensive."); id. at 99 ("[S]pecific textual or other
arguments may exceptionally demonstrate that a particular right is either reserved to citizens or
geographically limited." (emphasis added)); id. at 102 ("The mutuality of obligation approach respects
the written Constitution by making all the rights it contains presumptively applicable; as an approach to
interpretation it leaves room for textual references or other inputs to rebut the presumption."); Neuman,
Extraterritorial, supra note 21, at 2077 n.20 ("[The mutuality] presumption is rebuttable, where the text
expressly limits the personal or geographical scope of a right, or where structural arguments demon-
strate that the right should not be interpreted as applying." (emphasis added)).
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as the First and Eighth Amendments, can be viewed by globalists as absolute
withdrawals of power from the federal government, with no express qualifica-
tions of any kind based on personal or territorial status, and therefore potentially
applicable abroad.' 04 Globalists differ among themselves about what types of
rights are available and in what situations. But whatever their end point, most
globalists share a clear statement presumption which holds that, unless ex-
pressly restricted by the constitutional text, a given right is potentially available
to noncitizens abroad.
The clear statement argument based on the general and unrestricted language
of the Bill of Rights has a solid historical pedigree, dating at least from
Jeffersonian-Republican opposition to the Federalists' so-called "Alien Friends
Act" of 1798.105 More recently, rhetoric suggestive of this clear statement rule
has been used by a number of Supreme Court Justices, typically in dissenting
opinions. 10 6 The globalist textual argument gains some force by comparing the
unrestricted language in the Bill of Rights with other provisions in the Constitu-




Both originalist and non-originalist globalists commit serious methodological
errors. As discussed below, globalist originalism has not been supported by even
minimally sufficient evidence from the Founding period. Moreover, to the
extent that globalists use a clear statement presumption, it too is a serious error.
The presumption is arguably an unacknowledged "normative canon" of textual
construction 10 8 in that it advances a particular normative objective, that is,
globalist protections of aliens abroad. Clear statement rules and other normative
canons are by no means illegitimate. They can be useful when the text under
104. See John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and Foreign Relations,
36 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 27 (1986).
105. See, e.g., Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 21, at 927-38. For a discussion of the Act
and its context, see infra notes 356-89 and accompanying text.
106. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 283 n.7, 291 n.11 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1957) (plurality opinion); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738-39 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting).
107. For instance, Article IlI, Section 2 imposes a territorial limitation on the right of a criminal
defendant to be tried by a jury near the location of the crime. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article IV,
Section 2 contains a personal status limitation, providing that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States," thereby omitting noncitizens
from the same protection. Id. art. IV, § 2. In addition, the right to hold the offices of President, Senator,
or Congressman is textually limited to citizens. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl.
5. Article I, Section 8 states that only "throughout the United States," but not elsewhere, are all
congressionally enacted rules regarding naturalization of citizens and bankruptcy required to be
"uniform." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
108. See Curtis Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 505-09 (1998) (describing the distinction
between descriptive canons and normative canons of textual interpretation).
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consideration speaks, as the Bill of Rights often does, in "majestic generali-
ties."109 But the normative values or other objectives that allegedly justify the
default presumption must be acknowledged and defended. As noted above,
some globalists do this with a claim about the original intent of the Constitu-
tion's drafters and ratifiers. But many non-originalist globalists make textual
claims about the Constitution's silence or generality as to persons or places
based on an unacknowledged clear statement rule and without explicitly defend-
ing the rule's default assumptions.
To deploy the clear statement presumption, many globalists commit what
Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff refer to as the "dis-integration
fallacy," that is, "approaching the Constitution in ways that ignore the salient
fact that its parts are linked into a whole-that it is a Constitution, and not
merely an unconnected bunch of separate clauses and provisions."l° As demon-
strated in Part IV, the constitutional text and structure speak against the viability
of globalism in many places and many ways, besides the few words in a few
clauses of the Bill of Rights where globalists look to see whether the personal or
territorial scope of the rights has been expressly limited. Viewed as a whole, the
Constitution is not a globalist document."1
The next three Parts of this Article discuss the validity of globalist claims
about history and text by looking at the legal and political views of the
Founders, the constitutional text and structure, and inferences about constitu-
tional meaning that can be drawn from early practice by the U.S. government
under the Constitution.
IH. THE AMBIENT LAW OF THE ERA
As globalists emphasize, it was common for members of the Founding
generation to assert that certain personal rights were based on natural law and
were God-given to "all men."'1 2 Globalists suggest that, consistent with this
rhetoric, bills of rights of the state constitutions of 1776 and afterwards and the
federal Constitution of 1789 were thought to declare and secure the preexisting
"natural rights" of mankind, not to grant rights; globalists thus use the concept
of rights derived from nature or God to untether constitutional rights from a
particular territorially organized group of people.113 Since American bills of
109. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
110. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 20 (1991).
111. That is why it is incorrect to suggest, as some have, that I-and not the globalists---employ a
clear statement presumption. Reading the text of the Constitution holistically and in light of eighteenth-
century understandings, I contend that there is no good reason to read terms such as "person" or
"people" in the Bill of Rights as literally encompassing anyone anywhere in the world.
112. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
113. See Cole, Foreign Nationals, supra note 22, at 372 ("[W]hen adopted, the rights enumerated in
the Bill of Rights were viewed not as a set of optional contractual provisions enforceable because they
were agreed upon by a group of states and extending only to the contracting parties, but as inalienable
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rights merely declared preexisting natural rights of mankind, is it not then
likely, as many globalists suggest, that the U.S. Bill of Rights, written as it is in
general, non-exclusive language, was intended by the Founders to protect and
enforce the rights of everyone, even aliens abroad?
This Part answers this question in the negative by discussing the "ambient
law" of the era-the constitutive background assumptions and conceptions-
regarding issues central to the globalist project, such as the legal status of aliens,
the territorial scope of individual rights against government power, the purposes
of republican government generally and bills of rights specifically, and the
important conceptual distinction between domestic and international law.
Based on this method, this Part makes the following observations. In the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, legal rights and government regula-
tory powers were, to a greater degree than today, thought to be limited to
persons and things within the territory over which a government exercised
sovereignty. The availability of the writ of habeas corpus appears to have been
limited to the sovereign's own territory. But there were many exceptions to this
general understanding that law was territorial. Indeed, the United States was a
leader in projecting its regulatory power extraterritorially and, it appears, may
also have had a nascent sense that the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens could
potentially be available abroad. Aliens were sharply distinguished from citizens,
however. Aliens residing or traveling within the United States were considered
to be under the "protection" of the "municipal"-that is, domestic as opposed to
international or external-laws of the United States. Consistent with this, aliens
in the United States had access to the protective writ of habeas corpus, and
many Americans appear to have assumed that aliens in the United States had
U.S. constitutional rights. But aliens abroad were not under the protection of the
municipal laws. In general, municipal law was not thought to govern external
relations. 114 Rather, the more discretionary, practical, and flexible principles115
natural rights that found their provenance in God."); Lobel, supra note 22, at 875 ("The view of the
Framers that the 'compact' required government to respect the rights of all human beings is reflected in
their notion that constitutional rights were derived from the natural rights of all people and not from any
agreement."); Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 51 ("[T]he Constitution recognizes, it does not
merely create rights. The Framers regarded certain fundamental constitutional rights like physical
liberty and freedom of conscience as natural rights of mankind.").
114. See infra Part Ill.C.
115. The flexible and discretionary nature of the law of nations is seen in Montesquieu's famous
statement that
[t]he right of nations is by nature founded on the principle that the various nations should do
to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and in times of war the least ill
possible, without harming their true interests. The object of war is victory; of victory,
conquest; of conquest, preservation. All the laws that form the right of nations should derive
from this principle and the preceding one.
CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRT OF THE LAWS 7-8 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
trans., 1989) (1748). Other translations of "le droit des gens" (the right of nations) render it "the law of
nations." E.g., id. at 7 n.n (translators' note); see also WILLiAM BLAcKToE, 4 CoMMENrARIES *66
(paraphrasing this passage from Montesquieu on the "law of nations"). For other evidence of the
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of international law-the law of nations and, where they existed, treaties-
governed the external realm. Not a loose, universal-sounding rhetoric of natural
rights, but specific claims to positive constitutional rights tied to membership in
a national-constitutional community, formed the basis of Americans' claims
against Great Britain during the revolutionary period. The purpose of republican
governments built during and after the Revolution was to secure the rights of
members of the political community against internal turmoil and external
aggression. There was no significant strain of Founding-era thought that held
that concrete and enforceable rights were found in nature and thus available to
all mankind everywhere. This Part concludes, based on these overlapping
attitudes and rules, that aliens within the United States would generally have
been thought to be protected by U.S. constitutional rights, whereas aliens
abroad would not.
Although this evidence speaks only circumstantially, not directly, to whether
the Constitution and Bill of Rights were, as a historical matter, globalist, the
intellectual history presented in this Part is nevertheless valuable. When various
currents of legal and political thought and practice all seem broadly consistent
with one position and inconsistent with another, we can tentatively accept that
one position and reject the other. In the case of globalist originalism, the
evidence points against it and in favor of a reading of the Constitution under
which aliens in the United States were thought to be protected by the Constitu-
tion, but aliens abroad were protected by international law and diplomacy.
A. REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT AND BILLS OF RIGHTS
Although many Founders may have believed that "all men" were naturally
equal in their God-given rights-bearing capacity, as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence suggested, it does not necessarily follow that they also thought that the
government created by the U.S. Constitution would protect and enforce the
constitutional rights of all men everywhere. Indeed, the universal-sounding
language in the Declaration of Independence and other texts must be understood
in light of eighteenth-century views about the limited utility of natural rights
rhetoric and the nature and purpose of sovereignty and republican government
generally, and bills of rights specifically.
The Declaration of Independence followed its ringing affirmation of universal-
sounding individual rights by immediately locating the new American project
within what we might call-borrowing Justice Frankfurter's words-the "world
order based on politically sovereign States."'1 16 For the Declaration concluded
by stating that the American states were now "Free and Independent States,"
flexibility of the law of nations, see, for example, DAVID HuME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 619
(Ernest C. Mossner ed., Penguin Books 1969) (1739-40) (stating, in discussing the law of nations, that
"tho' the morality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same force as that of private persons,
and may lawfully be transgress'd from a more trivial motive").
116. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It is not for
this Court to reshape a world order based on politically sovereign States. In such an international
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and therefore "have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances,
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent
States may of right do."' 1 7 Of "necessity," the United States would henceforth
hold Britons, "as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace
Friends."118 From the beginning, then, American sovereignty and independence
implied an important legal, political, and moral distinction between Americans
and everyone else.
As John Phillip Reid, the leading scholar of the constitutional history of the
American Revolution, has shown, Americans' natural rights rhetoric was just
that: rhetoric. The claimed natural rights of men were, Reid writes, "abstract"
and "nebulous" concepts, "void of any practical application"; they were "the
shared platitudes of mankind, not standards for controlling governmental con-
duct that [could] be translated into legal rights."11 9 Instead, Americans claimed
rights as British subjects under the unwritten British constitution; these rights
were seen as concrete and positive and hence legally enforceable. 120 Positive
constitutional rights, tied to membership in a national-constitutional community,
formed the basis of Americans' claims against Great Britain. Accordingly, it is
unlikely that the Founders approached the task of writing a constitution or bill
of rights in 1787-1789 with the intent to enshrine natural rights of all mankind.
The most important purpose of republican government was to protect the
members of the society from internal and external dangers. Writing as Publius
in The Federalist No. 3, John Jay instructed that the primary consideration for
the proposed new form of government was "[t]he safety of the people" includ-
ing "security for the preservation of peace and tranquility, as well as dangers
from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from
domestic causes. 12 1 Preserving liberty was of crucial importance, but it was the
liberty of the members of society that mattered. At the Philadelphia Convention,
Charles Pinckney stated the uncontroversial point that "the great end of Republi-
can Establishments" is "a Government capable of extending to its citizens all
ordering of the world a national State implies a special relationship of one body of people, i.e., citizens
of that State, whereby the citizens of each State are aliens in relation to every other State.").
117. Tim DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31 (U.S. 1776).
118. Id. para. 32.
119. JOHN PILLIP REm, CONSrrmMONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 88-90 (1986).
120. See, e.g., id. at 90-91.
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 42 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Tim FEDERALIST
No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the Revolution had been
fought and the Constitution framed to ensure that "the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty
and safety"); 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF Tm WEALTH OF NATIONS ch.
IV, § ix, at 687-88 (R.H. Cambell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776) (stating that government
has "three duties of great importance": "first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and
invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every
member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of
establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain
publick works and certain publick institutions"); 3 EMMERICH nD VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 3 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) (stating that the purpose of a
political society is to procure the members' "mutual welfare and security").
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the blessings of civil & religious liberty."' 122 James Madison, in his 1789 speech
in Congress introducing the proposed Bill of Rights, explained that his Bill was
intended to "satisfy the public that their liberties will be perpetual" and to
"extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community" any apprehen-
sion about the security of his rights. 1
23
The focus on the rights of members of the community is seen in the
explanatory preambles of many Founding-era state constitutions. The "objects"
of the influential Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 were "to secure the
existence of the body-politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who
compose it, with the power of enjoying in safety and tranquility their natural
rights, and blessings of life" and, to this end, a government was created "for
Ourselves and Posterity.,"124 Both the Pennsylvania and the Vermont Constitu-
tions opened by stating that they created a government for "the protection of the
community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it to enjoy their
natural rights." 25 Even the Articles of Confederation, though different in nature
from the constitutions because it formed a confederation of states, not indi-
vidual people, announced a similarly inward-looking domestic purpose and
focus on the rights and protections it created.' 26 By 1787, then, the most
prominent exemplars of the new American constitutional tradition stated that
they were intended to benefit the members of society-to the apparent exclusion
of outsiders. 12 7 As discussed below, the U.S. Constitution states the same thing
122. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 14, at 402; see also id. at 423 (statement of Roger Sherman)
("Govt. is instituted for those who live under it. It ought therefore to be so constituted as not to be
dangerous to their liberties."); Remarks of Edmund Pendleton to Virginia Ratifying Convention (June
12, 1788) ('The happiness of the people is the object of this Government, and the people are therefore
made the fountain of all power."), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 1196; A Native of this
Colony [Carter Braxton], An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of
Virginia on the Subject of Government (1776) ("[A]ll writers agree in the object of government, and
admit that it was designed to promote and secure the happiness of every member of society."), in 1
AMERICAN POLmCAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 330 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz
eds., 1983).
123. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 449-50 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
124. See MAss. CONST. of 1780, pmbl.
125. PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.; VT. CONST. of 1786, pmbl.; see also N.H. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
(creating a government "for the preservation of peace and good order, and for the security of the lives
and properties of the inhabitants of this colony"); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl. (creating a government
"best calculated to secure the rights and liberties of the good people of this State"); VA. CONST. of 1776,
Bill of Rights, pmbl. (stating that "the representatives of the good people of Virginia" framed an
instrument containing rights which "do pertain to them and their posterity").
126. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. III ("The said States hereby severally enter into a firm
league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their
mutual and general welfare .... ").
127. This theme is also found in one of the most important precedents for the U.S. Bill of Rights: the
proposed amendments to the Constitution adopted by many of the state ratifying conventions in 1788.
Many ratification statements, e.g., Massachusetts (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 93 (1894) [hereinafter
DEF'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; New Hampshire (June 21, 1788), reprinted in id. at 141;
North Carolina (Aug. 1, 1788), reprinted in id. at 266; Virginia (June 27, 1788), reprinted in id. at 377,
recommended provisions, some of which were later incorporated into the Bill of Rights, and described
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in its Preamble. 2 ' The link between the purposes of government announced in
the Preamble and the fact that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are "paradig-
matically rights of and for American citizens" has been persuasively shown by
Professor Akhil Amar. '
29
Looking past these explicit declarations of the purpose of government,
globalists instead emphasize the generality of the language in bills of rights. But
the broad language would most likely not have been understood by the Found-
ing generation to include everyone everywhere within the protection of the
rights. It appears that many Founders believed that only "constituent members
of the society" or "citizens"-meaning essentially free, adult, non-alien, Protes-
tant, white males who held property or paid taxes-were entitled to the fran-
chise and full political and civil rights in the pre- and post-revolutionary
periods. 130 Globalists have not presented evidence that this view-what histo-
rian Jack Greene calls a "deep and abiding commitment... to political inequali-
ty lt-had been radically altered by 1789 when the federal Bill was adopted.
Moreover, for the Founding generation, bills of rights had other purposes in
addition to announcing enforceable restrictions on government power-for
example, bills of rights were intended to educate and inculcate good republican
values in the citizenry and government officials. 132 And historian Jack Rakove
has written of the "deeper tendency in eighteenth-century thinking to regard
rights not as absolute barriers against public regulation but rather as guarantees
that when the state acted it must do so lawfully."'133 So the rights announced in
bills would have been secured primarily through the regular processes of
government. The fact that only members of society were represented and could
participate in governmental decisionmaking means that the processes of demo-
cratic government would likely not be good at protecting outsiders. Moreover,
at the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were written and ratified, the idea
that federal courts would enforce the Constitution against the political branches
was highly controversial. The older and still more common view was, as
documented by Larry Kramer, that each coordinate branch of government
the new U.S. Constitution as a social "compact," which suggests a government by and for members. On
the prevalence and significance of social compact thinking on the Founders, see JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS 320 (1996); WOOD, supra note 7, at 283-91. For the argument that social compact
thinking is not necessarily inconsistent with globalism, see Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note
21, at 934-35.
128. See infra Part IV.B.
129. AKnIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 170 (1998). Professor
Amar notes that "[p]eripheral applications of the Bill"-such as to "resident aliens ... for reasons of
prudence, principle or both"-"should not obscure its core" meaning, namely protecting American
citizens. Id.
130. See generally WILLI PAUL ADAms, THE FIRsT AMERICAN CONsTmrriONS 184-86 (2d ed. 2001);
JACK P. GREENE, ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQuAL 3-33 (1976).
131. GREENE, supra note 130, at 4.
132. RAKOVE, supra note 127, at 306-09, 323-24, 333-36; Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus
Suspension After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 555, 577 (2002).
133. RAKOVE, supra note 127, at 329.
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interpreted and applied the Constitution for itself in its own sphere and that,
standing above the government in authority, "the people" were the ultimate
source and thus enforcer of constitutional limits, through petitioning, elections,
public demonstrations, constitutional amendments, and other "political" means. 134
It seems undeniable that the people who were the font of this "popular constitu-
tionalism"-Kramer's term-were the American people. All of this counsels
some caution before assuming that generality of language in bills of rights
necessarily represented an intent to encompass all the world within enforceable
protections of those rights.
Interpretive caution is especially warranted because one purpose that the
Constitution's Bill almost certainly did not have was introducing radical con-
cepts or novel rights, as universal human rights for all would have been. As
Leonard Levy relates, James Madison-the author of the Bill- "claimed that
he had recommended only the familiar and avoided the controversial. He
warned against enumerating anything except 'simple, acknowledged principles,'
saying that amendments of a 'doubtful nature' might damage the constitutional
system."' 35 The Bill's lack of novelty is evidenced by the familiar precedents 36
from which it was drawn, none of which purported to extend rights to foreigners
abroad, and by the debate surrounding its adoption, none of which appear to
have mentioned creating novel rights for aliens abroad.1 37
B. THE LIMITS OF "TERRITORIALITY"
Globalists present conflicting accounts of the original understandings about
the territorial limits of law. For example, whereas globalist-originalists appar-
ently believe that the Constitution was originally conceived as a universal
human rights document operative throughout the world, non-originalists suggest
that the Founders could not have conceived of extraterritorial constitutional
rights for either U.S. citizens or aliens because their thinking was bounded by a
134. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 48-50, 59-60,
72-74, 84-87 (2001).
135. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BnIL OF RIGHTS 248 (1999). The goal was to "protect basic
rights without endangering the 'structure' and 'stamina' of the Government." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITLmON IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 111 (1997). On the intent that the
Bill be uncontroversial, see ARKE. REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONsTrrunoN 319 (2005); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 95; Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice":
Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Durra L.J. 1421,
1513-14.
136. Precedents included the Magna Carta (1215); the English Petition of Right (1628); the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641); the English Bill of Rights (1689); common law rights
publicized by Blackstone, Coke, and other jurists; the 1774 declaration of rights of the Continental
Congress; the Declaration of Independence (1776); the post-independence constitutions of American
states, many of which included bills of rights; the Northwest Ordinance (1787); and the resolutions of
state ratifying conventions in 1788 and 1789 which suggested amendments for the new Constitution.
137. Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) ("[E]xtraterritorial application of organic
law [to alien enemies] would have been so significant an innovation in the practice of governments that,
if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one
word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such a view.").
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rigid territoriality that assumed that legal rights and duties were limited to the
sovereign's own territory.1 38 For globalist-originalists, then, globalism would be
a recovery of a lost golden age, while for non-originalists it would be a
correction of a pernicious anomaly-namely, why only aliens who are abroad
have been left outside the protection of the Constitution, now that we live in a
world where the U.S. government's coercive power operates throughout the
world; the Supreme Court has recognized in Reid v. Covert that citizens enjoy
constitutional rights abroad; and from a legal doctrinal standpoint, we have
moved beyond strict territoriality.1 39 Both globalist positions are materially
incomplete.
It is undoubtedly true that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal thought
was heavily territorial. Broadly speaking, a nation's law was viewed as territori-
ally limited, meaning that neither its proscriptive power nor its protections were
thought to operate extraterritorially. 140 As Chief Justice Marshall put it, the "full
and absolute territorial jurisdiction" of "every sovereign" is "incapable of
conferring extra-territorial power."141 The Founders would have derived this
territorial understanding from many sources, including influential writers on the
common law,1 42 the law of nations,1 43 and the social contract,44 as well as from
the constitutional history of England during the turbulent seventeenth century
145
and the American colonists' constitutional arguments against Parliamentary
legislative power in America. 146
138. See Rasul Amici Brief, supra note 85, at 20; NEuMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 7; Cole,
Double Standard, supra note 22; Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 21, at 973; Raustiala, supra
note 22, at 2509; cf. Mary Lynn Nicholas, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting
the Borders of the Fourth Amendment, 14 FoRDRASm INT'L L.J. 267, 277 (1990-1991). Relatedly, while
originalists must necessarily believe that the Founding generation foresaw extraterritorial activity by
the U.S. government impinging on the rights of aliens, some non-originalists appear to suggest that the
Framers did not foresee extraterritorial activity sufficiently extensive to warrant considering whether
aliens abroad should be protected by the Constitution. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note
21, at 980; Ragosta, supra note 53, at 288; Eric B. Fisher, Note, The Road Not Taken: The Extraterrito-
rial Application of the Fourth Amendment Reconsidered, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705, 707 (1996);
Roszell Dulany Hunter IV, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-Unalienable
Rights?, 72 VA. L. REv. 649, 649 (1986).
139. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 22, at 2523 ("The rationale for the continuing commitment to
legal spatiality in the area of alienage is hazy at best given the despatialized vision of the Constitution
announced in Reid [v. Covert].").
140. See, e.g., NEuMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 7; JOSEPH STORY, COMM.TrARIES ON THE
CoNucr OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DomEsnc §§ 7-8, 18-20 (5th ed. 1857); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of
Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 179, 187; Raustiala, supra
note 22, at 2509.
141. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
142. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire, Sir
Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REv. 439, 439 (2003).
143. See, e.g., 3 VA=rra-, supra note 121, at 138-39.
144. See, e.g., Jon,4 LocKE, SEcoND TREATISE OF GovERimwr §§ 9, 145 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1980) (1690).
145. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
146. Before events had made reconciliation with England impossible, many Americans had argued
that while foreign affairs (such as war, foreign trade, and the like) could be controlled by England
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But while eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal thought was heavily
territorial, it does not appear to have been an absolutely rigid dogma. It was
always understood that a nation's institutions of protective power could, of
course, be used abroad.'47 (Most or all globalists would, no doubt, agree.) More
important, extraterritorial regulatory enforcement jurisdiction was recognized in
certain circumstances, such as a nation's relations with its own citizens. Accord-
ing to John Marshall, "the jurisdiction of a nation extends to the whole of its
territory, and to its own citizens in every part of the world."'148 Numerous
examples can be found in which eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legisla-
tures, 14 9 courts, 1 50 and commentators1 5 1 recognized that nations have the power
to regulate the conduct of their own citizens or resident foreign nationals when
they were abroad.152 Some globalists, apparently in the thrall of a vision of
strict territoriality, overlook this evidence. 
153
There were other exceptions to strict territoriality. The First Congress enacted
in 1789 a statute allowing foreigners to sue in U.S. courts for torts committed
(largely through the King's exercise of prerogative), domestically-binding legislation could only be
passed lawfully by local American legislatures, not the British Parliament. See generally BAiLYN, supra
note 7, at 203-04, 209-11; JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERiEs AND CENTER: CONS'rtrrLONAL DEVELOPMENT IN
a EXTENDED POLrrIEs OF a BRmSH EMPIRE AND Ta UNTED STATES, 1607-1788, at 163 (1986); REID,
supra note 119, at 227-28, 245-47, 251, 279 (1991).
147. See, e.g., Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804) (stating that a nation's "power
to secure itself from injury, may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory").
148. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 597 (1800) (statement of Rep. John Marshall) (emphasis added).
149. For acts of the U.S. Congress, see, for example, Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, § 4, 3 Stat. 600
(criminalizing the seizure of slaves "on any foreign shore" by U.S. citizens or crew of U.S. vessels);
Act of Feb. 28, 1806, ch. 9, § 1, 2 Stat. 351 (barring "any person or persons resident within the United
States" from trading with those parts of St. Domingo then in a state of rebellion); Act of Jan. 30, 1799,
ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613 (criminalizing certain political communications with foreign governments by U.S.
citizens residing at home or "in any foreign country"); Act of June 14, 1797, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 520
(banning citizens from privateering "without the limits of the [United States]" against the citizens or
property of the United States or nations at peace with the United States); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33,
§ 5, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (punishing crimes by U.S. citizens or inhabitants against Indians in Indian
territory); Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112 (making treason a crime when committed
abroad). For acts of state legislatures, see, for example, Act of Oct. 1784, ch. 63, § 3, 1784 Va. Acts 471
(punishing in Virginia courts murder, arson, robbery, and "other crime" committed by "any citizen of
this Commonwealth" who left Virginia and then committed the crime in "the territory of any Christian
nation or Indian tribe, in amity with the United States").
150. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824); United States v. McGill, 26 F Cas.
1088, 1090 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 15,676); Williams' Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1331 (C.C.D. Conn.
1799) (No. 17,708).
151. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *369; HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 113 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 8th ed. 1866); 3 VArEL, supra note 121, at 147.
152. But this right might be limited by the sovereignty of a foreign state on its own territory. See,
e.g., WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 75 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2d ed.
1884).
153. See Wilson, supra note 75, at 168-69 ("Jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution has, for most of United States history, been dominated by a 'strict territorial' approach that
defines the reach of the U.S. Constitution as extending to 'the water's edge' of U.S. sovereign territory,
but not beyond.... International law ... recognizes that states may exercise authority over their
nationals beyond their territories, though U.S. law did not reflect this principle until 1957, with the
seminal case of Reid v. Covert.").
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against the law of nations; 154 some of these torts would occur abroad 55 or on
the high seas.1 56 Under English common law doctrine developing in the late
eighteenth century, "tort actions were considered to be transitory and could be
brought wherever the tortfeasor was found,"' 57 even by a nonresident non-
British plaintiff.158 Although most crimes were considered local and could only
be prosecuted where they occurred,1 59 the crime of piracy could be punished in
national courts even if committed by noncitizens on the high seas. 6° And
extraterritoriality was not limited to jurisdiction in a nation's own domestic
courts. The United States and other countries deployed consuls 161 to overseas
ports to adjudicate disputes between their nationals there. 162
There are some indications that the protective umbrella of U.S. municipal
rights, including constitutional rights, may have been thought to follow U.S.
citizens abroad in some circumstances. For example, when, in 1823, the British
government proposed to the U.S. government measures to suppress the slave
trade from Africa, the United States rejected them, explaining that they would
154. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76.
155. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795).
156. See Martins v. Ballard, 16 F. Cas. 923, 924 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 9,175).
157. Brief of Professors of Fed. Jurisdiction & Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (Nos. 03-339, 03-485), reprinted in 28
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 99, 116 (2004) [hereinafter Brief of Professors].
158. See Rafael v. Verelst, (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 621 (K.B.) (suit by Persian-Armenian merchant
resident in Bengal against official of the East India Company complaining that defendant caused the
independent ruler of the Indian state to imprison him); cf. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep.
1021 (K.B.) (suit by resident of Minorca against Governor of Minorca for false imprisonment and
causing him to be deported to Spain). Professor James Pfander relies heavily on Mostyn as part of a
larger globalist project in James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on
Terror, 91 CoRN.LL L. REv. 497, 499-500, 510-13 (2006) (relying in part on "cases from the British
Empire" to claim that "federal courts do indeed possess broad authority to inquire into the legality of
detention (and other military conduct) overseas, so long as the inquiry examines actions of the U.S.
government"). But it should be noted that neither Mostyn nor Rafael provide direct support for
globalism. First, as Pfander notes, Great Britain ruled Minorca under the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and
therefore the native Minorcan plaintiff in Mostyn was a British subject. See id. at 511 n.92. By contrast,
Rafael arose in Bengal, India, before the British government assumed direct control over that state as a
colony. See 96 Eng. Rep. at 622 (tort occurred within the territory of "a foreign prince"). As one of the
lawyers in Rafael pointed out, the Indian ruler was "constitutionally independent of the East India
Company," the company that employed the defendant. Id. So the British defendant was not directly
exercising sovereign government authority; instead, he was charged with procuring the tortious actions
of the sovereign Indian government. Id. at 621-22.
159. See Brief of Professors, supra note 157, at 116.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1289 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204).
161. In the eighteenth century, a consul was a government official resident in a foreign port city who
was legally entitled to resolve disputes among his countrymen there, and sometimes between his
countrymen and natives. See, e.g., 3 VA=r'E, supra note 121, at 209.
162. See Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Morocco, art. XX, January 1, 1787, 8 Stat. 100;
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, art. XXV, July 9-Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84 [hereinafter
1785 U.S.-Prussia Treaty]; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Swed., art. XXVI, Apr. 3, 1783, 8
Stat. 60 [hereinafter 1783 U.S.-Sweden Treaty]. Consistent with this contemporaneous practice, Article
II of the Constitution allows the President to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
"Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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infringe the constitutional rights of American citizens abroad.163 Another ex-
ample is the case of Mitchell v. Harmony,164 decided in 1851 by the U.S.
Supreme Court. While he was trading in Mexico during the war between the
United States and Mexico, Manuel Harmony's goods were seized by the U.S.
Army. Mr. Harmony, a naturalized U.S. citizen, sued the responsible Army
officer for trespass in U.S. federal court and argued, among other things, that his
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
had been violated.165 Although it was not explicit about the source of the law
being applied, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision in favor of Mr. Harmony
and described the officer's wrongful actions as a "taking" that violated "rights
of private property" "guarded under the Constitution and laws of the United
States."' 166 A third example is a pair of decisions arising out of a punitive
bombardment by a U.S. Navy vessel of a town in Nicaragua that had been
harassing American citizens, in which the U.S. Court of Claims appeared to
allow a U.S. corporation, but not an alien individual, to use the Constitution's
Takings Clause to sue for the value of its destroyed property. 1
67
163. The British proposed that that vessels of each country be subject to search by the navy of the
other, and that citizens of each country be liable to criminal trial in either admiralty courts of the other
nation or in a "mixed commission" of judges of several nations held in Africa or the West Indies. See
Letter from Envoy Stratford Canning to Sec'y of State J.Q. Adams (Apr. 8, 1823), in 42 ANNALS OF
CONG., App. at 3007-08 (1824); Letter from Sec'y of State J.Q. Adams to Envoy Stratford Canning
(June 24, 1823), in 42 ANNALS OF CONG., App. at 3011 (1824). Secretary of State John Quincy Adams
rejected the proposals for foreign trials, citing a "Constitutional objection," namely that "the very
question of guilt or innocence is that which the protecting care of their Constitution has reserved for the
citizens of their Union, to the exclusive decision of their own countrymen." Id. at 3012; see also id. at
3015 (stating that the United States are bound, "by the injunctions of their Constitution," to enforce the
congressional criminal statute against piracy by U.S. citizens only in U.S. courts). Earlier discussions of
the same subject suggest that the U.S. government may have believed that mixed or foreign tribunals
were objectionable because they would violate Article II's guarantee that the judicial power of the
United States would be exercised in tribunals created by Congress with U.S.-appointed judges with life
tenure. See Letter from Sec'y of State J.Q. Adams to Ministers Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush (Nov.
2, 1818), in 37 ANNALS OF CONG., App. at 1321 (1818).
164. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
165. See id. at 126-27 (argument of counsel).
166. See id. at 134, 136. Some contemporary treatises appear to have viewed Mitchell as a
constitutional decision. See JOHN NORTON PoMERoY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTTruToNAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 162-63 (New York, Hurd & Houghton 1868); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON
THE RULES WHICH GovERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
612 n.t (New York, John S. Voorhies 1857). Justice Black's plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert states
that Mitchell was a case where "federal courts have held or asserted that various constitutional
limitations apply to the Government when it acts outside the continental United States." Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 8 & n.10 (1957). But see IHRLG Brief, supra note 70, at 9 n.9 (stating that prior to Reid,
"the Supreme Court had never held that citizens had extraterritorial rights").
167. Compare Wiggins v. United States, 3 Ct. CI. 412 (1867) (American corporation entitled to
compensation), with Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 543 (1868) (French citizens not entitled to
compensation), aff'd, 79 U.S. 315 (1870). The reasoning of these cases is not always explicit and,
therefore, nothing definitive can be said about globalism based on their outcomes. But the Perrin court
found dispositive that Wiggins had concerned a claim by a United States citizen, while the foreign
citizenship of Perrin at the time of the incident rendered the claim an "international political question[ ]."
Id. at 547.
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The final two examples are from congressional debates about extraterritorial
actions by the U.S. military. The first debate concerned then-General Andrew
Jackson's 1818 attack on Spanish-owned Florida and his execution of two
British subjects he captured there. 168 Representative Henry Baldwin, later
appointed by President Jackson to the U.S. Supreme Court, disparaged the
notion that "the Constitution and laws of the country ha[ve] been violated" by
the executions because, as he put it, "neither have any bearing on the case of
these men. They were found and executed outside of the territorial limits of the
United States, where our laws or Constitution have no operation, except be-
tween us and our own citizens, and where none other could claim their benefit
and protection."
169
The final example is found in congressional debates in early 1858 about the
arrest in Nicaragua by the U.S. Navy of a group of American "filibusters" who
were attempting to take control of the country and establish a pro-slavery
government. 170 Many members of Congress-generally Democrats from slave
states-denounced the arrests as illegal under various theories, such as violation
of Nicaraguan territorial rights under international law, lack of power in the
executive branch because it allegedly was not authorized by statute to effect
arrests in a foreign country, and lack of jurisdiction or authority over the person
of the leader of the filibusters, one William Walker, who may have renounced
his U.S. citizenship during an earlier sojourn in Nicaragua when he led a
military government that briefly held power. One congressman argued that the
constitutional rights of the arrestees--described as "American citizens"-had
been violated. 17 1 Supporters of the arrests generally did not take up the constitu-
tional argument. But one argued, referring to Walker and not his indisputably
American followers, that this was "not the case of a citizen of our own country
that we are considering. It is the case of a man who is no citizen of ours; who
168. For a detailed discussion of this incident and the resulting congressional investigation and
debate, see infra Part V.C.
169. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1042 (1819) (emphases added); see also id. ("These men were not our
citizens, nor bound by our laws; they owed us no allegiance, and were entitled to no protection."); id. at
1044 ("[Jackson] has violated no Constitutional provision. It was not made to protect such men; they
are no parties to it; owe it no obedience; and can claim no protection from it.").
170. For background on these events, which took place soon after Dred Scott was decided and
during bitter debates about Kansas statehood, see 5 HERMANN E. VON HOLST, THE CONSTrrulONAL AND
POLmcAL HISTORY OF THE UNrroD STATES 470-84 (John J. Lalor trans., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1885);
6 id. at 158-64, 197-203.
171. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1858) (statement of Rep. Moore of Alabama)
('The Constitution of the United States guarantees to every citizen protection from seizure in his person
and in his property, unless upon due complaint, made and supported by oath or affirmation."); id. at 259
("The citizen of the ancient Roman Republic, in whatever land he might be, no matter how the hand of
power was sought to be laid upon him, could stand up and proclaim 'I am a Roman citizen!' and
forthwith he found protection in his rights, and his person was considered inviolate. Shall it not be so
with an American citizen?"). Another Southerner, Representative Stephens of Georgia, also may have
believed that there was a constitutional violation. See id. at 202. This is interesting because he had
earlier stated that the arrests were "a great outrage, unjustified by law or the semblance of law," whether
committed on "citizens of a foreign country, or American citizens." Id. at 198.
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has no right whatever to appeal to us for any of the rights of citizenship." 172
These five examples suggest that extraterritorial rights for American citizens
were "thinkable" well before the mid-twentieth century, and therefore that the
reliance by many non-originalist globalists on the rise and fall of a supposedly
strict dogma of territoriality is overstated. The possibility that constitutional
rights for Americans were seen as potentially global is supported by the fact that
in the British empire, into which the Founding generation was born, many had a
fairly robust conception of global rights for the subjects of the English Crown.
As a British government official stated in 1720, "Let an Englishman go where
he will.... he carries as much of law and liberty with him, as the nature of
things will bear."'
1 73
While the nation's military and regulatory jurisdiction and, perhaps, certain
constitutional rights of citizens, extended abroad, it seems that the English
common law writ of habeas corpus did not extend abroad because it was not
capable of reaching anyone outside the Crown's dominions. 174 In Rasul, the
Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions both concluded that the
English common law writ did not reach outside the dominions over which the
crown exercised jurisdiction.1 75 Additional evidence of this is found in the
constitutional struggles of seventeenth-century England. 176 Nevertheless, as a
172. Id. at 276 (statement of Rep. Clay of Kentucky).
173. ScHWARTz, supra note 6, at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also BALYN, supra note
7, at 217 (quoting a 1769 American pamphlet which argued that "all the British subjects everywhere
have a right to be ruled by the known principles of their common constitution"). Many colonial charters
granted by the British crown to settlers in America specifically provided that Americans would retain
the customary rights of Englishmen. See, e.g., CAROLINA CHARTER of 1665 para. 7, in 5 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 773 (Francis Newton
Thorpe ed., 1909); GA. CHARTER of 1732 para. 7, in 2 id. at 2765; MAss. BAY CHARTER of 1691, in 3 id.
at 1880-81. A major grievance that hastened the American Revolution was the claim that Americans'
rights as British subjects were being violated. See, e.g., Petition of Congress to the King, 1 JouRNALs OF
Ta CoNTIENTAL CONGRESS 115, 118 (1774) (complaining of "[tihe apprehension of being degraded into
a state of servitude from the pre-eminent rank of English freemen"). For a rich account of colonial
Americans' claims of entitlement to English liberties and common law rights, and counter-claims by
British government officials, see DANIEL J. HuxsFaoscH, CONSTrrurING EMPIRE 58, 63--64, 93-95, 146
(2005).
174. See In re Ning Yi-ching, (1939) 56 T.L.R. 3 (Vacation Ct.); 9 WILLAt HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 116-17, 124 (3d impression 1982); Douglas E. Dayton, Comment, A Critique of the
Eisentrager Case: American Law Abroad-Habeas Corpus at Home?, 36 CORNa.L L.Q. 303, 310
(1951); cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950) ("We are cited to no instance where a
court, in this or any other country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy
who, at no stage in his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction."). Numerous statements can
be found in eighteenth century sources stating that the territorial limit of the writ was the "dominions"
of the crown. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 47 (1794); 3 BLAcsTONE, supra note 115, at * 131.
175. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481-82 & nn.ll-13 (2004) (majority opinion of Stevens, J.)
(noting the writ extended to all "dominions under the sovereign's control"); id. at 502-04 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing the extension of the writ to such dominions).
176. In a number of instances agents of the Crown detained accused persons in overseas prisons in
order to avoid judicial scrutiny on habeas corpus. For example, according to impeachment charges
brought by Parliament against the Earl of Clarendon in 1667, he had caused "divers of his majesty's
2007]
498 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 95:463
matter of English constitutional history and current American law, the extent
and type of jurisdiction and dominion that the government must exercise in
order to bring a given overseas territory within the reach of the writ is unclear.
Although American courts have long held that, "for the meaning of the term
habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law," 177 it is
also unclear whether the English writ's domestic territorial limitation was
imported into the judicial systems of the American states and the new federal
court system created in 1787-1789. The jurisdiction of state courts to issue
writs of habeas corpus was likely limited to the territory of each state,1 78 but
more historical research is needed on this point. When the U.S. federal courts
were created in the Judiciary Act of 1789, they were given power to issue writs
subjects to be imprisoned against law, in remote islands, garrisons, and other places, thereby to prevent
them from the benefit of the law." WnLtaAm F. DUKER, A CoNslrrtrlONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 53
(1980). Parliament was opposed to overseas detentions of subjects because, in the words of Sir Thomas
Lee, "no Habeas Corpus can reach" the detainee there. Id. (quoting 1 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR 1694, at 237 (Anchitell Grey ed., 1763)). Previously the
Protectorate government had also sent prisoners "overseas ... beyond the reach of the writ" of habeas
corpus. DuKER, supra, at 51-52. Apparently, it was precisely because the habeas jurisdiction of the
English courts was territorially limited that these overseas prisons were used by the executive. See 2
HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTrrtTIONAL ISTORY OF ENGLAND 126-28 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978)
(1846); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 174, at 116-17; see also Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal
Black Hole, 53 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1, 8 (2004). Parliament's eventual reform measure-the famous
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679-is best read as confirming the domestic territorial limitation of the English
writ. Political prisoners had also been detained unlawfully within England, where the Crown's courts
and agents cooperated to throw up a welter of procedural obstacles that delayed or prevented detainees
seeking the writ from presenting their cases in court. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *135; 9
HoLDswoRTH, supra note 174, at 116-17. Parliament long tried to remedy these two different problems-
detention overseas beyond the reach of the writ of habeas corpus and intentional procedural delays to
undermine habeas corpus in domestic cases-with different bills addressed to each. See DuKER, supra,
at 53-59; 9 HoLDswORTH, supra note 174, at 117. The two bills were later combined and finally passed
as the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 174, at 117. Among other provisions,
the Act instituted domestic procedural reforms and designated the domestic places to which the writ
could issue and, separately, curtailed the imprisonment of subjects abroad and provided a civil damages
remedy against government officials who detained a subject abroad unlawfully. See 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 115, at *136-37 (summarizing the Act); 9 HoLDsWORTH, supra note 174, at 117 (same).
Importantly, the Act did not purport to extend the English courts' habeas jurisdiction to places outside
the dominions of the Crown.
177. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
178. Cf. Leonard S. Goodman, Eighteenth Century Conflict of Laws: Critique of an Erie and Klaxon
Rationale, 5 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 328 (1961) (explaining that "colonial courts were established
under the authority of the governors' commissions [which] generally authorized judicial power that
ended at the boundary of a particular colony, but there are examples of where it extended further").
Only South Carolina had a habeas corpus statute at the time of the Declaration of Independence, see
Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States, 1776-1865, 32 U. Cri. L. REv. 243, 251 (1965), and
jurisdiction to issue the writ was specifically limited to the territory of the state, see Act of Dec. 12,
1712, no. 330, § 4, in THE PuBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF SoUTm CAROLINA 21 (John Faucheraud Grinke
ed., 1790). By the time of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, five more states-Georgia, Massachu-
setts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia-had enacted habeas statutes. See Oaks, supra, at 251. The
statutes of New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts were modeled on the English Habeas Corpus Act
which, as noted above, appears to have confirmed the domestic territorial limitation of the writ. See
Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 39, §§ 9-10, 1785 Mass. Acts 270, 272; Act of Feb. 21, 1787, ch. 39, § 8, 1787
N.Y. Laws 424, 428; Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 35, § 2, 1784 Va. Acts 19, 20.
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of habeas corpus, but neither the territorial nor the personal scope of the writ's
protections was specified, perhaps suggesting that common law jurisdictional
rules would be carried forward.
Territoriality, then, while undoubtedly a factor in American legal thinking,
cannot fully explain why the early generations of Americans would have
thought that aliens abroad did not have U.S. constitutional rights, even though
aliens within the United States were protected by its laws. A fuller answer must
account for the unique protective relationship existing between the U.S. govern-
ment and U.S. citizens and other residents of the country. The evidence regard-
ing habeas corpus, however, suggests that the territorial limitation on the writ
was likely strict.
C. DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MUNICIPAL LAW VERSUS INTERNATIONAL LAW
Generally speaking, insofar as international relations were thought to be
governed by law, rather than policy, they were governed by treaties and
customary international law-known in the eighteenth century as the law of
nations-which gave substantial deference to national interests and the discre-
tion of the political branches of government,179 while domestic affairs were
thought to be governed by municipal laws like statutes, constitutions, and the
common law.180 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
customary law of nations consisted of rules governing relations between states,
between states and individuals of other states, and between individuals of
different states. The last category includes maritime law, the law merchant, and
the law of conflicts of laws.18' A sharp distinction between the law governing
foreign affairs and domestic affairs appears to have been common ground
179. For example, the eighteenth century law of nations gave states wide discretion to use force
when they believed that other states had violated the law of nations. See 3 VArrL, supra note 121, at
106-07 ("It is of the greatest importance to nations that the Law of Nations, which is the basis of their
peace, be everywhere respected. If anyone openly treads it under foot all may and should rise against
that nation; and by thus uniting their forces to punish their common enemy, they will fulfill their duties
towards themselves and toward human society, of which they are members."); id. at 8 ("[AIll Nations
may put down by force the open violation of the laws of the society which nature has established
among them, or any direct attacks upon its welfare."); see also, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALExANDER HAmLTON 406-07 (Harold C.
Syrett ed., 1969) ("There is no principle better supported by the Doctrine of Writers, the practice of
Nations, and the dictates of right reason, than this-that whenever a Nation adopts maxims of conduct
tending to the disturbance of tranquility and established order of its neighbours, or manifesting a spirit
of self-aggrandisement-it is lawful for other Nations to combine against it, and, by force, to controul
the effects of those maxims and that spirit. The conduct of France... was an offence against Nations,
which naturally made it a common cause among them to check her career.").
180. But note that American legal theory recognized that the federal government could legislate
regarding the domestic effects of relations with foreign nations and people. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cls. 10-11; Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 119 (1804); Tm FEDERALIST
No. 53 (James Madison).
181. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-15 (2004); Stephens, supra note 46, at
463--64.
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among American courts, 182 political officials,18 3 and commentators. 184 Madison,
for example, in one of his Helvidius essays, distinguished "external laws"
designed to preserve "external peace" from "municipal laws" designed to
preserve "internal peace."
1 85
The distinction between internal municipal law and external international law
and diplomacy would have made sense to Americans who, in the previous
decade, had generally conceded that "external" affairs including war and for-
eign policy were lawfully the province of the British government but had fought
a revolution to reject the notion that the same overseas government could
lawfully regulate the "internal police" or the local, domestic affairs of American
colonists. 186 The distinction between internal municipal law and external interna-
tional law derived from many other sources, including the theories of Black-
182. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828) (stating that
an admiralty case based on events outside the United States does not arise under the Constitution and
laws of the United States but the law of nations); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 260 (1796)
(opinion of Iredell, J.) (suggesting that foreign policy is regulated by the law of nations and the
discretion of the political branches); see also The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 382, 384 (1814) (holding
that a prize of war would be adjudicated under the law of nations not "mere municipal regulations"
found in U.S. statute); Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 91 (1795) (opinion of Iredell,
J.) (suggesting that all prize cases should be decided under the law of nations not "mere municipal
regulation"); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. 19, 26 (1795) (argument of counsel by Mr. Tilghman) (asserting
that common law courts may address some aspects of prize cases because the exclusive jurisdiction of
admiralty courts is based on the nature of a prize case as a "controversy, arising on the high seas,
affecting, usually, the rights and interests of different States; and, consequently,... ought to be decided
by the law of nations, and not by the municipal law of either country"); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419, 475 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (distinguishing cases affecting foreign diplomats and
admiralty cases from cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States and concluding
that the former are to be regulated by the law of nations and fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts); Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393, 402-03 (Pa. 1788) (determining that a
U.S. citizen was subject to municipal law and could not be considered a public enemy under the law of
nations).
183. See Letter from Sec'y of State Thomas Jefferson to Minister George Hammond (May 29,
1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 202 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair
Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833) [hereinafter Jefferson Letter to Hammond] (stating that
Great Britain considered the American Revolution an internal rebellion and therefore "did not conduct
it according to the rules of war, established by the law of nations, but according to her acts of
parliament").
184. For example, in one of his influential Crisis essays, Thomas Paine argued that, by the
Declaration of Independence and the 1778 treaty with France recognizing her independence, the United
States then came, in her relations with Great Britain, "within the law of nations, [and] out of the law of
Parliament." The Crisis No. VII, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, OR THE GENERAL ADVERTISER, Nov. 12, 1778.
There are, of course, exceptions and nuances to these generalizations. For example, many believed that
the law of nations also contained duties which nations owed to themselves, see, e.g., James Wilson, Of
the Law of Nations (1790), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 137-38 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896), that both domestic and international law were often ultimately based
on the same source, the law of nature or God, see, e.g., Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as
Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1, 68-70 (1999), and that municipal law applied in court cases implicating external events could
incorporate, where appropriate, the law of nations, see infra note 242.
185. James Madison, Letter of Helvidius No. H (Aug.-Sept. 1793), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 159-60 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
186. See generally BAILYN, supra note 7, at 203-04, 209-11; GREENE, supra note 146, at 153.
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stone, Locke, Vattel, Pufendorf, and other influential writers. 87 According to
Montesquieu, for example, the external "right of nations" (or law of nations)
governs "the relation that.., peoples have with one another," while internal
"political right" and "civil right" govern, respectively, "the relation between
those who govern and those who are governed" "in a society" and "the relation
that all citizens have with one another."1 88 He emphasized that the "things that
belong to the right of nations must not be decided by the principles of civil
laws" or "political laws." 189 Similarly, Locke taught that the legislature enacts
"municipal laws" which operate within the society and for the benefit of its
members, while "all the transactions, with all persons and communities without
the common-wealth," are entrusted to an executive power of government,
charged with "the management of the security and interest of the public" in the
external realm. 90 Pennsylvania Judge Alexander Addison summarized this type
of thinking, as applied to the United States: "The restrictions of the [U.S.]
constitution are not restrictions of external and national right, but of internal and
municipal right."'1 91 Or as George Taylor, a Virginia legislator, put it in 1798,
"municipal regulations, where citizens and others were concerned under the
particular laws of the state" were distinguished from "cases between the govern-
ment and aliens, which arise under the law of nations." '19
There was an intensely practical reason for the internal/external distinction
187. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *43, *69, *263-64; 4 id. at *66-67; CoRm.LIus BYNKERSHOEK,
A MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 17-18
(Gordon J. Lang trans., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1995) (1744); 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE lURE BELLI
LIBRI TREs 3, 5 (John C. Rolfe trans., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1995) (1612); CHARLES JENKINSON, A
DISCOURSE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN RESPECT TO NEUTRAL NATIONS 7-8
(London 1801) (1758); 8 SAMUEL FREIHERR VON PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 748-49,
836 (5th ed. London 1749); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE UPON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF
THE INEQUALITY AMONG MANKIND 138-39 (London, R. & J. Dodsley 1761); 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH,
INSTITUTES OF THE NATURAL LAW 43-64 (Cambridge, J. Bentham 1756); 4 THE SERMONS OF JOHN DONNE
274 (George R. Potter & Evelyn M. Simpson eds., 1959); JAMES TYRRELL, A BRIEF DISQUISITION OF THE
LAW OF NATURE xli (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1701); 3 VATTEL, supra note 121, at 3-4, 6, 8.
188. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 115, at 7.
189. Id. at 514-15.
190. LociKE, supra note 144, §§ 146-47; see also id. §§ 131, 134 (suggesting that legislatures by
consent establish "standing laws" for the common good of the society, but that external relations are
governed by force, not law).
191. Alexander Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia Assembly (1800),
reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRrrING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 122, at 1070. As late
as 1936, the Supreme Court stated that, regarding U.S. activities abroad, "operations of the nation
... must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of
international law," rather than "the Constitution [or] the laws passed in pursuance of it." United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Among other reasons, Curtiss-Wright is
controversial for its suggestion that the external "power" of the United States government does not
derive from the Constitution and laws but from international law and concepts of inherent sovereignty.
Whatever the merits of this claim about power, it is a different claim than what the Court suggested
about external relations being regulated by international instead of municipal law.
192. VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800 TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS 35 (Leonard W. Levy, ed., DeCapo Press 1970) (1850) [hereinafter VIRGINIA REPORT]
(statement of George Taylor in 1798).
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that saw external relations as governed by the more forgiving standards of
international law and discretion. Locke argued that, compared to domestic
matters, foreign affairs are "much less capable to be directed by antecedent,
standing, positive laws" because "what is to be done in reference to foreigners
... must be left in great part to the prudence of those[] who have this power
committed to them."' 93 Similarly, Rutherforth wrote that external executive
power must often be "discretionary" because "the public understanding cannot
direct by settled rules, which have been established beforehand, but must act if
it acts at all as occasion offers." '194
This view was understood by influential American Founders who argued that
the Constitution-a municipal enactment-should not provide rigid, enforce-
able legal limits to the powers that the federal government might need to defend
against external aggression. Madison asked in The Federalist No. 41:
With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited
by those who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could
chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then
indeed it might prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set
bounds to the exertions for its own safety....
... The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the
danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by
no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of
self-preservation. 195
Alexander Hamilton concurred, arguing in one issue of The Federalist that:
[National defense powers] ought to exist without limitation, because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies,
or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary
to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are
infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed
on the power to which the care of it is committed. 196
D. THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS WITHIN THE COUNTRY
Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century understandings about the legal sta-
tus of aliens appear to have been inconsistent with globalism. Under the
common law, aliens had fewer rights than citizens in important areas. For example, in
193. LocKE, supra note 144, § 147 (emphases omitted); see also id. § 145.
194. 2 RtJrHERFORTH, supra note 187, at 56, 60, 65.
195. THE FEDERAausT No. 41, at 257 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
196. THE FEDERAtUST No. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
omitted). A civil libertarian defense of discretionary federal power against external enemies appears
repeatedly throughout the ratification debates: robust national power must exist to protect American
liberty against external foreign aggression. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay); Nos. 8, 24-26,
29 (Alexander Hamilton); Nos. 41, 45 (James Madison).
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England and early America they were largely barred from beneficially owning,
devising, or inheriting real property, and from voting and holding public or military
office. 197 Nevertheless, aliens within the country were under the protection of the
sovereign's municipal laws. 198 Influential writers like Vattel and Blackstone empha-
sized that aliens residing or sojourning within their countries were required to obey
local laws and, reciprocally, were entitled to the "protection" of the sovereign and the
municipal laws while within the country.' 99 Blackstone, for example, wrote that "as
the prince affords his protection to an alien, only during his residence in this realm, the
allegiance of an alien is confined (in point of time) to the duration of such his
residence, and (in point of locality) to the dominions of the British empire."2 °°
The general principle that allegiance and protection were reciprocal duties
and rights was common ground among many theorists read by the revolutionary
generation20 I and entered mainstream American thinking.20 2 Consistent with
these general understandings, the common law writ of habeas corpus was
available to friendly aliens resident or visiting within the country in both
England and in the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
203tion.
The view that alien residents or visitors are under the protection of the
sovereign's municipal laws so long as they are within the country had roots in
197. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *371-72; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 56 (New York, 0. Halstead 1827); 1 ZEPHANIAH SwIFr, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CoNNECTICUT 165-66 (Windham, John Byrne 1795).
198. See, e.g., An Act Containing an Abstract and Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the
People of this State, and Securing the Same of 1776 para. 3, reprinted in ACTS AND LAWS OF TM STATE
OF CONNECTICUT, IN AMERICA 2 (New London, Timothy Green 1784) ("[AII the free Inhabitants of this
or any other of the United States of America, and Foreigners in Amity with this State, shall enjoy the
same Justice and Law within this States, which is general for the State, in all Cases proper for the
Cognizance of the Civil Authority and Court of Judicature within the same ...."); MASS. BODY OF
LIBERTIES, art. 2 (1641) ("Every person within Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or forreiner shall enjoy
the same justice and law, that is generall for the plantation, which we constitute and execute one
towards another, without partialitie or delay."), reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETrS 33
(1995).
199. See 3 VArEL, supra note 121, at 87, 145, 371.
200. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *370; see also id. at *369.
201. See, e.g., J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIc LAW 29-30 (Thomas
Nugent trans., John Rice ed., 1791) (1735); 3 HuGo GROTIUS, OF THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 349
(London, D. Brown 1715) (1682); 2 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 187, at 33.
202. For eighteenth century examples, see 1 Swr, supra note 197, at 164; Letter from Thomas
Jefferson, Sec'y of State, to Jean Baptiste de Temant, Minister Plenipotentiary of France (May 15,
1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 183, at 148; John Adams, Thoughts
on Government (1776), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 122, at
405. For later examples, see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120 (1804); 3
Op. Att'y Gen. 253, 254 (1837).
203. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("In England prior to 1789, in the Colonies,
and in this Nation during the formative years of our Government, the writ of habeas corpus was
available to nonenemy aliens as well as to citizens." (citing Sommersett v. Stewart, (1772) 20 How. St.
Tr. 1, 79-82 (K.B.); Case of the Hottentot Venus, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 344 (K.B.); King v. Schiever,
(1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.); United States v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No.
16,622))); see also United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 49 (1795) (argument of Att'y Gen.
Bradford) (stating that a Frenchman in the United States could employ the writ of habeas corpus).
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the Magna Carta,2° and probably also in the Hebrew and Christian Bibles. The
Hebrew Bible, in particular, emphasized equality under the laws for alien
2006residents or sojourners,"' as did early bilateral treaties of the United States,2 °6
and official statements of U.S. government policy. 20 7 Treating aliens within the
country equitably and generously was a refrain of many theorists, 20 8 and was an
emerging norm of the law of nations in the eighteenth century.20 9 The strong
desire of many eighteenth-century Americans to stimulate economic develop-
ment 2 '0 and to populate their new country by encouraging immigration 2"
would likely have contributed to the understanding that aliens within the
country should be under the protection of the laws, as would the American
social values of egalitarianism, opportunity, and hospitality to strangers.21 2
During the debates about the so-called Alien Friends Act in 1798, Jefferson-
ian Republican members of Congress argued that friendly-that is, not "en-
emy"-resident aliens were fully protected by the Constitution by citing the
reciprocal norms of protection and allegiance.213 Given the strong influence of
204. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *69.
205. See, e.g., Leviticus 24:22 ("Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one
of your own country: for I am the LORD your God."); Numbers 15:16 ("One law and one manner shall
be for you, and for the stranger that sojourneth with you."); Deuteronomy 24:17-18 ("Thou shalt not
pervert the judgment of the stranger.... But thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in Egypt,
and the LORD thy God redeemed thee thence: therefore I command thee to do this thing."); Zechariah
7:9-10 ("Thus speaketh the LORD of hosts, saying, Execute true judgment, and shew mercy and
compassions every man to his brother: And oppress not the widow, nor the fatherless, the stranger, nor
the poor....").
206. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-United Mexican States, arts. XIV-XV,
Apr. 5, 1832, 8 Stat. 410; Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spaln, art. XX, Oct. 27,
1795, 8 Stat. 138 [hereinafter 1795 U.S.-Spain Treaty]; 1785 U.S.-Prussia Treaty, supra note 162, art.
II; 1783 U.S.-Sweden Treaty, supra note 162, art. XVII; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth.,
art. VIII, Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32.
207. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 192, 193 (1816); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 30, 32 (1793).
208. See RIcRARD HOOKER, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 32 (Dublin, J.A. Husband
1773) (stating that the law of nations concerns itself with "the courteous entertainment of strangers");
see also, e.g., 3 VATrEL, supra note 121, at 145-48.
209. See G.F. voN MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND
CUSTOMS OF TIE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE, Bk. 3, ch. 3 at 83, Bk. 8, ch. 2 at 273 (William Cobbett
trans., 1802) (1795). The importance of treating aliens within the country equally under the law can be
seen from the fact that "denial of justice" to alien nationals was viewed as a legitimate reason for the
aliens' home state to resort to war or reprisals against the offending nation. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80
(Alexander Hamilton); 3 VATrEL, supra note 121, at 230-31. See generally Anthony D'Amato, The
Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INr'L L. 62, 64-65 (1988) (stating
that unjust treatment of aliens abroad was "the major excuse for war").
210. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 238-39 & n.22 (2d ed. 1985) (noting
the link between relaxation of bans on alien land ownership and the United States' interest in economic
growth, "build[ing] population and stimulat[ing] the land market").
211. See supra note 14; see also JAMES H. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CTZENsHmP:
1608-1870, at 65-247 (1978).
212. See generally RICHARD B. MORIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION: 1781-1789, at 163 (Henry Steel
Commager & Richard Morris eds., 1987); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 222, 237 (1991).
213. See, e.g., 8 ANNAiLs OF CONG. 2012 (1798) (statement of Rep. Livingston).
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the social compact theory of constitutional government on many Founders, it is
not surprising that some Americans, particularly Federalists, disputed that aliens,
even those within the United States, were protected by the most important
municipal law, the Constitution, because aliens were not parties to the Constitu-
tion's social compact.214 As discussed in detail below, there was bipartisan
consensus that alien enemies-nationals of a state engaged in hostilities with
the United States-were not protected by the Constitution or any other munici-
pal laws, but only by the law of nations.
In sum, for the Founding generation there were strong and overlapping
traditions of thought that aliens were protected by the municipal laws of society,
but only when physically present in the country's territory during peacetime.
Otherwise, aliens were protected only by the much looser rules of the law of
nations, which gave significant deference to national interest and the discretion-
ary decisions of sovereign governments.
IV. THE TEXTUAL BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES
The Constitution's text reflects many of the understandings just discussed. It
distinguishes internal and external powers and rights, and municipal and interna-
tional law. Aliens abroad are protected in several ways, but generally under
international law and diplomacy, which are largely under the substantive control
of the political branches of the U.S. government. Habeas corpus is protected,
but only domestically. Much of the Bill of Rights is written in language that
generally appears to have a domestic limitation, though its descriptions of the
rights holders are unrestricted by references to citizenship. By contrast with the
internal realm where power is diffused among many institutions and textually
limited as to its objects, external national defense powers are concentrated in the
President and Congress and textually unlimited. All of this, interpreted on the
background of the contemporary attitudes and understandings discussed in Part
m, suggests that constitutional rights generally protected U.S. citizens and
resident or visiting foreigners, but that aliens abroad would have been protected
only by international law, diplomacy, and policy choices of the political branches.
A. PROVISIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALIENS
An important purpose of the Constitution, visible in its text, was to provide
certain judicial and executive protections to foreign nations and foreign nation-
als.21 5 One textual example is the President's authority to "receive Ambassadors
214. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis); VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note
192, at 34 (statement of George Taylor in 1798); see also infra notes 376-380 and accompanying text.
215. See generally FREDERICK W. MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING
OF THE CONsmnmON 142-43, 151-52 (Scholarly Resources Inc. 1986) (1973) (discussing the important
constitutional goal of better internal enforcement of treaties and the law of nations); Holt, supra note
135, at 1452-53, 1462--64 (noting the failure of the Confederation to enforce foreign debt repayment
2007]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
and other public Ministers" from foreign countries, who would be expected to
spend much of their time attempting to protect the rights and interests of their
co-nationals.21 6 The Constitution shows the importance it accords to the role of
foreign diplomats by protecting them with original jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court.
2 17
A second and more important way that foreigners are protected under the
Constitution is through treaties made by the President with the Senate's consent,
enforceable in federal court.218 In the eighteenth century, as now, treaties of
amity and commerce commonly provided that each signatory grant certain
rights and protections to the visiting or resident nationals of the other treatying
state.2 19 By the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, treaties are deemed
to be the "supreme Law of the Land," binding on state and federal courts
alike; 220 and Article III extends the federal judicial power to cases arising under
treaties.221 A leading purpose of the Constitution was to provide a national
government under which treaties and the customary law of nations could be
uniformly and fairly applied for the benefit of foreigners.222 If the new national
legislature enacted discriminatory measures against aliens or foreign nations
that would hamper America's foreign policy goals, the President was given a
veto.223
It was common ground among the Founders that aliens, particularly mer-
chants and lenders doing business in the United States, had not been adequately
protected by state courts after independence from Britain.22 4 The Constitution's
and the pressure to strengthen enforcement under the Constitution); Ruth Wedgwood, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction-Applicability of Constitutional Restraints to U.S. Officials Acting Abroad, 84 AM. J. INT'L
L. 747, 753 (1990) (calling the belief that the Constitution was intended solely to benefit American
citizens "ahistorical").
216. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Of course, this clause also served many American interests, which were
doubtless more important to the Founding generation than protection of aliens.
217. See id. art. lIl, § 2, cl. 2.
218. Id. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. VI, cl. 2. The inclusion in the Constitution of federal judicial power
to enforce treaties was intended in part to benefit foreigners. See, e.g., Rici, H. FALLON ET AL., HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 15 n.79 (4th ed. 1996).
219. See supra note 206.
220. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
221. Id. art. l, § 2.
222. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay). The heated academic debate over whether the
Founders intended that all, some, or no treaties would be self-executing and directly enforceable in
court by individuals is beyond the scope of this Article. But the evidence that the Founders strongly
believed, as a general proposition, that treaties should be enforced and enforceable appears to be
compelling. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Under-
standing, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999). But see John C.
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,
99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 (1999).
223. See AMAR, supra note 135, at 143.
224. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716-19 (2004); THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James
Madison); Remarks of James Madison to Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNsTrrTON 583 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT, DEBATES]; Sylvester, supra note 184, at 22-25. Foreign diversity jurisdiction
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grants to federal courts of alienage jurisdiction and admiralty jurisdiction were
intended to protect foreigners,225 as were other provisions.226 As Professor
Neuman notes, Article III of the Constitution "appears to 'establish Justice' for
foreign citizens, subjects and even ambassadors by designing tribunals that will
decide their cases impartially., 227 The Constitution's promises to observe and
enforce treaties and protect creditors were designed to, among other things,
serve the strategic goals of avoiding international conflict, promoting com-
merce, and reassuring foreign governments and businessmen that the United
States would be a trustworthy and dependable international citizen.228
Constitutional protection for aliens, including those residing abroad, can also
be seen in the grant of power to Congress to "define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Na-
tions. '229 Foreigners as well as Americans could easily be the target of piracy
and felonies committed on the high seas. The law of nations-the second head
of Congress's "define and punish" power--directly concerned the interests and
rights of foreigners. Madison and others viewed the impunity with which
American states had committed "[v]iolations of the law of nations and of
treaties" to the detriment of foreigners as one of the principal vices of govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation.23 °
These structures protecting aliens are not best understood as evidence of
globalism. By recognizing the importance of aliens becoming citizens,23' the
Constitution signaled that citizens would have greater rights. Moreover, the
Constitution's protections of foreigners had inward-looking instrumental pur-
poses: to promote commerce, increase population, and prevent friction with
foreigners and foreign nations from ripening into war or otherwise harming the
in federal courts would help protect foreign lenders and businessmen, see 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTAR-
IES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1692 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833);
Wedgwood, supra note 215, at 753, while federal admiralty jurisdiction over prize cases would protect
the foreign owners of ships captured by American privateers or naval vessels, see 1 STORY, supra, at
§ 484.
225. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 218, at 15; THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton);
NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 5. Federal removal jurisdiction of aliens' suits, see Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79, and federal appellate review of state court decisions implicating
federal rights, see CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 168-69 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1993) (1928), were other ways that the Framers protected foreigners.
226. The Constitution protects creditors who loaned money to Americans to fight the Revolutionary
War, see THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the
purpose of U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1), and bars state governments from passing laws reneging on
contracts, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Constitution also vastly diminished the ability of
individual states to annoy foreign countries through discriminatory taxes on imports. See id. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
227. NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 5.
228. See AMAR, supra note 135, at 299; Sylvester, supra note 184, at 19-26.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
230. See, e.g., James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), reprinted in
9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 349 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975); see also
MARKS, supra note 215, at 142.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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United States.23 2 The Constitution is not particularly concerned with the protec-
tion of foreigners for their own sake.
The constitutional text and structure display a preference for the political
branches to manage the substance of external relations even in the areas where
the Constitution gives the courts a role in protecting foreigners. Some important
protections for aliens, such as diplomatic protection and rules for naturalization,
appear to be, as a textual matter, under the discretionary control of the President
and Congress, respectively, with no role for the courts. The substantive content
of other provisions protecting aliens are also controlled by the political branches,
such as rights granted under treaties.233 The Constitution also gives the political
branches some control over the substance of the non-treaty law to be applied in
court cases concerning aliens. The content of mercantile, admiralty and mari-
time law, and other forms of customary international law can be controlled to
some extent by Congress-subject to presidential veto--through constitutional
provisions such as the Law of Nations Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause,
and the power to make rules concerning "captures. 234 Indeed, if it is true that
the Founders viewed the law of nations as a form of general common law, to be
applied by courts interstitially, it is significant that the Founders generally also
believed that common law was subject to legislative modification or override. 35
In the eighteenth century, many violations of international law were not
232. For example, the Constitution's provision for better enforcement of international law vis-4-vis
foreigners had the instrumental purpose of preventing conflicts with foreign countries that might harm
the United States. See THE FEDERAIST No. 3 (John Jay); see also 1 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 14, at
19 (statement of Edmund Randolph); id. at 316 (statement of James Madison). The grants of federal
court jurisdiction over maritime law and foreign diversity cases, and Congress's power to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations were justified by instrumental arguments that they would
benefit the United States and its people by increasing commerce and generating other benefits. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); 3 STORY, supra note 224, at § 1160.
233. This is true unless one believes that the President and Senate's treaty-making power is
constrained by Bill of Rights guarantees to the nonresident foreigners affected by a treaty. This is an
extravagant idea, but it does seem to follow from the logic of some globalist arguments. After all, Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the most important Supreme Court case for globalists, held that bilateral
treaty provisions cannot trump Bill of Rights protections owed to Americans abroad.
234. Congress, for example, is given power to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, even though "Questions relative to captures on the high Seas"
arose under "the Law of Nations," 13 JOUtNALS OF THE CONrrl mAL CONGREsS 135 (1779).
235. The precise status of the customary (not treaty-based) law of nations in the eighteenth century
is a very difficult question that has been debated extensively by scholars. Many agree that the law of
nations was seen as somehow part of the general common law. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position,
110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 823-24 (1997); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort
Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 221, 234 (1996);
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1513, 1517-21 (1984); Stewart Jay, The Status of the
Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REv. 819, 821-28 (1989). These concepts are
slippery and difficult, precluding any definitive statements in the short space of a footnote. But if it is
correct that the law of nations was part of the common law, the fact that the U.S. Congress was
understood to have the power to override the common law, see, e.g., Agrippa VI, MAss. GAZrTE, Dec.
14, 1787, in 4 Docu MEaARY HIsTORY, supra note 14, at 427; Letter from James Madison to George
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thought to give rise to private rights of action by the aggrieved individual but
only state-to-state political remedies.236 The primacy of the political branches is
seen in the fact that the Constitution expressly makes treaties-negotiated by
the President and approved by the Senate-the supreme law of the land, while
omitting any mention of customary international law. Reading the Supremacy
Clause together with the Law of Nations Clause of Article I (giving Congress
power "to define and punish Offences against the Law of Nations"), we see that
the Constitution allows the political branches to "punish" violations of the
customary law of nations, but makes no explicit provision for the political
branches to be punished by courts for violations of customary international
law. 237 Besides controlling courts through substantive legislation, Congress is
given important powers to control the jurisdiction or even the existence of
federal courts.238 In sum, the constitutional text shows a role for federal courts
in managing certain foreign relations disputes but gives the last word to the
political branches.239
B. TEXTUAL INDICATIONS THAT THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS THE PEOPLE IN THE
UNITED STATES
As Akhil Amar has noted, the Preamble and the Supremacy Clause "mark[]
the Constitution's most sustained meditation upon itself."240 Both suggest that
the Constitution is not globalist. The Supremacy Clause states that the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land,, 241 not of or for any other place. In eighteenth-century usage, the "law of
the land" referred to domestic law, often the common law, and was explicitly
Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 13 id., at 409, suggests a potentially very significant amount of
congressional control over the meaning and application of the law of nations.
236. See, e.g., A Charge Delivered to the Grand Jury for the District of North Carolina by Justice
James Iredell (June 2, 1794), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 410, 423 (Griffith J.
McRee ed., New York, Peter Smith 1949) (1857) ("In whatever manner the law of nations is violated, it
is a subject of national, and not personal complaint."); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *68
("[O]ffences against this law ["the law of nations"] are principally incident to whole states or nations:
in which case recourse can only be had to war; which is an appeal to the God of hosts, to punish such
infractions of public faith, as are committed by one independent people against another.").
237. There is, however, some evidence that the "Laws," which the President is charged with
"faithfully execut[ing]," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, were thought to include the law of nations. See, e.g.,
Helvidius No. 11 (1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 86 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds.,
1985). For contemporary debates about this, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute
and Article 111, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 602 n.65 (2002).
238. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
239. This stands in some contrast to interpretations of the Constitution. Although the political
question doctrine and other rules of constitutional law often allow the political branches of the U.S.
government a say in how the Constitution is interpreted, especially in regards to foreign affairs, it is
nevertheless true, as a general matter, that the federal courts have asserted that they are the leading
expounders of the meaning of the Constitution. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
240. AMAR, supra note 135, at 299.
241. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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contrasted to the law of nations.242 The Preamble states that the Constitution is
intended to "insure domestic Tranquility"-not foreign.243 "Liberty" is "se-
cure[d]" only to "ourselves and our Posterity., 2"4 The Constitution is designed,
and Congress given the power, to "provide for the common defence. 245
Textually, this refers to the defense of "the People of the United States" and the
"Union," not of any foreign people or places. 246 The Preamble closes by
announcing that the entire Constitution is "ordain[ed] and establish[ed] for the
United States of America"247-not for anyone else.248
The U.S. Constitution further discloses the relative value it places on the lives
and liberties of residents in the United States versus foreigners through its
provisions for political representation and protection of residents of the United
States and lack of the same for anyone residing outside the states. People in
territories of the United States and foreign nations, although expressly contem-
plated by the Constitution,249 have no representation in the House, the Senate,
or the electoral college.250 The Constitution directs that the federal government
"protect" each state "against Invasion" and, upon request from the state govern-
ment, from "domestic Violence., 25 Territories of the United States and other
areas or peoples outside of the states are not so protected. The Constitution also
directs the federal government to protect the political liberty of the people of the
states, but no other peoples or places.252
The Privileges and Immunities Clause cuts against a globalist reading of the
Constitution. The federal government guarantees that "[tihe Citizens of each
State" receive the protection and benefit of "all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States. 253 Foreigners (and even resident aliens) are
242. See, e.g., Read v. Read, 9 Va. (5 Call) 160, 173 (1804); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *69; 1
MATHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 94 (Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2003) (1736). But note that the law of nations was often said to be incorporated into the
common law or law of the land, while still being conceptually distinct. See, e.g., Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 114 (Ct. Oyer & Terminer Phila. 1784) (argument of counsel);
Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 note (Philadelphia C.P. 1781) (argument of counsel).





248. See Christopher C. Langdell, The Status of Our Territories, 12 HARv. L. REv. 365, 372 (1899)
("[T]here is a very strong presumption that when a constitution is made by a sovereign people, it is
made exclusively for the country inhabited by that people, and exclusively for that people regarded as a
body politic.... The preamble, however, does not leave it to presumption to determine for what regions
of country and for what people the Constitution of the United States was made."); see also Ross v.
McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (to the same effect); AMAR, supra note 129, at 170 (similar).
249. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
250. See id. art. I, § 2, cls. 1, 2; id. art. I, § 3, cls. 1, 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
251. See id. art. IV, § 4.
252. See id. A duty of the federal government to protect the District of Columbia, though not part of
any state, is implied by the purpose of the creation of the District. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; cf. In re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1890) (federal government has implied constitutional power to protect itself).
253. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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excluded. As Madison noted, "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitu-
tion to the federal government are few and defined.... [These powers] will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce .... The operations of the federal government will be most extensive
and important in times of war and danger., 254 As a result, the liberties of people
in America would be much more likely to be put at issue in their frequent
interactions with state and local governments, which regulated the domestic
field, than in their interactions with the tiny, externally-focused federal govern-
ment. Yet noncitizens were excluded from the Privileges and Immunities Clause's
guarantee of rights against state governments. This choice arguably speaks to
the value the Constitution places on the rights of aliens versus citizens.
The Article I, Section 8 powers of Congress are another source of textual
evidence that the Constitution is designed to protect the people in the United
States to the exclusion of foreigners. The first power granted is to tax and spend
"for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." 255 This
provision textually cross-references the Preamble; both are express directions
that the national government concern itself with the care and protection of the
people and territory of the United States.256 Article I, Section 8 contains
numerous powers that are designed to improve the domestic prosperity of the
United States. At the same time, Article I allows the United States to use
unbridled coercion externally against foreigners. Congress can, for example,
"declare War."257 There are no standards, no qualifications, no limits, no
permissible or impermissible goals expressed by the constitutional text. The
lesser war power of Congress to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" is also
textually unlimited.258 As Chief Justice Marshall put it, the Constitution "con-
fers absolutely" the war power.259
Unbridled constitutional powers to use force externally are distinguished
from the internal powers, which are circumscribed as to the objects of the use of
force. Internal force only may be used to the extent necessary to "execute the
Laws of the Union,'  "suppress Insurrections, or "on Application" of the
state government affected, protect states "against domestic Violence., 262 The
Constitution's textual distinction between militia and army is suggestive of
254. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison). Many Anti-Federalists disagreed with this. See, e.g.,
Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 14, at 628 (complaining that the Constitution will effectuate the "total destruction
of the state governments").
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
256. Cf. 4 ANRALs OF CONG. 170-71 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison) (suggesting that Congress
may lack constitutional power to spend "the money of their constituents" on relief for French refugees).
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
258. d.
259. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,542 (1828).
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
261. Id.
262. Id. art. IV, § 4.
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greater solicitude for the lives and liberties of Americans. The military is placed
firmly under civilian control by the United States government, insuring that its
strength, while needed against external foes, would not be turned inward to
threaten domestic liberties. The militia, made up of part-time citizen-soldiers,
arguably only may be used domestically. 263 This contrasts with the absence of
territorial limitation on the deployment of "Armies" and the "Navy.''264 The use
of the territorially limited militia to "execute the laws"' 265 is a textual cross-
reference to Article II, which commands the President to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed. ' 266 The President is therefore empowered to use
the militia to the extent necessary to ensure that the rule of law prevails within
the United States. There is no similar provision for external relations to be
governed by domestic law.
The constitutional text is therefore fairly explicit in describing the personal
and territorial scope of the people who are protected by the government it
creates. The people protected are the same people who ordained and established
the Constitution and who are politically represented by the government offices
created under the Constitution: the People of the United States. The constitu-
tional text and structure create an internal republic of laws and liberty protected
against the external world by an armored shell of force.
This reading of the Constitution is supported by a structural inference from
the document's dispersion of internal, domestic powers and its contrasting
concentration of external, foreign affairs powers. The constitutional text de-
scribes an intricate diffusion of power internally among state courts, state
legislatures, state executives, the people of the states, the U.S. House of
Representatives, the U.S. Senate, the federal courts, and the President. The
phenomena I am describing are, of course, federalism, popular sovereignty, and
the separation of powers.2 67 Shared powers, popular involvement, deliberation,
and checks and balances are hallmarks of the domestic system structured with
diffused powers. In external relations, the opposite is the case. Power is
concentrated in the federal government, specifically in Congress and the Presi-
dent, while the states268 and the people 269 are largely excluded, in order to
263. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (granting Congress the power to call forth the militia to, among other
things, "suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions").
264. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13.
265. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
266. Id. art. n, § 3, cl. 4.
267. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1442-44,
1448-50 (1987).
268. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 11-13; id. art. I, § 9, cls. 5-6; id. art. I, § 10, cls. 1-3.
See generally United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (discussing federal supremacy in the
area of foreign affairs).
269. Private citizens are excluded in many ways from foreign relations. Influential Founders thought
that juries should not hear cases arising under the law of nations, see THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander
Hamilton); Remarks of James Wilson to Penn. Ratifying Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT,
DEBATES, supra note 224, at 516-17; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787),
in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955), and indeed admiralty and
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promote the initiative, efficiency, flexibility, and power needed to protect the
United States against external enemies. 270 That the key structural checks on
government power and protections for civil liberties are active domestically but
nearly absent externally suggests a Constitution designed for the benefit of
people within the United States as against people outside the United States. This
inference is strengthened by looking at which bodies exercised the federal
government's lawmaking powers. Domestic legislation, which would primarily
affect the people of the United States, could only be enacted by the combination
of the House of Representatives (elected directly by the people), the Senate, and
the President. By contrast, foreign affairs legislation-treaties-is enacted with-
out the participation of the popular House.27 1 Thus, in multiple and overlapping
ways, the original Constitution is inconsistent with globalism and instead
creates a government to protect and benefit the people within the United States.
C. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
To avoid the fallacy of dis-integration, all of the foregoing provisions of the
Constitution must be interpretive context for reading the general language that
the Bill of Rights uses to describe the rights holders ("person," "people,"
"accused").272 Globalists conspicuously fail to consider the Constitution as a
whole. Besides this, there are other real weaknesses in their textual and original-
ist claims about the Bill.
1. Contemporary Conceptions of the Bill of Rights
Globalists place too much weight on the generality of the language in the Bill
of Rights. For one thing, the generality of the language in the Bill is overdeter-
mined; the Bill's language is general and unrestricted in multiple ways at once.
As David Currie has noted:
maritime cases under the new Constitution were tried to the court, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73, 77; The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823). Any potential role of private individuals in
foreign affairs was also limited by the Constitution's provision for treason prosecutions and its
concomitant implicit grant of power to Congress to determine the identity of the "Enemies" of the
United States to whom Americans are forbidden to provide "Aid and Comfort." U.S. CoNsT. art. III,
§ 3. Early constitutional history confirms that Congress and the President thought it proper to exclude
private individuals from foreign and military affairs. The Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381,
barred individuals within the United States from planning or launching armed attacks against nations at
peace with the United States, while the Logan Act of 1799, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613, criminalized many kinds
of unauthorized communications by U.S. citizens with foreign governments. See PETER M. SHAN &
HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 636-37, 853-54 (2d ed. 2005)
(citing the Neutrality and Logan Acts as examples of Congress and the President exercising their
constitutional prerogative to exclusively manage foreign affairs).
270. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 70, 74 (Alexander Hamilton); SOFAER, supra note 46, at 45-46.
271. See generally JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEAcE: Tm CoNsTTrrnoN AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 22-23 (2005).
272. Because adoption of the original Constitution was, in important respects, conditioned on the
later adoption of a bill of rights, and because the Bill was, of course, adopted in order that it become
"Part of this Constitution," U.S. CONST. art. V, it makes "originalist" sense to read the two texts
together.
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[E]xcept for the first and seventh amendments, all provisions of the Bill as
adopted are phrased in general terms that on their face seem equally appli-
cable to both federal and state authorities.... Yet it was abundantly clear
from the outset that none of these provisions was meant to limit the actions of
state governments.2 73
The Constitution is filled with other examples of this. Despite its absolutist
phrasing ("Congress shall make no law"), the First Amendment has never been
interpreted to ban all laws that abridge speech or religious exercise. 274 Like-
wise, the universal-sounding protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ments have never been thought to cover many military activities during
wartime.275 Another example is the Constitution's use of the word "person."
Although the term is seemingly a general one, it is used in several places where
it is clear that it does not intend to refer to all persons everywhere. For example,
slaves are referred to as "persons" three times.276 The Constitution refers to a
"person" accused of treason, but plainly this term cannot comprehend aliens
abroad with no prior connection to the United States.27 7 The Constitution
requires that the President, Senators, and members of the House be citizens, 8
but elsewhere refers to them as "person[s]. ' ' 279 In sum, that the general language
is susceptible to broad interpretations does not mean that all interpretations are
equally plausible. This does not rule out, say, that constitutional "persons"
might include aliens abroad, but it is a reason for interpretive caution.
The problems with an ahistorically literalist reading of constitutional lan-
273. CuuiE, supra note 135, at 114. It was not until 1833 that the Supreme Court squarely held that
the Bill of Rights was binding on the federal government only, in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1198-1215 (1992) (analyzing the Barron decision in a
historical context).
274. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)
("Speech and press are, of course, to be free, so that public matters can be discussed with impunity. But
picketing and demonstrating can be regulated like other conduct of men.").
275. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950); United States v. Chem. Found. Inc., 272
U.S. 1, 11 (1926); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 308 (1909); Stewart v. Kahn, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506 (1870); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671-72 (1862); cf. Jefferson
Letter to Hammond, supra note 183, at 201 n.11 ("[It is a condition of war, that enemies may be
deprived of all their rights.").
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see Remarks of James Iredell to
North Carolina Ratifying Convention, in 4 ELUoT, DEBATES, supra note 224, at 176 ("The northern
delegates, owing to their particular scruples on the subject of slavery, did not choose the word slave to
be mentioned [in the Constitution].").
277. Cf. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 631 (1818) (construing the words "any person or
persons" in the treason statute and noting that, though phrased in "general terms," the "words are
necessarily confined to any person or persons owing permanent or temporary allegiance to the United
States").
278. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senate); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5
(President).
279. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (referring to members of Congress as "Persons voting for and against the
Bill"); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (referring to candidates for the presidency as "Persons"); id. amend. XII
(same).
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guage are heightened because, in practical usage, words like "man," "people,"
"subject," "individual," or "person" are almost always indistinct in scope. This
can be seen in the bills of rights contained in state constitutions written in 1776
and thereafter. For example, Article 8 of Pennsylvania's Declaration of Rights
states that "every member of society hath a right to be protected in his enjoy-
ment of life, liberty and property., 280 But the very next article states: "nor can
any man be justly deprived of his liberty except by the laws of the land, or the
judgment of his peers.,, 281 Because the substantive rights in each article appear
to be almost identical, it would be strange if Pennsylvania intended that the
difference in language delimit two distinct categories of rights holders. And it
would also be somewhat strange if Pennsylvania had in mind a category of
rights holders truly distinct from those protected by, say, Massachusetts' similar
clause: "Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the
enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws."282
If the differences in language signified immensely important differences in
coverage, one might have expected to see detailed public debate about word
choice during the framing of the U.S. Bill of Rights and consideration of the
possible scope of different choices. Globalists have not presented any evidence
of deliberations about word choice that reflect an intent to expand the scope of
rights holders to include aliens abroad. And the great variation in how rights
holders were described in different documents is often hard to understand as
deliberate choices about scope. The Virginia ratifying convention recom-
mended, in June 1788, a series of constitutional amendments in the nature of a
bill of rights for the federal Constitution. James Madison, the principal drafter
of the U.S. Bill of Rights, was a leading member of the Virginia convention.
Although the due process-type clause in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776
protected every "man," the 1788 convention recommendation protected every
"freeman, ' 283 apparently a more restrictive category. The U.S. Bill of Rights
then used the word "person. ' '28 Similarly, New York's ratification convention
suggested a First Amendment-style assembly clause protecting "the People,"
while its petition clause, found in the very same section, protected instead
"every person. 285 A similar variability in wording is found in the Declaration
of Rights of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. Many rights are described as
being held by "the people,' 286 while others are held by "subject[s]. 287 A few
280. PENN. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. 8 (emphasis added).
281. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added); see also VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, art. 10 ("every member of
society"), id. art. 11 ("any man").
282. MAss. CONST. of 1780, Decl. of Rights, art. 10 (emphasis added).
283. Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia (June 26, 1788), in 2 DEP'T OF STATE,
DocuMErNARY HISTORY, supra note 127, at 379.
284. U.S. CONST. amend V.
285. Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788), in 2 DEP'T OF STATE,
DocutnmwrARY HISToRY, supra note 127, at 192-93.
286. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Decl. of Rights, art. XXIX.
287. Id. arts. XI, XII.
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rights protect "inhabitants," "individual[s] of the society," "person[s]," and
"citizen[s]. 288 In all of these precursors to the U.S. Bill of Rights, it is hard to
discern a comprehensive political theory that explains the great variability in
wording. For example, in the Massachusetts Constitution, the seemingly founda-
tional and universal right to be tried only by independent and impartial judges is
reserved for "citizen[s]," while the right to jury trial is given to "any person,"
and the right to "obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it"
belongs to "[e]very subject of the commonwealth. 289
In sum, there are reasons to be skeptical of our ability to discern important
constitutional distinctions in the selection of various general words to describe
rights holders. The idea that aliens abroad would be protected by municipal
rights found in the Constitution does not appear to be consistent with the
debates and conceptions of the Founding generation about, for example, the
status of aliens, the territorial limits of law, and the distinction between internal
and external laws and powers. Nor is it consistent with the differing structures
of government for external and internal affairs found in Articles I, II, and III of
the original Constitution. This counsels against reading general language in the
Bill of Rights in that manner. On the other hand, strong and overlapping
currents of eighteenth-century thought held that aliens within a sovereign's
territory were entitled to the protection of the laws of that territory. This concept
vastly increases the plausibility of finding that the general language in the Bill
encompasses aliens within the United States.
2. Amendments One Through Ten
A few amendments receive the bulk of the globalists' attention, notably the
Fourth and Fifth. On the other hand, there are several-for instance, the Second
and Third-that are essentially ignored by globalists, likely because it would be
absurd to think of them as protecting aliens abroad. But considering the Bill as a
whole is crucial. All ten amendments were debated and adopted at the same
time, and the amendments all share the general, unrestricted language that
globalists highlight as evidence of applicability abroad. It is unfair to stack the
deck in favor of globalism by simply ignoring the amendments that cut most
strongly against it.
First Amendment. The language of the Amendment is broad and general-the
rights holders are "the people." And it is written as an absolute deprivation of
power-"Congress shall make no law.",290 For many globalists, these are the
textual hallmarks of rights which should apply to aliens abroad. 29' Yet it is
rather incongruous to think of the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses
288. Id. arts. IX, X, XII, XXIX.
289. Id. arts. XI, XII, XXIX.
290. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
291. As noted in supra note 67, since Verdugo-Urquidez distinguished between "the people" and
"persons," it has become common for globalists to assert that parts of the Bill of Rights protecting
"persons" are broader than parts, as in the First Amendment, that protect "the people."
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as limits on the U.S. government in favor of aliens abroad. The text and history
of the antecedents of the Amendment 292 reveal that the types of assembling,
speaking, writing, publishing, reading, and petitioning that are protected by
these Clauses primarily concern the relation between the government and the
governed.293 It would be surprising if the Constitution were to grant rights
intimately related to popular sovereignty in the United States to aliens abroad,
especially in light of the widespread concern among the Founders about perni-
cious foreign intrigue and foreign influence on the nascent U.S. government.294
A textual methodology leads to the same conclusion, if one finds it significant
that "the people" whose popular sovereignty rights are protected by the First
Amendment is the same group ("the people of the several States") 295 that, as
provided in Article I, votes for members of Congress, and that, according to the
Preamble, ordained and established the Constitution for itself and its poster-
ity.
2 9 6
The religion clauses of the First Amendment do not describe the rights
holders but instead are phrased as restraints on Congress, perhaps suggesting
broad or universal applicability. But the major purposes of the clauses-for
example, to be a bulwark against government tyranny, to prevent internal strife
among different sects, to prevent establishment of a state religion 297 -suggest
292. E.g., CONTINENrAL CONG., DECLARATION & RESOLVES (Oct. 14, 1774); MASS. CONST. of 1780,
Decl. of Rights, arts. 16, 19, 21-22; PENN. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. 16; ENGLISH BILL OF
RIGHTS (1689).
293. See AMAR, supra note 129, at 29-31. That is why Justice Story could comment that the petition
and assembly rights "would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican government,
since it results from the very nature of its structure and institutions." 3 STORY, supra note 224, at
§ 1887. I do not mean to suggest that the First Amendment did not or cannot protect any other types of
expression; my point is that popular sovereignty was a core purpose of the Amendment, and that this
core purpose does not appear to be consistent with globalist ideals.
294. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (barring U.S. government officers and employees from
receiving things of value from foreign governments); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 22, 59, 68
(Alexander Hamilton), No. 62 (James Madison); 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 14, at 68-69, 235
(statement of Morris); id. at 112, 216, 271-72 (statement of Mason); id. at 235 (statement of Pinkney);
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 6, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CoNSTrrtrION 473
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993); Letter from John Jay to George Washington (July 25, 1787), in FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 14, at 61; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 251; Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esq. (Oct.
10, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 603 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
296. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990) (reading "the people" as
a term of art referring to "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community");
see also AMAR, supra note 129, at 26-30, 48-49, 64-68, 120-22 (reading "the people" in the Bill of
Rights as a "collective noun" referring to "We, the people" in the Preamble).
297. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 122, at 631-37; Remarks of
Iredell to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (1788), in 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 224, at
191-200.
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protection of domestic interests.2 98
Second Amendment. It is very hard-perhaps impossible-to conceive that
the Constitution would protect a right to bear arms on behalf of noncitizens
abroad. That the first clause refers to the militia of the several states also
anchors the Amendment to the domestic realm, notwithstanding its otherwise
general language.
Third Amendment. This is the only explicit constitutional limit on the tactical
exercise of Commander-in-Chief powers. Not even globalists would suggest
that this Amendment grants such a check on the Commander-in-Chief's discre-
tion when he is directing the army abroad; it would be too inconsistent with
deep-rooted constitutional concepts. 299 The historical antecedents of the Amend-
ment suggest that it protects the people against their own government.
300
Therefore, although the language is general ("any house"), and the Amendment
is written as an absolute deprivation of power ("No soldier. . . ,),3o' it is highly
implausible to think that it protects aliens abroad.
Fourth Amendment. Verdugo-Urquidez's textual reading of the term "the
people" in the Preamble, Article I, and the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments has been discussed above, as have reasons to be skeptical of
our ability to draw much meaning from the difference between "people" and
"persons." Historical evidence of the Amendment's purposes-protecting the
homes and private effects of Americans against overzealous law enforcement
using general warrants302-points toward a domestic limitation.30 3 The text of
the Amendment certainly does not foreclose a globalist reading. 3° But without
a clear statement rule, the text provides no support for globalism either.
Judicial Process Rights. The Fifth through Eighth Amendments concern
primarily judicial processes and procedural rights in the courts of the United
States. The bill to establish the federal court system in the United States and
Madison's proposed Bill of Rights were both debated in Congress during the
summer and fall of 1789; these texts are, in important respects, in pari mate-
298. On the other hand, the Founders' concerns about the potential corruption of religion by
entanglement with government could have salience if the U.S. government attempted to establish a
religion abroad among foreigners.
299. Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950) (disparaging the view that it could
somehow be considered "unconstitutional for the Government of the United States to wage a war in
foreign parts").
300. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEIENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776) (criticizing the King "for quarter-
ing large bodies of armed troops among us"---that is, in America); PETITION OF RIGHT art. VI (1628)
(protesting the quartering of English troops within "the realm"-that is, England).
301. U.S. CONsT. amend. HI.
302. See, e.g., THOMAs M. CooLEY, TREATIsE ON THE CONsTrruIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGiSLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMEmCAN UNION 299-308 (1868); Thomas Y. Davies,
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. Rav. 547, 553,601-10(1999).
303. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990).
304. Some precedents for the Fourth Amendment named the rights holders as "subjects" or "citi-
zen[s]." See Davies, supra note 302, at 595-96. This might provide some support for viewing the term
"people" in a more globalist fashion.
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ria.30 5 The Bill of Rights, adopted against the background of a wholly domestic
court system, presupposed the existence of complex judicial institutions and
processes, such as courts, courthouses, judges, magistrates, clerks, prosecutors,
and grand and petit juries. The requirement of the existence of institutions in
order to implement constitutional "process" rights seems somewhat at odds with
the idea that these constitutional rights would be available to aliens abroad.
Consistent with this, the text of the Sixth Amendment appears to contemplate
providing rights only during "criminal prosecutions" held in a "State. 3 °6 The
other procedural amendments lack express geographic limitations, but, as a
textual matter, are rooted in federal court proceedings3 "7 which, under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, could only occur in the United States.3 °8
This sketch of the Amendments as a judicial process framework is not
dispositive of globalist arguments. There could exist rights that are enforced in
judicial proceedings yet protect against harms that occur out of court, perhaps
even out of the United States. And, of course, procedural rights could be
applicable in other federal fora besides Article IH courts located in the United
States. The Fifth Amendment seems to recognize this potential by excepting
from the grand jury requirement "cases arising" in the military and militia
"when in actual service in time of War or public danger. , 30 9 A similar exception
has long been found by implication in the Sixth Amendment. 310 But this
carve-out for U.S. military courts suggests a structural reason to reject a
globalist argument that aliens abroad should be protected by the Bill of Rights:
it would be strange to read the Bill as providing greater benefits to those persons
than to American soldiers.3 '
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. As a textual and historical matter, the
core meaning-but, again, not the only possible meaning--of the Due Process
Clause is a quotidian one, consistent with this domestic judicial framework.
305. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, To BEGIN THE WORLD ANEw 106 (2003).
306. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672-74 (1998); Cook v.
United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891).
307. The Seventh Amendment suggests that it applies only "in any Court of the United States." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII. The Eighth Amendment uses commonly understood terms of the judicial process
("bail," "fines," "punishments"). U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Fifth Amendment is likewise rooted in
federal court procedures and rules: the grand jury, double jeopardy, and the privilege against self-
incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Its text speaks the language of law courts: "indictment, "crime,"
"offence," "cases," "witness," and "criminal case." Id.
308. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75.
309. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
310. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 597 (1800) (statement of Rep.
John Marshall).
311. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) (noting the absurdity of reading the Fifth
Amendment to accord more protections to alien enemy soldiers abroad than to the U.S. servicemen
fighting them); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Fury, THi NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 18, 20
(offering a heavily qualified defense of aspects of President Bush's November 2001 military tribunal
order and noting that "[w]e consider military tribunals sufficiently impartial to judge our own military
personnel accused of crime. Why should members of Al Qaeda and those who aid them enjoy a
constitutional right to a theoretically purer form of justice than our own soldiers?").
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This may seem crabbed or strange at the current time in our constitutional
history because we have assimilated the broad conceptions of "due process of
law" created by the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Things were different in 1789. "Due process of law" was an English common
law term which Sir Edward Coke identified with the phrase "by the law of the
land" in the Magna Carta. 312 Coke taught that these terms meant using the
customary and fundamental common law judicial procedures in proceedings
where the life, liberty, or property of a subject was at issue. 31 3 It is commonly
thought that the Founding generation understood "due process of law" as Coke
had.31 4 Alexander Hamilton said as much in a pamphlet of 1784 and a speech in
1787,'3 15 as did John Marshall in 1800.316 Indeed, there seems to be general
agreement that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause was
consistent with Coke's earlier teachings.31 7 A unanimous Supreme Court, in its
first case discussing the Clause at length, interpreted it this way.
318
In the Constitution's Bill of Rights, the customary and fundamental common
law procedures were largely secured by other provisions besides the Due
Process Clause.3 19 Some have suggested that the Clause was therefore almost
irrelevant as an original matter.320 But we must be wary of too quickly conclud-
ing that any part of the Constitution is an empty redundancy.321 There is some
textual and drafting evidence that the Clause expressed broad, aspirational
values.3 2 2 It is undeniable that the Due Process Clause, on its face and divorced
of context, speaks in "relatively universal term[s]," as Chief Justice Rehnquist
312. 1 EDWARD COKE, SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUrES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50-53 (Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1642). See generally MAGNA CARTA § 39 (1215) ("No freemen shall be taken or
imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him,
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.").
313. COKE, supra note 312, at 52-53.
314. AMAR, supra note 129, at 200-02; 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARES wrrIH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 137 & n.24 (St. George
Tucker ed., Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 1996) (1803); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMErrARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
*13; LEvy, supra note 135, at 248; 3 STORY, supra note 224, § 1783.
315. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REMARKS ON AN ACT FOR REGULATING ELECTIONS (Feb. 6, 1787),
reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 179, at 35 ("The words 'due process'
have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of
justice."); see also LETTER FROM PHOCION TO THE CONSIDERATE CrTZENS OF NEW YORK (Jan. 1784),
reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 179, at 485, 488.
316. 10 ANNALS OF CNG. 612 (1800) (statement of Rep. John Marshall).
317. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 15 (1980); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 35
(1958); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 129 (1825); 3
STORY, supra note 224, § 1783.
318. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855).
319. See LEvY, supra note 135, at 248.
320. Easterbrook, supra note 135, at 98-99.
321. Cf Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALE L.J. 1131, 1190 n.262 (1991).
322. The Clause's invocation of "life, liberty, or property" mimics the inspiring language in many
revolutionary declarations of principle issued by American colonists, invoking broad and inclusive
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noted.323 Can it therefore be interpreted, based on historical or textual evidence,
to grant rights to aliens abroad? This would be a stretch. Globalists have not
presented any Founding era evidence that "due process" was thought to protect
aliens abroad. So globalists are left with a clear statement rule that defaults with
constitutional rights for aliens abroad. But, as discussed throughout this Article,
this default is highly debatable as a textual and historical matter. Stated another
way, a domestic limitation for the Clause is suggested by its placement within a
Bill of Rights and a larger Constitution which are themselves designed as
internal, domestic rules for the benefit of people in the United States.
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. There are textual problems with reading the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments as support for globalism. The Ninth states that
the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights of the people does not
suggest that other unmentioned rights of the people do not exist or are not
protected.324 To see who retains unenumerated rights, the text directs that we
look at who is given enumerated rights because the Amendment states that they
are the same people. Some rights in the Constitution are expressly given to
"citizens," while many more are given to "the people" or "persons" or unspeci-
fied beneficiaries. None is expressly given to aliens, even though the Founders
clearly knew how to refer to aliens when they wanted to (as in Article III). It is
textually problematic to say that the Ninth Amendment's protection of "the
people['s]" unenumerated, inherent rights shows that aliens abroad could have
rights, unless we can say that enumerated rights are extended to aliens. But we
cannot say that. The only way that individual rights under the Constitution can
be extended to aliens abroad is by implication from the generality of language.
Relying on the Ninth Amendment to support the globalist argument is bootstrap-
ping.
"The people" in the Tenth Amendment to whom undelegated powers are
reserved are apparently the same "people" who delegated their other powers to
the federal government or the states in the constitutional instrument.325 The
Preamble states that the "people" who delegated their powers to form the
Constitution were "the People of the United States," acting for themselves and
their posterity, and "for the United States of America., 326 This appears to
exclude aliens abroad.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL HABEAS CORPUS
Textual and structural evidence suggests that the constitutionally protected
writ of habeas corpus is only available within the United States. To understand
the scope of the writ preserved by the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
natural rights theories to explain their opposition to King George's tyranny. See, e.g., CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, DECLARAnON & RESOLVES (Oct. 14, 1774); VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights § 1.
323. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
324. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
325. Id. amend. X.
326. Id. pmbl.
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tion,32 7 courts and scholars have long looked to the history of the common law
writ, on the assumption that it was essentially incorporated by reference into the
Constitution.328 The English writ did not reach beyond the dominions of the
Crown, but it is a difficult question whether this understanding was, in practice,
imported to America during the colonial period. The divergent views of the
majority and dissent in Rasul about the territorial limitations of the eighteenth-
century common law writ show the limits of historical analogy for resolving
329contemporary questions.
A textual and structural focus on the U.S. Constitution, rather than historical
precedents, is more fruitful. The Clause allows suspension only in cases of
"Rebellion or Invasion." Both terms refer to conflicts internal to the country.330
If the only two permissible triggers for suspension are internal events, it follows
that the writ cannot be suspended based on purely external threats. Textually,
the closest relative of the Suspension Clause in the Constitution is the Article I
power of Congress to call forth the militia to "execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions. 331 The fact that the Militia Clause
limits the use of temporary citizen-soldiers as opposed to professional troops
might suggest a domestic limitation because nonprofessional part-timers would
desire to fight close to home.332 The history of the Militia Clause bears this out
and points to a structural connection to the Suspension Clause. Both English
and colonial law had precedents allowing the use of militia outside the troops'
home territory only in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion.333 Similarly,
the charters of several American colonial governments allowed martial law to
be declared on occasions that track the language of the Suspension Clause. For
example, the 1691 charter of Massachusetts Bay allowed the colonial govern-
ment to "exercise the Law Martiall in time of actuall Warr Invasion or Rebellion
327. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
328. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2517 & n.56 (1998).
329. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,481-82, 502-05 (2004).
330. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 593-94 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); George P.
Fletcher, Black Hole in Guantanamo Bay, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 121, 131 (2004); Arthur E. Sutherland,
Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARv. L. RaV. 383, 410 (1951); Note, Habeas Corpus Protection
Against Illegal Extraterritorial Detention, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 368, 373-74 (1951). In the eighteenth
century, the words apparently meant the same as they do today. See Luther Martin, Genuine Informa-
tion, in 3 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 14, at 213. For uses of the words where context suggests
internal events are described, see 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 14, at 47-48 (statements of various
speakers regarding rebellion); 1 id. at 113 (statement of Mason regarding rebellion and invasion); 1 id.
at 340 (statement of Mason regarding rebellion).
331. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 15 (emphasis added).
332. Cf. THE FEDERAIuST No. 29, at 182 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
power of regulating the militia and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are
natural incidents to the duties.., of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.").
333. Militia Act, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 27; An Act Concerning the Levying of War, Within
This Province of 1650, ch. 26, paras. 1, 3, reprinted in LAWS OF MARYLAMN AT LARGE (Annapolis, Jonas
Green 1765); 1 BLAcKsTONE, supra note 115, at *413.
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as occasion shall necessarily require. 334 Tracking this language, the Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780 provided that the government could exercise "the law
martial, in time of war or invasion, and also in time of rebellion, declared by the
Legislature to exist, as occasion shall necessarily require. 335 It seems likely
that the Suspension Clause invokes these concepts, therefore contemplating that
suspension could occur only during similarly severe domestic emergencies.
The Suspension Clause's domestic limitation suggests a serious structural
problem with globalism enforced by federal courts. If courts extend constitu-
tional rights to aliens abroad that are enforceable through habeas, and if the
availability of some habeas review is found to be constitutionally required (that
is, protected from "suspension"), there could occur situations where the lack of
a domestic invasion or rebellion prevent suspension, even if the political
branches correctly determined that "the public Safety ... require[d] it."' 336 In
this situation, the Judiciary would be encroaching on the primary province of
the Executive and Congress: the political branches are textually and structurally
given the responsibility for national protection, especially beyond the borders of
the United States. This structural reasoning provides a way to think about the
availability of the writ outside the fifty states of the United States. Assuming
that the writ should not be available anywhere that the political branches could
not, if the public safety required, temporarily suspend it, the writ should only be
available in territory over which the United States exercises such pervasive and
persistent sovereignty that a hostile military incursion could be fairly described
as an "invasion" vis-A-vis the United States, or an armed insurrection could
fairly be described as a "rebellion" vis-A-vis the United States.337
Globalists have not adequately addressed the domestic limitation of the
Suspension Clause. According to Professor Raustiala, for example:
[T]he writ is aimed at ensuring that the government does not deprive a person
of liberty without providing an adequate legal basis to a court of law. On its
face, that idea seems unconnected to geographical location. Since the aim of
habeas is to constrain executive power, it is not obvious why it ought to
matter where that power is exercised.338
According to Professor Henkin, "[n]o reasons exist why an alien held by United
States authorities abroad should not have the right to bring a writ of habeas
334. MASS. BAY CHARTER of 1691, in 3 THORPE, supra note 173, at 1884; see also GA. CHARTER of
1732 para. 11, in 2 THORPE, supra note 173, at 776.
335. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Decl. of Rights, pt. 2, ch. 1, art. 7.
336. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
337. On the other hand, one could argue that no external conflict could sufficiently endanger the
United States to justify so drastic a step as suspension of the writ. Cf. Remarks of Edmund Randolph to
Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), in 9 DocUMENTARY ISTORY, supra note 14, at 1099
(stating that the Suspension Clause can only be invoked "in cases of extreme emergency").
338. Raustiala, supra note 22, at 2529-30.
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,corpus in a United States court. ' 3 3 9 The Supreme Court, too, seems unmindful
of textual and structural reasons for reading the Suspension Clause as having
only domestic effect. In the recent Hamdan decision, for example, the Court
appeared to entertain the possibility that there might be "Suspension Clause
problems" with construing a congressional statute to prevent Guantanamo
detainees from filing habeas petitions in federal court.340 Before holding that
aliens outside the United States have rights under the Suspension Clause, the
Court should consider why the Clause is phrased to refer only to domestic
events.
V. EARLY PRACTICE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Early practice under the Constitution appears to have been broadly consistent
with the textual and historical analyses outlined above. The United States
actively protected foreigners, but did so through international law and policy
choices. Many, but not all, Americans seem to have believed that aliens within
the United States had constitutional rights, but it does not appear that there is
evidence that aliens abroad had constitutional rights. A review of early practice
also reveals a consensus that alien enemies, even within the United States, had
limited rights, and those rights arose under international law, not the Constitu-
tion.
This Part first addresses the United States' early actions with regard to
protecting aliens, using force, and defining and enforcing international law.
Then, it presents two case studies of instances where the United States govern-
ment engaged in explicit debates about the constitutional rights of aliens. The
first instance occurred during the Quasi-War with France in the late 1790s; the
second involved a congressional investigation of General Andrew Jackson's
incursion into Spanish-owned Florida in 1818.341
A. PROTECTING ALIENS, USING FORCE, AND IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
After the Constitution was ratified, the new U.S. government took a number
of actions to protect aliens. None presupposed that aliens had constitutional
rights. The Constitution left it entirely within the discretion of Congress to set
the terms for naturalizing aliens into new citizens. The First Congress exercised
339. Henkin, Compact, supra note 19, at 32 n.127; see also Fletcher, supra note 101, at 964
(suggesting that there is no reason why civilian judicial restraints on government power, such as habeas
corpus, are not available extraterritorially); Neuman, Abiding, supra note 21, at 151 ("The Constitution
contemplates the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress even within the
United States when necessitated by invasion or rebellion." (emphasis added)). Other scholars make this
error. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 19 ("[M]ost of the Constitution's provisions are not textually
restricted by either the population or the geographic area to which they apply.... Article I unqualifiedly
prohibits the suspension of habeas corpus .... (emphasis added)).
340. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2814 (2006).
341. Professor Neuman and other scholars examine these debates to understand Founding era
attitudes toward the rights of aliens. See, e.g., NEUMAN, STRANGERs, supra note 10, at 52-60; Cleveland,
supra note 10, at 87-98.
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its discretion liberally, allowing aliens (assuming they were "white") to become
citizens after only two years of residence.342 The Judiciary Act of 1789 con-
tained a provision allowing aliens to sue in U.S. courts for torts suffered here or
abroad-the Alien Tort Statute.343 This protection came in the form of a grant of
jurisdiction to federal courts to hear suits by aliens for torts "in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States," not in violation of the U.S.
Constitution or other municipal law.34 Likely reacting to several assaults on the
prerogatives or persons of foreign diplomats in the United States, the First
Congress used its "define and punish" power to criminalize assaults on ambassa-
dors and violations of safe conducts.345 Much of the United States' early law
enforcement activity was directed against violations of the law of nations.34 6
The political branches largely controlled the substance of the law governing
external interactions with aliens. This is seen in the numerous statutes that
defined the law of nations and determined how and when it would be enforced
and against whom.3 47 It is also seen in active treaty making by the United States
government, covering issues ranging from providing religious, economic, testa-
mentary, and judicial rights; establishing consulates to protect each signatory's
citizens within the territory of the other; granting rights of protection on the
high seas or territorial waters; regulating searches and seizures of vessels on the
high seas; settling boundary disputes; confirming the rights of neutrals during
war and rules of prize; and promising to restrain persons within the country
from attacking or molesting citizens or subjects of the treaty partner.348 When
expanding the United States by acquiring new territory peacefully (Louisiana
Purchase) or through conquest (Mexican-American War), the United States
government provided by treaty that the people in the added territory would in
the future obtain the full constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, implying that
342. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
343. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76. See generally Wedgwood, supra note 215, at
753 (suggesting that passage of the Alien Tort Statute showed the Founders' intent to protect aliens).
344. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9.
345. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machan, 542 U.S. 692, 718-21 (2004) (discussing the 1790 Crimes Act).
346. See 1 FR,.cs WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMNAL LAW § 330 n.2, at 417 (11th ed. 1912).
347. See Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 276 (punishing violations of treaty barring sale of
weapons and liquor in certain territory); Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 510-13
(punishing piracy, a crime against the law of nations); Trading with the Enemy Act of 1812, ch. 129,
§ 7, 2 Stat. 778, 780-81 (repealed 1815) (defining and punishing trading with the enemy, Great Britain);
Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578, (1798) (voiding treaties with France); Act of May 28, 1798, ch.
48, 1 Stat. 561 (authorizing the President to use naval force to seize French vessels "committing
depredations" against American commerce "and bring into any port of the United States, to be
proceeded against according to the law of nations, any such armed vessel"); Neutrality Act, ch. 50, § 7,
1 Stat. 381, 384 (1794) (repealed 1818) (enforcing U.S. policy of neutrality in wars among foreign
powers).
348. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Tripoli, June 4, 1805, 8 Stat. 214; Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, July 11, 1799, 8 Stat. 162; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tunis,
Mar. 26, 1799, 8 Stat. 157; Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, 8 Stat. 133; 1795
U.S.-Spain Treaty, supra note 206; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19,
1794, 8 Stat. 116.
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they had not previously had such rights.349
The practice of the U.S. government appears to have been to treat the search
or seizure of persons and goods seeking to enter the United States as uncon-
strained by the Constitution.350 And starting in the nineteenth century, United
States customs agents began to operate abroad, mainly in Canada, to enforce the
revenue laws.351 Globalists have not presented any evidence that these opera-
tions were thought to implicate individual constitutional rights.
Early constitutional history is filled with instances of American use of the
military or law enforcement against nonresident aliens.35 2 It does not appear
that extraterritorial coercive force by the United States government was thought
to implicate constitutional rights of noncitizens. By contrast, internal distur-
bances were governed by municipal law. In suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion
in Pennsylvania in 1794, President Washington used militia instead of regular
troops, and required that a federal judge and the U.S. District Attorney accom-
pany the militia so that the rebels could be immediately turned over to civil
authorities for trial.35 As Justice Iredell later emphasized in his charge to a
Pennsylvania grand jury, the executive branch acted against the rebellion "by
every constitutional means in its power.
'3 54
Simply because the Constitution did not govern extraterritorial uses of coer-
cive force did not mean that the Founders considered such actions to be
extra-legal. Rather, there was a strong current of opinion that treaties and the
law of nations provided the legal framework governing the U.S. government's
actions abroad, at least in the absence of contrary congressional regulation.
Numerous cases judged the actions of U.S. executive officials against aliens on
the seas under international law, and awarded damages or other relief where the
349. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo),
U.S.-Mex., art. IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922; Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., art. I, Apr. 30, 1803, 8
Stat. 200.
350. Both the First and Second Congresses gave executive branch customs agents and naval officers
the discretion, without judicial supervision, to search any ships suspected to contain dutiable or
smuggled goods, and to seize the offending goods. See Enrolling and Licensing Act, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat.
305, 315 (1793); Collection of Duties Act, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789). Apparently, this did not
seem to the Founding generation, or later generations, inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. See
generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990) ("There is likewise no
indication that the Fourth Amendment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to
activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory or in international waters.");
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (stating that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to international border searches because of the need for "national self-protection").
351. See ETHAN A. NADELMANN, Cops AcRoss BoRDERs 22-29 (1993).
352. See, e.g., MAX BoOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE 13-14 (2002); SoFAER, supra note 46, at
120-22.
353. See JoAN M. JENsEN, ARMY SURVEILLANCE iN AMEICA: 1775-1980, at 12-14 (1991). Alexander
Hamilton accompanied District Judge Richard Peters and District Attorney William Rawle to help
gather evidence for use in civilian trials. See Louis FisHER, PRESmENTAL WAR PowER 23 (2d ed. 2004).
354. A Charge Delivered to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania, April 12, 1796, FED.
GAZETTE & BALT. DAmy ADvERTsER, Apr. 21, 1796, at 3 (emphasis added).
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United States violated international law. 355
B. ALIEN FRIENDS AND ENEMIES: THE QUASI-WAR WITH FRANCE
By early 1793, the French Revolution had turned aggressively Jacobin, and
France was at war with Austria, England, Spain, Holland, and the many German
and Italian states. 356 Despite a military alliance cemented by treaty with France,
President Washington determined to stay out of the European war, issuing the
Neutrality Proclamation in 1793. 357 Disagreement over the merits of the French
Revolution and other issues led American politics to polarize along regional,
economic, and ideological grounds.358 The rest of the 1790s saw domestic
tensions and external problems, as U.S. shipping was harassed by the warring
parties, particularly the French. After the United States ratified Jay's Treaty with
Great Britain and President Washington was succeeded in 1797 by the Federal-
ist John Adams of Massachusetts, France stepped up attacks on American
shipping.359 Some worried that France-which had openly campaigned against
Adams in favor of Thomas Jefferson-contemplated an invasion of the United
States. 36
During the Adams presidency, Congress and the Executive took a number of
actions regarding France that illuminate contemporary understandings of the
constitutional status of aliens and the relationship between municipal and
international law. In 1798, Congress passed the so-called Alien Friends Act,
which allowed the President, in his discretion, to deport "all such aliens as he
shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States., 361 At about
the same time, Congress also passed both the Sedition Act 362 and a law
concerning detention or deportation of "alien enemies. 3 63 The concepts of
"alien friend" and "alien enemy" were drawn from the common law and the law
of nations. They referred, respectively, to nationals of states at peace and at war
with one's country.3 64 Under the common law and the law of nations, the rights
of aliens diminished substantially when their home state engaged in hostilities
with their state of current residence-when they became alien enemies. Alien
enemies, and, in particular, alien prisoners of war, lacked any legally enforce-
355. See, e.g., The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1825); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
362, 371 (1824); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198-99 (1815); see also
H.R. REP. No. 17-207 (1822), reprinted in 1 AMERIcAN STATE PAPEs: NAVAL AFFAIRS 787-88 (Walter
Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington: Gales & Seaton 1834) (suggesting that international law
and policy should guide U.S. naval actions in the Caribbean against pirates).
356. See STANLEY ELKIrNs & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 311 (1993).
357. See 1 ALEXANDER DECONDE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 50-51 (3d ed. 1978).
358. See DANIEL G. LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 91-156 (Kenneth W. Thompson
ed., 1985).
359. SOFAER, supra note 46, at 139-40.
360. See id. at 119-22; see also DECONDE, supra note 357, at 62.
361. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (1798).
362. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
363. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
364. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1950).
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able rights.365 As Blackstone put it, "alien enemies have no rights, no privileges,
unless by the king's special favor, during the time of war.",3 6 6 This was the law
in the United States at and after the time of the adoption of the Constitution.3 67
Enemy alien status and its concomitant civil disabilities did not turn on the
existence of a formal, declared war between sovereign states, under either the
laws of the United States 368 or Great Britain.369 Congress's Alien Enemies Act
of 1798 allowed the Executive to detain an alien without a formal declaration of
war.3 7 0 More generally, application of international legal rules applicable during
wartime did not await a formal declaration.371
365. Regarding alien prisoners of war, see The Case of Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 96 Eng. Rep.
775 (K.B.) (holding that alien prisoners of war were "not entitled to any of the privileges of
Englishmen; much less to be set at liberty on a habeas corpus"). Regarding alien enemies generally, see
Crawford v. The William Penn, 6 F Cas. 778, 779 (C.C.D.N.J. 1815); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas.
942, 947 (D. Pa. 1793); Rex v. Schiever, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 551-52 (K.B.); Sylvester's Case, (1703)
87 Eng. Rep. 1157 (K.B.); 1 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 415 (Samuel Rose ed.,
London, A. Strahan 1800).
366. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at *372-73.
367. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("In England prior to 1789, in the Colonies, and in
this Nation during the formative years of our Government, the writ of habeas corpus was available to
nonenemy aliens .... " (emphasis added)); Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 338 (1796) (holding that
alien enemies are excluded from our courts of justice during the hostilities); Wilcox v. Henry, 1 Dall.
69, 71 (Pa. 1782) ("An alien enemy has no right of action whatever during the war .... ); Addison,
supra note 191, at 1071 ("[A]lien enemies have no rights."); Jefferson Letter to Hammond, supra note
183, at 211 (noting that an "alien enemy" "cannot maintain an action"); id. at 201 n.I1 ("[lit is a
condition of war, that enemies may be deprived of all their rights." (quoting Cornelius Bynkershoek));
Remarks of James Madison to Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES,
supra note 224, at 533 ("[A]n alien enemy cannot bring suit at all."). This rule continued in force well
past the eighteenth century. See Exparte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510, 511 (1942) (per curiam); Caperton v.
Bowyer, 81 U.S. (1 Wall.) 216, 236 (1871); Levine v. Taylor, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 8, 9 (1815);
Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 119, 122-23 (1814).
368. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 84 (1798) (directing that Frenchmen attempting to outfit military ships in
the United States "should be apprehended" and, if acting for the French government, "be treated as an
enemy, and confined as a prisoner of war" even though there had been no declaration of war); 9 ANNALS
OF CONG. 3000 (1799) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) (stating, at a time when no war was declared,
that French were alien enemies).
369. See 1 MATrTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF a LAW 164 (Henry Grillim ed., London, A.
Strahan 1832) (see the heading "Aliens"); 1 MATrTEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
162 (Thomas Dogherty ed., London, E. Rider 1800) (1736); WLLIAM HAWKINS, TREATISE OF THE PLEAs
OF a CROWN 51 (Thomas Leach ed., Dublin, Elizabeth Lynch 1787) (explaining that aliens "who in a
hostile manner invade the kingdom, whether their king were at war or peace" with Great Britain would
be dealt with "by martial law"). From the British perspective, the American war of independence was
an internal colonial rebellion, not a formal war between sovereign states. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 228 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 263 (opinion of Iredell, J.); Jefferson Letter
to Hammond, supra note 183, at 202. Yet English courts treated Americans as enemy aliens not entitled
to use habeas corpus. See Furly v. Newnham, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B.).
370. See Alien Enemies Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
371. See David Cole, What Bush Wants to Hear, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 17, 2005, at 8, 9 ("At the
time of the Constitution's drafting, a formal 'declaration of war' was not necessary for the exercise of
war powers under either domestic or international law .... ") (reviewing JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR
AND PEACE (2005)); see also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
Dal].) 37, 40 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.); Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 220, 251-52 (Pa. 1810)
(opinion of Tilghman, C.J.). For an excellent discussion emphasizing the nuances and disagreements
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While the Alien Enemies Act was relatively uncontroversial,372 Jeffersonian
Republicans excoriated President Adams and other Federalists about the Alien
Friends and Sedition Acts, asserting that they violated various provisions of the
Constitution.37 3 Republicans argued that resident aliens were protected by the
same constitutional rights as citizens.374 Like today's globalists, they based this
argument in part on what they believed was the general, unrestricted language
of the Bill of Rights.375 Federalists replied that the Constitution was a social
compact protecting its members only, and that aliens--even those resident
within the United States-were not parties to that compact 376 and therefore did
not have constitutional rights.3 77 Instead, aliens in the United States were
protected only by the law of nations and dictates of policy. 378 According to
Federalist judge Alexander Addison, the exercise of power over aliens in the
United States "affects no party to the constitution, but a party to the law of
nations; its exercise is to be regulated, not by the constitution or municipal law,
but by the general law of nations." 379 This meant that the Suspension Clause did
not protect habeas for aliens, because "here the Constitution leaves aliens, as in
other countries, to the protection of the general principles of the law of nations,
or of the particular provisions of treaties made between the United States, and
the government whose subjects or citizens the aliens severally are.",380 The most
about this issue, see Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 1543,
1575-89 (2002).
372. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (conceding that U.S.
government has power over alien enemies, consistent with international law, by implication from the
Article I power of Congress to declare war).
373. See NEUAN, STRoERS, supra note 10 at 53, 58-59.
374. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1798) (statement of Rep. Livingston) ("[Alien friends... re-
siding among us are entitled to the protections of our laws.... [There is] [n]o distinction between
citizen and alien.... All are entitled to the same equal distribution of justice .. "). See generally
NEUtMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 53-60.
375. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1798) (statement of Rep. Livingston) ("[The Constitution]
speaks of all 'judicial power,' 'all trials for crimes,' all 'criminal prosecutions,' all 'persons accused.'
No distinction between citizen and alien .... All are entitled to the same equal distribution of
justice .... "); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (stating that the Due
Process Clause "speaks of persons, not of citizens; so far as relates to personal liberty, the Constitution
and common law include aliens as well as citizens"). See generally NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10,
at 53-60; JAMES M. Sirra, FREEDOM'S FETrTRS 87 (1956).
376. See, e.g., REPORT OF a SE. .cr CoMMIrrE OF THE HOUSE OF RPRESENTATIVES, in 9 ANNALS OF
CONG. 2987 (1799); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis).
377. See, e.g., Answer of the States-Massachusetts (Feb. 18, 1799), in 4 EUJ.OT, DEBATES, supra
note 224, at 534-35 (objecting to the Virginia Resolutions and stating that the rights of aliens "were not
particularly contemplated in the Constitution" and aliens "are entitled only to a temporary protection
while they yield a temporary allegiance"); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2019 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis); 8
ANNALS OF CONG. 1984-85 (1798) (statement of Rep. William Gordon); VRGI NA REPORT, supra note
192, at 31-32, 105 (statement of Del. Henry Lee).
378. VRGiNIA REPORT, supra note 192, at 52 (statement of Del. John Allen) (stating that friendly
aliens in the United States had rights "derived to them from the laws of nature, nations, and humanity")
379. Addison, supra note 191, at 1072; see also VmRGrNA REPORT, supra note 192, at 100 (statement
of Del. William Cowan); id. at 62 (statement of Del. James Barbour).
380. ALEXANDER ADDISON, A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JuRIEs OF THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE FIumH
CIRcUIrr OF THE STATE OF PENNsYLvANIA 18 (1799).
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that Jeffersonian Republicans argued in response to these claims was that
friendly resident aliens were under the protection of the U.S. Constitution while
they were in the United States and while their home state was at peace with the
United States.
In 1800, the Virginia House of Delegates issued a report, authored by James
Madison, which responded to Federalist arguments that the Alien Friends Act
did not violate constitutional rights and was within the power of Congress to
exact reprisals on foreigners.38' Madison's Report of 1800 argued that removing
a resident alien from the country was not a "reprisal" within the ordinary
meaning of that word and, in any event, the Federalist argument overlooked
"the distinction.., between reprisals on persons within the country and under
the faith of its laws, and on persons out of the country., 382 This statement
suggests that Madison, speaking for anti-Federalist Republicans, did not believe
that the Constitution granted rights to aliens abroad.
Additional evidence comes from contrasting congressional debates about the
Alien Friends Act, which featured Jeffersonian-Republican arguments that
friendly resident aliens were protected by the Constitution, with the nearly
contemporaneous House debate about a proposal to allow the United States to
kill captured Frenchmen in certain circumstances in retaliation for French
outrages against American prisoners.383 During the latter debate, there was no
suggestion that the proposed retaliation implicated the French detainees' consti-
tutional rights.384 During the same period of time, Congress repeatedly autho-
rized the discretionary use of force on the high seas against hostile French ships
and crews 385 without expressed concern about constitutional rights.
386
As noted above, the Alien Enemies Act was uncontroversial. Even staunch
Republicans accepted that a state of armed conflict (not necessarily formal war)
put aliens within the United States outside the fulsome protection of the
Constitution, and instead under the lesser protections of the law of nations and
policy.387 There is evidence that, in the decades after the enactment of the Alien
381. This argument was made in THE ADDRESS OF THE MINoRrrY IN THE VmGINIA LEGISLATURE TO THE
PEOPLE OF THAT STATE; CONTAINING A VINDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ALIEN AND SEDmON
LAWS (1799).
382. REPORT OF VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REGARDING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1800),
reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 321 (David. B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter
REPORT OF 1800].
383. See Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743.
384. See 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2907-15, 3045-52 (1799); see also 5 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 583
(1799).
385. See Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 60, 1 Stat. 572; Act of May
28, 1798, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 561.
386. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) ("[I]t was never suggested
that the Fourth Amendment restrained the authority of Congress or of the United States agents to
conduct operations such as [armed attacks against French shipping and naval vessels].").
387. REPORT OF 1800, supra note 382, at 321 (stating that the Alien Enemy Act "being conformable
to the law of nations, is justified by the constitution," but that the Alien Friends Act is "repugnant to the
constitutional principles of municipal law"); id. at 320 ("Alien enemies are under the law of nations... [while]
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Enemies Act in 1798 and the ratification of various treaties protective of
resident aliens, American courts began to soften their treatment of noncomba-
tant enemy aliens by allowing habeas corpus review of their detentions; but
alien enemy combatants were still thought to have no rights against executive
detention and no constitutional rights generally.38 8 Greater judicial protection of
aliens in the United States, at the instance of statutory and treaty policy crafted
by the political branches, is more consistent with my reading of the Constitution
than with globalism.
For Professor Neuman and some other globalists, "[t]he legacy of the Alien
Act debates includes the fundamental rejection of the claim that citizenship is
the key to rights-bearing capacity under the Constitution., 389 But given the
poles of debate in the 1790s-Federalists denying that any aliens had constitu-
tional rights; Republicans arguing that friendly aliens resident in the United
States had constitutional rights-it is difficult to imagine that any thought that
nonresident aliens located abroad had constitutional rights, especially during
military conflicts.
C. GENERAL JACKSON'S SEMINOLE WAR
Review of the congressional debates that followed General Andrew Jackson's
incursion into Spanish-owned Florida in 1818 shows that the prevailing view
was that aliens abroad were protected by international law but did not have U.S.
constitutional rights. While the United States was at peace with Spain, General
Jackson led a force of U.S. troops, Tennessee volunteers, and friendly Indians
into Spanish Florida, ostensibly to punish hostile Seminole Indians and runaway
slaves who were using Florida as a haven to attack Americans on the other side
of the border.390 Either from weakness or deliberate policy or both, Spain had
declined to take steps to stop the cross-border attacks, though obligated under a
[a]lien friends ... are under the municipal law."); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1582 (1798) (remarks of Rep.
Gallatin) (stating that alien enemies could be removed from the United States on the basis of the law of
nations); id. at 1790 (remarks of Rep. Sewall) (stating that the status of alien enemies in the United
States "would be regulated by treaties as well as by the law of nations").
388. See Lockington's Case (Pa. 1813) (Tilghman, C.J.), reprinted in 5 AM. L.J. 92 (1814) (holding
that enemy alien merchant was entitled to habeas corpus review of his detention, but noting that a
prisoner of war would not be entitled to use habeas because they have "no municipal rights to expect
from us"), aff'd 5 AM. L.J. 301 (1814). Some courts allowed non-hostile alien enemies resident within
the United States to sue to enforce economic rights, stating that this was consistent with the law of
nations and U.S. policy expressed in treaties and the Alien Enemies Act, see Jackson ex dem. Johnston
v. Decker, 11 Johns. 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), but
held that nonresident alien enemies were still subject to the common law inability to use the courts
while hostilities lasted, see Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). See generally Gerald
L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961,
992-94 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman & Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall and the Enemy Alien: A Case
Missing from the Canon, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 39 (2005).
389. NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at 103.
390. See 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 215, at 403-06 (1906).
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1795 treaty with the United States. 391 According to President James Monroe,
Jackson's orders had been to terminate the Indian attacks and punish the
perpetrators but, in so doing, to enter Florida only if necessary in pursuit of the
enemy and to refrain from molesting Spanish authorities.39 2 Jackson had never-
theless proceeded directly into Florida and, while there, attacked and seized
several Spanish garrisons and displaced the Spanish authorities; killed numer-
ous Indians and runaway slaves; and captured, tried, and executed several
men-including two British subjects named Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert
Ambrister, who were thought to have incited the Indian attacks.39 3
There was public outcry in Spain, Great Britain, and the United States,
especially after it was learned that although a court-martial had reconsidered its
initial death sentence for Ambrister and instead recommended lashing and
imprisonment, General Jackson had nevertheless ordered him shot. President
Monroe's government disavowed the seizure of Spanish territory, but neverthe-
less supported Jackson's actions as justified by the facts on the ground, while
still maintaining they had not been authorized in advance.39 4 Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams wrote a lengthy defense of Jackson which, among other
things, blamed Spain for failing to restrain the attacks against the United States
and declared that the executions of the British were consistent with international
law because they had associated themselves with savages who violated the laws
of war.39 5 Although the British and Spanish governments were fairly quickly
mollified, 396 highly-charged congressional investigations in the United States
Congress ensued, apparently instigated by Speaker of the House Henry Clay of
Kentucky, a political rival of Monroe, Adams, and Jackson.39 7
In January 1819, a divided House Committee on Military Affairs reported
that Jackson should be censured because, among other things, it could "find no
law of the United States, authorizing a trial, before a military court, for such
offenses as are alleged" under the law of nations, and because of procedural
391. See Message from President Monroe to House of Representatives (Mar. 25, 1818), in 32
ANNALS OF CONG. 1473 (1819).
392. See id.; see also, e.g., DECONDE, supra note 357, at 115-16.
393. See, e.g., 2 MOORE, supra note 390, at 403-04; 3 JAMES SCHOULER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, UNDER THE CONsTrUTnoN 69-75 (1894); WILLIAM EARL WEEKS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND
AMERIcAN GLOBAL EMPIRE 110-11 (1992).
394. See, e.g., Message from President Monroe to Congress (Nov. 16, 1818), in 4 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 215 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales and
Seaton 1834); see also 2 MOORE, supra note 390, at 403-05; Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Power and
Control of Information: Practice Under the Framers, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1, 40-44.
395. See Letter from Sec'y of State J.Q. Adams to George W. Erving (Nov. 28, 1818), in 4 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 394, at 539, 544. Thomas Jefferson applauded the Adams
opinion. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to President Monroe (Jan. 18, 1819), in 10 THE WRIrTNGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 122-23 (Paul L. Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1899).
396. See WEEKS, supra note 393, at 118-22, 147-49; see also ROBERT V. REMa, ANDREW JACKSON
AND HIs INDIAN WARS 166 (2001).
397. See 1 CARL ScHuRz, LIFE OF HENRY CLAY 153-54 (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1893); SOFAER,
supra note 46, at 357; WEEKS, supra note 393, at 158-59.
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irregularities during the trials.398 Weeks of debate about the Constitution and
law of nations ensued before a House Committee of the Whole; the galleries
were crowded with spectators.399
Clay gave an impassioned speech severely criticizing Jackson's actions; it
was ambiguous regarding the source and nature of the law that governed the
executions of the British, but unambiguously held that the executions were
illegal. Representative Alexander Smyth of Virginia then rose and characterized
Clay as having stated that the executions violated the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and that the captives "should have been turned over to the
civil authority. So soon as the stranger treads the American soil, he is encircled
by the laws.,,400 The Annals of Congress do not contain remarks of Clay to that
effect. And, as Smyth himself pointed out, the captures and executions undisput-
edly took place in Spanish territory,4 °1 so it is not clear why Clay would have
suggested otherwise. Based on his speech recorded in the Annals, Clay appears
to have argued that: (i) Jackson exceeded his authority because the charges
against the captives were not authorized by the Articles of War governing
courts-martial, approved by Congress;40 2 (ii) Congress had not authorized
retaliations to be made for Indian war crimes; and (iii) the executions violated
international law because foreigners joined to the armed forces of a recognized
national entity, as the Indian tribe was, were entitled to be treated as regular
prisoners of war, not outlaws. Therefore, because they were not sanctioned by
international law or Congress, Clay concluded that the executions violated the
right of every man "in this free country," "native or foreigner, citizen or alien,"
not to be executed "without two things being shown; 1st. That the law con-
demns him to death; and 2dly. That his death is pronounced by that tribunal
which is authorized by law to try him."'40 3 Although Clay did not appear to
argue that foreigners in Spanish territory had individual rights under the U.S.
Constitution, his remarks are ambiguous and could perhaps be construed that
way. Another critic of Jackson, Representative Henry Storrs of New York,
argued that the "proceedings [were] contrary to all those safeguards which the
municipal law has provided for the security of personal liberty,",40 4 but he
appears to have meant the procedures for courts-martial, not the Bill of Rights.
In contrast, several Congressmen stated during the debates that the Constitu-
tion and U.S. municipal law did not govern extraterritorial actions by the U.S.
government. °5 Representative Philip Barbour of Virginia agreed that the "ques-
398. See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 516-17 (1819).
399. See 2 JAMES PARTON, LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 533-34 (1885).
400. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 693 (1819) (statement of Rep. Smyth).
401. Id. (statement of Rep. Smyth).
402. Id. at 643-45 (statement of Rep. Clay).
403. Id. at 645 (statement of Rep. Clay).
404. Id. at 752 (statement of Rep. Storrs).
405. And several others implied as much, but in ambiguous language. See id. at 845-46 (statement
of Rep. Strother); id. at 852 (statement of Rep. Walker).
2007]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
tion must be settled according to the laws of war" because "the civil power has
no jurisdiction over it.' ' 4° 6 According to Smyth of Virginia:
It is alleged that these incidents, the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister,
are at variance with the principles of our Constitution and laws. Our Constitu-
tion and laws were formed for the people of the United States. They have no
force in Florida.... [The prisoners] never did tread on that portion of Ameri-
can ground where they could claim the benefit of our laws. Nor do those laws
protect enemies in time of war.
407
He concluded that international law, not municipal law, governed external
relations, stating that the President "may do beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States whatever the law of nations or treaties authorize the United States
there to do."4 °8 Representative Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania, later a Supreme
Court Justice, rejected the claim that "the Constitution and laws of the country"
had been violated because "neither have any bearing on the case of these men.
They were found and executed outside of the territorial limits of the United
States, where our laws or Constitution have no operation, except between us
and our own citizens, and where none other could claim their benefit and
protection., 40 9 Baldwin further explained that "the laws and usages of nations"
governed the trial of the Englishmen, not municipal law. 4 10
Ultimately, both the Committee of the Whole and the entire House voted
decisively not to condemn any of Jackson's actions.411 While these votes cannot
be considered a constitutional decision on the merits, the preceding debates
suggest that the dominant view was that constitutional rights were not available
to Ambrister and Arbuthnot in Florida but that international law governed
instead.
The Senate spent far less time on the matter than the House did. In February
1819, a Senate Select Committee issued a scathing report asserting that Jackson
had repeatedly exceeded his orders by attacking the Spanish authorities instead
406. Id. at 778 (statement of Rep. Barbour).
407. Id. at 693 (statement of Rep. Smyth).
408. Id. at 679 (statement of Rep. Smyth); id. at 684 (statement of Rep. Smyth) (contending that
Congress has no authority to legislate regarding territory of a foreign power, but that "[i]f treaties or the
law of nations give the United States a right to act within the territory of a foreign Power, in peace or
war, it is the Executive that must so act"); id. at 699 (statement of Rep. Smyth) ("Let us leave the
Executive to act with all its energy against foreign Powers, while we strongly restrain that branch from
acting against the people.").
409. Id. at 1042 (statement of Rep. Baldwin); id. (statement of Rep. Baldwin) ("These men were not
our citizens, not bound by our laws; they owed us no allegiance, and were entitled to no protection.");
id. at 1044 (statement of Rep. Baldwin) ("[Jackson] has violated no Constitutional provision. It was not
made to protect such men; they are no parties to it; owe it no obedience; and can claim no protection
from it.").
410. Id. at 1042 (statement of Rep. Baldwin).
411. See id. at 1132-36; WEEKs, supra note 393, at 160 ("Jackson (and the administration) stood
completely vindicated.").
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of confining himself to action against Indians and former slaves.41 2 Although
the Committee discussed at length how General Jackson had acted unconstitution-
ally by ignoring orders from his civilian superiors and purporting to begin war
with a foreign power without congressional authorization, the Committee did
not hint that Jackson's attacks on Indians, Spaniards, and the Englishmen aiding
the Indians somehow violated the constitutional rights of those persons, or that
the executions were improper.41 3 The full Senate took no action. 4 Jackson, in a
written defense, noted that the law of nations determined the legality of the
conduct of the English because the offenses "were committed by foreigners
beyond our own territorial limits and jurisdiction, [so] our municipal code
contained nothing by which to test the offense.' 5
D. GLOBALIST REJOINDERS
The viability of globalist originalism is called into question by this evidence
from the Quasi-War and Seminole War. Non-originalist globalism of the categori-
cal "mutuality" variety would have at least two serious responses to historical
evidence that constitutional rights were not thought to apply to French sailors
during the Quasi-War or English prisoners in Spanish Florida. First is that
globalism does not contend that individual constitutional rights apply during
active warfare, and therefore that evidence of the absence of such rights does
not undercut globalism. As Professor Neuman describes his theory, the Constitu-
tion does not impose a requirement of "due process of war"416 and "[iut cannot
be expected that the [U.S. Supreme] Court would insert constitutional standards
for treatment of foreign nationals into the disorder of an active war zone
overseas." 417 The second (non-originalist) globalist rejoinder to historical evi-
dence is that no one-neither U.S. citizens nor aliens-were thought to have
constitutional rights while abroad before the mid-twentieth century because of
the impact of the dogma of strict territoriality, and therefore evidence about the
French during the Quasi-War or the British in Florida cannot be said to show a
special rule about aliens.418
These responses raise important and difficult questions, but are ultimately not
entirely convincing. The first globalist rejoinder raises the question of how to
cabin "war" from everything else, such as law enforcement, covert intelligence
action, reprisals, ad hoc actions to protect U.S. citizens, "quasi-war," counter-
insurgency, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics operations, etc. While certain
412. See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 256-68 (1819).
413. See id. at 267-68.
414. See Sofaer, Executive Power, supra note 394, at 44 n.293.
415. Memorial from Major General Andrew Jackson to the Senate, in 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 2308,
2319 (1819); see also 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 516-17 (1819).
416. Neuman, Abiding, supra note 21, at 151 n.166 (citing NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 10, at
110-11).
417. Id. at 151.
418. See Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 21, at 45; Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 21,
at 912.
2007]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
extreme examples may be easy to distinguish, the huge middle ground is murky.
Globalists do not provide clarity when they argue that the U.S. military's
operations against aliens outside the United States in the current "war on terror"
are subject to constitutional rights constraints in some areas-for example, the
detention of alleged terrorist combatants4 9-even though this is an armed
conflict that many would agree satisfies modem de jure and de facto require-
ments for a state of war.
420
The force of the globalist distinction between war and everything else would
be increased by a conceptually coherent way to draw lines. Formal declaration
of war is a possible line, yet only five out of the several hundred uses of force
by the United States have been authorized by a declaration of war.421 Moreover,
application of the special legal regimes of armed conflict-such as alien enemy
status, belligerent rights of search, ability to use military tribunals, and the
like-did not, when the Constitution was ratified or thereafter, depend on a
formal declaration.
In addition, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, external military
action and law enforcement operations-which, as noted above, were governed
by international law, diplomacy, and policy judgments, not the Constitution-do
not appear to have always been neatly distinguished. In cases where Congress
enacted criminal statutes with extraterritorial reach, it sometimes explicitly
authorized the Executive, in its discretion, to use military force instead.422
Turning to a specific example, I am not aware of evidence that U.S. and allied
government operations against pirates in the Caribbean or Mediterranean in the
early nineteenth century were thought to be subject to the Bill of Rights. Yet the
United States had previously enacted applicable criminal statutes,4 23 and en-
419. See, e.g., Neuman, Abiding, supra note 21, at 151.
420. See, e.g., Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(recognizing that the 9/11 attacks presented "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States" and broadly authorizing the President to use military force in
response); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (appearing to recognize that the 9/11 attacks gave rise to the right to use
armed force in self-defense under the U.N. Charter); Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(Sept. 12, 2001) (noting that NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty in response to the 9/11 attacks,
designating them "armed attacks" that justify the use of "armed force" in response); see also Hamdan v
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) ("[W]e assume that the AUMF activated the President's war
powers." (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion))). See generally The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 669 (1863) (holding that a state of war can arise because of enemy
attacks even without a U.S. congressional declaration); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800)
(holding that Congress can authorize hostilities short of formal war yet still governed by laws of war).
421. See Yoo, supra note 46, at 177.
422. See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, §§ 1-2, 3 Stat. 510, 510-13; Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, § 7, 2
Stat. 426, 428; Neutrality Act, ch. 50, § 7, 1 Stat. 381, 384 (1794).
423. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113-14 (criminalizing piracy on the high
seas by "any person"); see also Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, § 3, 3 Stat. 600, 600 (same); id. § 4
(criminalizing actions taken to seize slaves "on any foreign shore" by U.S. citizens or by "any person
whatever" on a vessel "owned in whole or part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any citizen or citizens
of the United States").
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forced these statutes in domestic civilian court against captured pirates,424
meaning that U.S. military operations against pirates, deadly though they were
in purpose and effect, 5 were also law enforcement operations.426
Other external uses of the military were justified, at least in part, as law
enforcement measures, but were nevertheless thought to be governed by the law
of nations and U.S. policy interests, not municipal rules. In 1817, Amelia Island
in Spanish Florida was subdued by a U.S. naval force because "numerous
violations of our laws had been latterly committed by a combination of freeboo-
ters and smugglers of various nations. 427 A report of the House Committee on
Foreign Relations found that it had been a "duty" of the United States to stop
this activity, in order to secure commerce, stop attacks on neutral shipping, and
prevent violations of the United States' "revenue and prohibitory laws. 4 28 Even
though it had claimed to be advancing law enforcement-type interests, the U.S.
government asserted that the operation was justified under the law of nations.429
General Jackson's Seminole "war" was justified by President Monroe at least in
part as a law enforcement operation. The President stated that "hordes" of
Indians and "[a]dventurers from every country, fugitives from justice, and
absconding slaves," living in Spanish Florida, "have violated our laws prohibit-
ing the introduction of slaves, have practised various frauds on our revenue, and
committed every kind of outrage on our peaceable citizens, which their proxim-
ity to us enabled them to perpetrate., 430 Notwithstanding the law enforcement
purposes, President Monroe determined that the United States had been justified
424. In one action near Havana, in 1823, American navy and marines attacked pirates on land and on
their moored boat, killing many of them. See A Pirate Taken, BAIT. PATRIOT, Apr. 29, 1823, at 2. And
then they brought at least one of the captured pirates, a foreign national named Manuel Cartacho, to the
United States for civilian trial in federal court. See United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D.
Va. 1823) (No. 14,738); see also United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No.
15,204) (seized by British navy on coast of Africa); United States v. Smith, 27 F Cas. 1172 (D. Ga.
1820) (No. 16,339a) (seized by American naval cutter on the high seas); United States v. Tully, 28 F.
Cas. 226 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,545) (seized by government of St. Lucia on that island).
425. See BooT, supra note 352, at 41-45.
426. These lines are still blurry today. The United States invaded Panama in 1990 in part to enforce
U.S. municipal laws against President Manuel Noriega. See A Transcript of Bush's Address on the
Decision to Use Force in Panama, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 21, 1989, at A19. Noriega was captured and
prosecuted in a domestic civilian court. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D.
Fla. 1990). More recently, John Walker Lindh, the "American Taliban," was captured during U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and later prosecuted in a domestic civilian court. See United
States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545-47 (E.D. Va. 2002).
427. H.R. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on Suppression of Piratical Establishments (Jan. 10,
1818), in 4 AMERicAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 394, 133; see also Message of
President Monroe to Congress (Dec. 2, 1817), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 394, at 130 (stating that the people occupying Amelia Island had made it "a channel for the illicit
introduction of slaves from Africa into the United States, an asylum for fugitive slaves from the
neighboring States, and a port for smuggling of every kind").
428. H.R. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 427, at 133-34.
429. See SOFAER, supra note 46, at 377.
430. See, e.g., Message of President Monroe to Congress (Nov. 16, 1818), in 4 AMEmcAN STATE
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 394, at 214.
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in chasing them down in Florida "by the law of nations. '431
The second globalist response to historical evidence is also not entirely
convincing. Some globalists contend that no one-neither U.S. citizens nor
aliens-was thought to have constitutional rights while abroad before the
mid-twentieth century because of the impact of the dogma of strict territoriality,
and therefore evidence about the French during the Quasi-War or the British in
Florida cannot be said to show a special rule about aliens. As discussed above,
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal and political thought was undoubtedly
"territorial," but it did recognize extraterritorial legal relations between a state
and its citizens. More specifically, I have given five examples above that
suggest that the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law included individual constitu-
tional rights for American citizens.432 At a minimum, these examples are
evidence that citizenship was a very important variable in deciding whether
persons abroad had constitutional rights.
More historical research is needed on these and related topics; but this
preliminary review of early practice under the Constitution suggests that interna-
tional law, but not the Constitution, was thought to protect aliens abroad, and
that globalist critiques of the value of this evidence are not convincing.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This Article has endeavored to show that the textual evidence for globalism is
weak, and the historical evidence for globalist originalism is even weaker. The
claims of globalist originalism are not supported by specific historical evidence
beyond citations to natural rights ideas and the general phrasing of the Declara-
tion of Independence and the Bill of Rights. Given the large amount of primary
source material from the Founding era that is now available, the essentially
unsupported claims of globalist originalism do not meet minimal evidentiary
standards.
The failure of globalist originalism to prove its case need not undermine
globalist textualism. A globalist clear statement rule for reading the Bill of
Rights, with a default that rights are available to aliens abroad, could be
supported by something besides historical understandings. This Article has
argued, however, that as an intra-textual matter, the clear statement rule is not
especially consistent with the constitutional text. Globalism errs by reading the
provisions of the Bill of Rights in isolation from many other parts of the
431. See id. There are many other examples of U.S. military force being used extraterritorially for
law enforcement-type functions, including chasing down Mexican bandits, see Orders of Sec'y of War
to Gen. Sherman (June 1, 1877), in 2 MOORE, supra note 390, at 422, and punishing Pacific Islanders
and Nicaraguans in the 1830s-1850s for robberies and attacks on U.S. citizens, 2 MOORE, supra note
390, at 414-16; MEMORANDUM OF THE SoLicrroR FOR THE U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECrT
CmzENs IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES 55-57 (3d ed. 1934). Globalists have not presented
evidence that these or other non-war uses of external force were governed by municipal constitutional
rights.
432. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
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Constitution that inform its meaning, such as the Preamble, and the structures
for managing internal and external affairs created by Articles I, II, and IH.
There are of course other methods of interpreting the Constitution besides the
textual and historical approaches used in this Article. Globalist results could
follow from some other approaches, especially explicitly normative approaches
that privilege universal protection of human rights and significant restraints on
U.S. government power. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
noting that a doctrinal methodology based on Supreme Court precedent also
presents problems for globalists. Many Supreme Court cases seem inconsistent
with globalism generally or, at least, with arguments of certain globalists. For
example, Supreme Court cases suggest-albeit often in dicta or by implication-
that the government's war powers are subject to few rights-based limitations;433
that foreign relations and national defense are largely controlled by the political
branches, not the courts; 4 3 4 that many aspects of external relations are governed
by international law, not municipal law;4 35 that the Constitution allows sharp
distinctions to be drawn by the federal government between the rights of
citizens and aliens;4 36 and that the Constitution, or at least many important
constitutional rights, do not protect aliens outside the United States or those
seeking entry.437 All of this doctrine---even though it is not all internally
coherent and is often implied rather than stated, or stated in dicta-presents a
challenge for globalists who strive for a doctrinally-based constitutional theory
433. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990); United States v.
Caltex (Philippines) Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1953); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785
(1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934); United States v.
Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 308 (1909);
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901); Gates v. Goodloe,
101 U.S. 612, 617-19 (1879); New Orleans v. The S.S. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 394 (1874);
Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506 (1870); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268,
305 (1870); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 616-18 (1850).
434. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 944; Chicago & S.
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 302 (1918); Juragua Iron Co., 212 U.S. at 308; Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 305; Kennett v.
Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420
(1839); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511, 517 (1838) (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253
(1829)).
435. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Juragua Iron,
212 U.S. at 308; Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828); The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
382, 384 (1814).
436. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Zavydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948).
437. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
at 270-74; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950);
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 782-85; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937); Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. at 318; Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931); United States
ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904).
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that coheres "with less unsettled constitutional practices" and doctrines.4 38
In contrast to both globalism and to claims that aliens may lack any rights or
protections against the U.S. government, this Article has suggested a middle
road. This middle road recognizes that the Constitution was designed to secure
the liberties of Americans at home in part by giving the U.S. government a good
deal of freedom to act coercively against aliens abroad. My approach has
highlighted that aliens were intended beneficiaries of many constitutional provi-
sions and structures, and that the law of nations and treaties were seen as
potentially protective of aliens as against the national and state governments.
Reading the generally phrased provisions of the Bill of Rights to protect aliens
within43 9-but not without-the United States, and looking to international law,
diplomacy, and policy choices to protect aliens outside the United States is,
then, more consistent with constitutional text and history than is globalism.
In addition to being broadly consistent with the constitutional text, history,
and arguably a decent amount of Supreme Court doctrine, my reading of the
Constitution explains the apparent anomaly mentioned at the beginning of this
Article: if location does not matter where the rights of U.S. citizens are
concerned (they have full constitutional rights both here and abroad), and if
alienage matters little within the United States (aliens have most of the same
constitutional rights as citizens when they are in the United States), why then do
alienage and location combine to place aliens abroad wholly outside the protec-
tions of the Constitution? This Article shows that it is not anomalous or
unprincipled to read the Constitution as protecting people within the United
States but not aliens abroad. And notwithstanding globalist claims that declin-
ing to apply the Constitution to protect aliens abroad will leave them entirely
defenseless against American power, this Article has suggested that aliens
abroad were understood to be protected by international law, diplomacy, and
policy set by Congress and the President.
438. NEumAN, STRANEis, supra note 10, at 98. My theory may also help account for the doctrine of
territorial incorporation, developed by the Supreme Court in the so-called Insular Cases and cases
involving settled territories within the United States that had been designated for eventual statehood.
See supra note 11. Under this theory, residents in territories that Congress has decided will eventually
become states of the Union are entitled to the full complement of constitutional rights, unlike residents
of territories that will not be incorporated. See, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,
304-06 (1922). This theory seems more generally consistent with my reading of the Constitution (rights
available to citizens and aliens within the United States, but only citizens without) than with the many
forms of globalism which reject territorial-based limits on the application of constitutional rights and
see the judiciary rather than the political branches as the primary decision-maker.
439. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending the notion that the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are "universal in their application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality" to the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); accord Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976) (stating that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect "aliens within the jurisdiction of the
United States").
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